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Abstract  
This thesis investigated intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories (IFAMs), 
memories deliberately created to be false.  The first aim of the thesis was to 
understand the processes underlying IFAM generation.  Secondly, the thesis 
examined beliefs held by the public about autobiographical memory (AM) and about 
lying, in an attempt to clarify current levels of knowledge.  The third aim was to 
understand how AMs and IFAMs of staged events were reported, and to identify 
characteristics that could distinguish AMs from IFAMs.  In particular, the work aimed 
to understand if entirely fabricated everyday memories differed from partially 
fabricated everyday and emotional memories.  Finally, this thesis examined the effect 
that repeatedly providing an IFAM of an experienced event had on the ability to 
subsequently recall the original AM.  AMs and IFAMs were elicited using cue word 
and staged event techniques.  Participants were either asked to type their memories 
into a computer or were interviewed using structured questioning.  Data regarding 
beliefs about memory and lying were gathered using questionnaires.  Results 
revealed that IFAMs are frequently generated by firstly recalling a truthful AM which 
is then ‘edited’ to create a novel mental representation.  The generation of an IFAM 
was therefore found to be reliably more cognitively effortful than the generation of 
an AM.  Results also identified a number of erroneous and inconsistent beliefs about 
the nature of memory and of lying.  Additionally, results showed that a number of 
characteristics could reliably identify AMs and entire IFAMs of everyday events.  
However, the number of characteristics was reliably reduced when AMs and partial 
IFAMs of everyday events were compared.  Most strikingly, no characteristics were 
found that could reliably distinguish AMs from IFAMs of emotional events.  Finally, 
results revealed that repeatedly providing an IFAM of a staged event reliably impaired 
the individual’s ability to then recall the original AM.  
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Chapter One 
1 Literature Review 
The purpose of this work is to investigate truthful and intentionally fabricated 
autobiographical memories (AMs and IFAMs).  In particular, this work aims to 
understand the processes and beliefs that underlie the construction of these 
memories.  Additionally, it aims to identify characteristics that may allow AMs and 
IFAMs to be distinguished from one another.  Particularly, the work aims to contrast 
entirely and partially fabricated memories of both neutral and more emotional events 
to see if distinguishable characteristics remain consistent across memory types.  
Finally, the work aims to investigate the affect providing an IFAM has on the 
subsequent ability to recall the original AM.  Memories will be elicited using both cue 
word and staged event methodologies.  Gaining an insight into both these memories 
will provide additional theoretical knowledge to an under-researched area of 
autobiographical memory.  Further, it is hoped that this work will feed into more 
applied situations in which an understanding of fabricated memory is essential, such 
as police interviews and testimony in court where often, memory is the only 
evidence. 
This chapter will provide a background to both truthful and fabricated 
autobiographical memory, exploring empirical and theoretical work.  It will begin by 
detailing autobiographical memory, its definition, its purpose, how it is stored and 
retrieved and its characteristics.  It will then discuss varieties of false memories, and 
identify ways in which truthful autobiographical memories can become, unknowingly, 
distorted and altered.  Finally, it will discuss a further variety of false memory, 
intentionally fabricated memories, those central to this thesis.  These will be defined, 
compared and contrasted with other types of deception, and tools that have 
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attempted to distinguish truthful from deceptive memories will be evaluated.  
Previous research, although limited, will be also discussed.   
1.1 Autobiographical memory  
Autobiographical memory is a system that contains memories of past personal 
experiences.  These memories are mental representations of an original sensory 
experience and contain sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective information 
(Conway, 2009) of the original event and through evaluation of this information come 
concepts and beliefs regarding others, the self and the external world.  The system 
works to fulfil short- and long-term personal goals and together, provides the 
individual with a sense of self and a personal life narrative.  Therefore, inherent to the 
process of remembering is a remembering self: an individual must possess the ability 
to distinguish autobiographical knowledge from other forms of mental 
representations insofar that autobiographical knowledge relates to the rememberer’s 
personal past.   
In addition to an ability to recognise our personal past as our own, what is also 
required for autobiographical remembering is a sense of self.  The self is a construct 
that represents our goals, achievements, self-beliefs and self-images (Conway, 2005) 
and evolves over the lifetime (McAdams, 2001).  It also has a reciprocal relationship 
with memory as it both constructs and constrains the recall process (Conway, 2005).  
For example, primary information that is encoded, stored and retrieved is done so to 
satisfy the current sense of self, in other words, material is only remembered and 
recalled if it is consistent with the self at the time.  Further, beliefs and knowledge 
concerning the self exist within the autobiographical system (Conway, 2005).  
Autobiographical memory is therefore unique when considering other forms of 
memory as it is inherently related to the self (Tulving, 2002).    
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The necessity of the self in autobiographical memory can be seen clearly within three 
dimensions provided by Brewer (1986).  These dimensions serve to distinguish 
autobiographical remembering from other forms of mental representations: memory 
acquisition: single or multiple instances; category of mental representation: visual or 
non-visual and content: self or depersonalised.  An autobiographical memory is an 
image-based mental representation of a singly experienced event regarding the self, 
for example “going for a jog this morning”.  The non-visual counterpart of this 
memory, knowing that I went for a jog this morning, is considered the 
autobiographical fact.  Further, a memory may contain visual images, but form a 
representation of multiple instances of an event occurring, for example, my general 
memory of going for a jog in the morning.  The non-visual counterpart of this memory 
type represents more general personal knowledge, for example, “I like to keep 
healthy and hence go for a jog each morning.”  Here the integration of the self into 
the memory representation of a singly experienced event can be seen as a necessary 
component to autobiographical remembering.   
1.1.1 Functions 
Having provided an outline of what constitutes an autobiographical memory, it is now 
important to ask what function does it serve?  What use does recalling, reflecting and 
sharing our memories provide?  Bluck and Alea (2002) suggest three broad functions 
of autobiographical memory: directive, self-representative and communicative.  A 
fourth category, adaptive functioning, has been proposed by Williams, Conway and 
Cohen (2008).   
Directive functioning allows us to access the past to solve problems and predict 
future events (Baddeley, 1987, Lockhart, 1989).  Positive and negative aspects of past 
personal memories can be used to create schematic models of behaviour, which can 
then be applied to present or future situations to provide a way of dealing with a 
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challenge or problem (Pillemer, 2003).  The self-representative function of 
autobiographical memory allows a coherent sense of self to be created over time 
(Barclay, 1996; Conway, 1996).  The past can be reflected upon, and its evaluation can 
be built into the self-image (Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005).  Autobiographical 
memory is also said to serve a social function insofar that reminiscing provides 
material for conversation and in turn facilitates social interaction (Cohen, 1998).  
Sharing autobiographical memories may provide a platform for interpersonal 
integration, allowing listeners and speakers to engage, understand and empathise 
with each other (Cohen, 1998).  Pillemer (2003) suggests this function is particularly 
strengthened when listeners respond with a memory of a similar experience.  Social 
bonding can be further facilitated by sharing memories with an individual who was 
not present at an original event, by the providing of details about an event and the 
self (Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996).  Indeed, Bluck et al. (2005) proposed that the 
social function of autobiographical memory contains two broad sub-functions: to 
develop new and nurture existing relationships.  Finally, autobiographical memory is 
said to have an adaptive function in that it allows us to maintain favourable and 
modify unfavourable moods (Williams et al., 2008) through the recall of positive 
memories.  This regulation of emotion is thought to create a coping mechanism to 
help deal with negative emotions and in turn, increase resilience (Williams et al., 
2008).  
1.1.2 Storage and construction 
The above discussion has provided an understanding of what defines an 
autobiographical memory and what components are necessary for one to exist.  Next, 
it is important to understand how autobiographical memories are stored and 
constructed.  The prevailing theory of the construction of autobiographical memory is 
the Self-Memory System (SMS) (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005).    
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The SMS is an amalgamation of theoretical considerations from a number of areas of 
psychology, including cognitive, clinical and neuropsychological autobiographical 
memory research (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and is primarily concerned with 
the experiencing rather than the remembering self (Conway, 2005).  Broadly, the SMS 
comprises two main components: the working self and the autobiographical 
knowledge base.  The former consists of goals arranged hierarchically, and serves to 
represent the self in the past, the future and the present.  The latter contains general 
autobiographical information.  This too is arranged hierarchically, with information 
ranging from general knowledge and themes about one’s life, for example knowing 
where one was born or what high school was attended to more specific information 
such as people involved with particular life themes.  The autobiographical knowledge 
base allows for one further level of specificity as it also stores sensory-perceptual-
conceptual-affective knowledge.  It is important to note here that for Conway, 
episodic memories (discussed in section 1.1.3) are somewhat reconsidered as 
reflecting episodic content of autobiographical memory.  Therefore, for Conway, it is 
within the highly specific realm of the autobiographical knowledge base that episodic 
knowledge is stored.   
The system works through an interaction between the autobiographical knowledge 
base and the working self insofar that the working self mediates access to the 
autobiographical knowledge base, allowing access only to mental representations 
relevant to the current sense of self (Conway, 2005).  Retrieval is then commenced, as 
it accesses life themes, general event knowledge and probes sensory-perceptual-
conceptual-affective knowledge until a temporary representation is generated in 
working memory (Conway, 1996).  If a satisfactory representation is not generated, a 
new cycle of retrieval will begin.  In this way then retrieval is considered cyclical.  It is 
because of cyclical retrieval that autobiographical memories are considered dynamic 
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and transitory (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), being constructed anew each time 
the working self probes the autobiographical knowledge base.   
Due to the interaction between autobiographical knowledge base and the working 
self, the cyclical nature of consciously accessing and recalling memories is relatively 
effortful, as compared to the relatively instantaneous access of semantic knowledge 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Haque & Conway, 2001).   
1.1.3 Episodic Memory 
This review will now turn to describing episodic memories (EMs), which, as shown in 
the above description of the SMS, are thought to reflect specific sensory-perceptual-
conceptual-affective knowledge within the autobiographical knowledge base 
(Conway, 2009).  EMs are distinct from other forms of mental representation since 
they allow the individual to access highly specific memories from a particular time 
frame (Conway, 2009).   
Table 1.1. Nine properties of episodic memory (Conway, 2009) 
Properties of episodic memory 
Contain summary records of sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective processing. 
Retain patterns of activation/inhibition over long periods. 
Often represented in the form of (visual) images. 
Always have a perspective (ﬁeld or observer). 
Represent short time slices of experience. 
Are represented on a temporal dimension roughly in order of occurrence. 
Are subject to rapid forgetting. 
Make autobiographical remembering speciﬁc. 
Are recollectively experienced when accessed. 
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Conway (2009) proposed nine features (see Table 1.1), that, when occurring 
collectively, define and distinguish EMs.  This review will briefly discuss each of these 
properties.   
1.1.3.1  Summary Records  
As previously discussed, EMs are records of sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective 
processing that renders them dynamic representations of an experienced event.  
However, this understanding must be viewed with caution.  Firstly, the EM may not 
accurately reflect an experience insofar that we may make errors regarding the 
details of the event.  For example, we may incorrectly recall the colour of a blue car 
as green.  However, Conway (2009) suggests that in fact, many of the sensory-
perceptual-conceptual-affective details may in fact closely correspond with actual 
experience.  These detailed, dynamic features can cause EMs to appear extremely 
vivid, allowing an individual to mentally relive an experience (Conway, 2009).  
However, a second caution should be taken here since EM can contain highly specific 
detail which did not in fact occur or which have migrated from another mental 
representation, in the case of false memories (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; see also 
section 1.2 for review of false memories).   
1.1.3.2  Activation and Inhibition 
This feature refers to the process whereby detail in EM can be accessed differently 
through conceptual, non-episodic recall (Conway, 2009).  For example, an item can be 
inhibited when an attempt at access is made through normal EM retrieval.  However 
this same detail, when an attempt at access is made through more general processes 
of retrieval, is successfully recalled.  This unusual pattern of activation is referred to 
as episodic inhibition and is thought the mediate EM content, allowing it to provide 
the rememberer with a representation of an event, rather than a literal copy in order 
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to satisfy the primary need of the working memory: goal processing (Williams, 
Conway, Baddeley, 2008). 
1.1.3.3  Visual imagery and visual perspective 
As discussed in section 1.1.5, memories are often accompanied by recollective 
qualities (Brewer, 1996) including visual imagery, which is in turn always viewed 
through a particular perspective – either a field (whereby a memory is experienced as 
representing its original viewpoint, through one’s own eyes) or observer perspective 
(whereby the individual sees themselves acting in the memory) (Nigro & Neisser, 
1983).  For Conway (2009) both visual imagery and the perspective from which it is 
viewed are essential features for the classification and definition of EM.   
1.1.3.4 Short Time Slices 
EMs are represented in short time frames.  Research suggests that these time frames 
begin with information regarding actions and end with facts and details regarding 
these actions (Williams, et al., 2008).  However, little is known about what constitutes 
these episodic boundaries.  Despite a lack of knowledge regarding the definitive 
formulation of episodic boundaries, it has been proposed that EMs are structured in 
such short time frames to again promote the goal driven autobiographical memory 
system (Conway, 2009; Tulving, 2002). 
1.1.3.5 Temporal Order 
Conway (2009) suggests that EMs are usually represented in the same temporal order 
as when they were originally experienced.  This temporal order places the EM within 
a time system that allows it to be anticipated (prior to its occurrence) and reflected 
upon (following its occurrence).  Although the standard representation of an EM is in 
experience-corresponding temporal order, EMs can be consciously recalled in a 
number of temporal orders (backwards, starting from a mid-point).  Indeed, this 
ability to alter the temporality of an EM has been utilised both by those attempting to 
increase the amount of (accurate) detail of a remembered event, in the Cognitive 
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Interview, for instance (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010) and for those attempting to detect 
deceit (Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2006), since it is assumed that conscious altering 
of the temporal order will require an increased cognitive effort.  
Further, the temporal nature of EMs allows the individual to project themselves both 
into the future, in order to anticipate and plan for future events, and into the past, 
allowing for evaluation and rumination of an alternative history.  This ability, 
described by Tulving (2002) as “mental time travel”, has received much attention in 
recent years, with particular focus falling on our ability to conceive the future (Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Newby-Clark & Ross, 
2003; Schacter & Addis, 2009; Szpunar & McDermott, 2008).  However, only a handful 
of studies have investigated our ability to create fictitious past events (Conway, 
Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross & Sharpe, 2003).  Mental time travel is considered in 
more detail in section 1.1.4 below.   
1.1.3.6 Endurance 
Research has shown that as retention intervals increase, so does the difficulty in 
accessing many EMs (Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, & Eustache, 
2002).  However, this is not to suggest that EM is entirely forgotten after a period of 
retention.  Indeed, many life-logging studies have shown that after recognition tests 
(often using images of daily events taken from a camera worn around the neck) that 
many EMs, otherwise considered forgotten, can be retrieved (Hodges et al., 2006; 
Sellen et al., 2007).  In this way then EMs may be reconsidered as enduring mental 
representations, whose recall is often dependent on external recollective measures 
(Conway, 2009).   
1.1.3.7 Specifying Autobiographical Memory  
EMs lie at the foundation of the autobiographical knowledge base, providing the 
most specific detail when specific autobiographical memories are accessed.  Thus, 
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they allow detail to be accessed in the retrieval cycle of autobiographical memory.  
This specificity attributed to EMs is again assumed to help promote and facilitate the 
goal-oriented working self (Conway, 2009).  Specific episodic information allows for 
an adaptive system that draws on previous experience to influence and inform goal-
driven decisions and actions in both the present and the future (Conway, 2009).   
1.1.3.8 Recollective Experience 
It is the specific sensory-perceptual-conceptual-affective knowledge within EM that 
allow a past experience to be mentally relived.  These details may give rise to a highly 
specific and detailed memory, allowing the individual to recall what was seen, who 
was present, what emotions were felt etc. (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008).  
These details are essential to EM as they allow the rememberer to have a sense of 
past self (Klein, 2001) and provide a means of distinction from other forms of mental 
representations such as dreams and beliefs (see section 1.3.9.1) (Johnson, Hashtroudi 
& Lindsay, 1993).  Essentially then, these details allow us to mentally relive the event 
(Tulving & Kim, 2007).   
1.1.4 Mental Time Travel 
As discussed above, an essential mechanism involved with episodic remembering is 
temporality.  Not only does this ability allow the individual to place the specific 
memory in time, allowing for its anticipation and evaluation within the memory 
system (Schacter, 1999; 2009), but also allows an individual to imagine feasible future 
scenarios  – termed “mental time travel” (Tulving, 2002).  Indeed, the connection 
between memory and imagination has been shown to be so strong, that the memory 
system has been somewhat reconceptualised as a remembering-imagining system 
(Conway, 2009). 
Tulving (1985, 2002) originally suggested that the ability to imagine the future was 
necessarily dependent on access to information in long-term memory.  This 
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hypothesis has been rigorously and dynamically investigated within a number of 
disciplines.  Studies of brain-injured patients (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & Maguire, 
2007; Tulving, 1985)  showed that damage to brain regions involved with episodic 
memory generation (medial temporal, frontal lobes, hippocampus) rendered 
individuals unable to imagine future events and recall past events.   Further, more 
recent neuroimaging research has revealed that imagining both future and past 
events activates a large number of common neural regions, regions which have 
previously found to be associated with mediating memory retrieval (Addis, Wong, & 
Schacter, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran & Maguire, 2007, Conway et al., 2003).  Memory 
of past events and fictitious future events has also been found to be related in many 
of their recollective qualities (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008). 
1.1.5 Phenomenology of Memory 
Now that a definition, an outline and understanding of the construction processes 
and varieties of autobiographical memories have been provided, it is important to 
understand how memories are distinguished from other forms of mental 
representations, such as imagining or dreaming.  Essentially, the feelings associated 
with recall allow us to make distinctions between ourselves in the past and in the 
present – our remembering and experiencing selves (Tulving, 2002; Windhorst, 2008).  
Despite many researchers now investigating the phenomenology of memory 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2008; Marche, Brainerd & Reyna, 2010, 
Tulving, 2002) the behaviourist turn in psychology rendered introspection and other 
unobservable forms of measurement redundant for investigation. 
However, phenomenological enquiry has a rich background with its foundations 
rooted within philosophy.  For philosophers, qualia represent the experiences or felt 
nature of mental states (Larsen, 1998), with famous examples including the 
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perception of the redness of red (Brentano, 1995) and subjective experiences of pain 
(Wittgenstein, 1953).  However, philosophers reserve particular qualia for the act of 
remembering.  Indeed, early introspection studies (Boring, Langfield and Weld, 1939) 
considered memory to be less detailed, less stable, less clear, less intense and less 
vivid than perception (Larsen, 1998).  Initial experimental work on the subject within 
psychology (Brewer, 1988; Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988) supported 
philosophical thought and introspection studies by showing that mental imagery 
frequently accompanied memories, indeed, Brewer (1996) showed that close to 100% 
of memories are associated with mental imagery.  Due to this reciprocal relationship 
between memory and image, researchers (e.g. Brewer, 1996) have strongly 
advocated the tandem study of memory performance in terms of its behavioural 
functioning and its associated recollective experience, or autonoesis (Tulving, 2002).   
Due to the ubiquitous nature of mental imagery, it has undergone strategic 
investigation.  For example, Freud (1915) first identified that memories may not 
always represent a copy of an original experience since they were often viewed 
through a third person perspective and hence edited in some way that did not reflect 
their original viewpoint.  This observation has been replicated repeatedly in 
psychology, leading to categorisation of “field” and “observer” memories (Nigro & 
Neisser, 1983).  Field perspective represents that memory imagery viewed as the 
event would have been experienced initially – through one’s own eyes; often referred 
to as “shoulder camera” perspective (Vrij et al., 2010).  Observer memories however 
represent a “third person” perspective, with this perspective often including the 
rememberer in the image.  Interestingly, perspective has shown to influence further 
the recollective experience associated with a memory, for example (Libby & Eibach, 
2002) showed that field perspective memories usually carried more vivid mental 
imagery and (Robinson & Swanson, 1993) found that older memories were recalled 
22 
 
less frequently with a field perspective.  Further, Libby, Eibach & Gilovich, (2005) 
noted that an observer perspective is often taken when a memory is incompatible 
with a current self-image.  It may be then that those memories of our pasts represent 
dissonance between past and present selves, which is in turn represented visually. 
In addition to the perspective through which the mental imagery of a memory is 
viewed, Brewer (1996) also noted how recollective images also contain superfluous 
information that was not necessarily pertinent to the remembered event, such as the 
clothes one was wearing (if they were not central to the remembered event).  He 
termed this information irrelevant detail.  Initially, this irrelevant detail was assumed 
to be an feature of remembering relevant only to flashbulb memories – a subset of 
memories once believed to be highly accurate, vivid and particularly resistant to 
forgetting (Brown & Kulik, 1977).  However, this finding has been refuted through 
work on ordinary or “everyday” memories which were also found to contain many 
irrelevant details, with much work now assessing detail in accounts (Levine et al., 
2002; Palladino & De Beni, 2003). 
Further, it has been noted that in addition to visual imagery, thought as being central 
to memory by philosophers, memory also contains “occurrent thoughts and felt 
affects” (Brewer, 1986, p. 34).  The argument proposed by Brewer here is that 
emotions may not be successfully represented in image form and may therefore 
require supplementary analysis.  This has indeed been the case with emotions 
accompanying memory receiving a great deal of attention over the past few decades 
(Christianson & Safer, 1996; Holland & Kensinger, 2010; Porter & Birt, 2001).  
However, it is important to note here that although emotion associated with a 
memory may be qualitatively different from emotion associated with experience, it is 
unlikely to remain constant over time, particularly as our comprehension of ourselves 
in the past changes (Windhorst, 2008).  Therefore, unlike visual imagery that can be 
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considered as representing the memory itself, emotion can be thought to arise from 
the evaluation of the content of the memory, rather than being an attribute to which 
it is fixed (Windhorst, 2008).  
Therefore, investigation regarding the nature of phenomenology associated with 
memory leads to two clear conclusions: firstly, that accompanying visual imagery 
should be investigated in a multi-faceted way – allowing all features such as 
perspective and detail to be examined.  Secondly, that emotion associated with recall 
should be investigated with caution since it may represent present feelings about the 
self in the past, rather than the actual feelings experienced at the time of encoding.  
Although research shows that mental images are pervasive when remembering, it is 
important to understand whether mental images are necessary for remembering to 
occur.  Is it possible to remember without mental imagery?  Tulving (2002) claimed 
“no autonoesis, no mental time travel”.  For Tulving (1985) then, autonoesis was 
essential to memory to allow distinction from other forms of awareness including 
thinking, imagining and dreaming.  Conway (2009) considers sensory-perceptual-
conceptual-affective processing to be fundamental for the classification of episodic 
memory.  It seems then that this mental imagery is not simply an artefact of an 
experienced event, but is functional in that it allows cognitive distinctions to be made 
regarding the experiencing and remembering self  (Windhorst, 2008).   
The question however can be reversed: can recollective qualities exist without an 
original sensory experience?  As was shown earlier in section 1.1.5, a memory can 
exist without any causal link to the original sensory experience insofar that a memory 
can consist solely of phenomenological representations of an original event 
(Windhorst, 2008).  In addition, recollective experience has been shown to occur 
when an original experience is entirely lacking (Windhorst, 2008) – i.e. in the case of 
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false memory (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Marche et al., 2010) and when projecting 
oneself into the future (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 2008; McGinnis & 
Roberts, 1996). 
1.2 Varieties of False Memories 
The current view of memory represents a system that is constructive in nature; 
memories are not verbatim reproductions of an experienced event but are instead 
the recombination of information from various sources (e.g. perceptual, contextual, 
episodic).  Essentially then, memories are created anew each time they are recalled 
and represent the amalgamation of disparate information sources (Addis et al., 2007; 
Conway, 2005).  A consequence of this reproductive system is that it renders 
memories particularly susceptible to errors and distortions (Bell & Loftus, 1989; 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Loftus, 1993; Roediger & 
Mcdermott, 1995; Schacter, 1999; 2009).  
1.2.1 Coherence and Correspondence  
Memory errors can occur in a variety of ways, from internal processes such as 
forgetting information in the long-term store, to processes that involve some kind of 
external influence, such as leading or suggestive questioning (Schacter, 1999; 2009).  
For Conway (2005) all memories fall between the two dimensions of correspondence 
(with a fact) and coherence (of propositions).  Coherence refers to the way in which 
memories are altered, both in terms of their accessibility and content, to make them 
more consistent with current goals, self-images and beliefs.  Therefore, the self and 
the memory system form a cohesive unit that serves to propagate current self-views 
by accessing specific confirmatory memories.  For example, Krans, Näring, Becker, & 
Holmes (2009) found that intrusive trauma memories failed to be incorporated into 
the autobiographical knowledge base due to necessary altering of goal structures.  
Changes to these structures come at high emotional and cognitive costs and are 
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avoided to protect current self-coherence (Krans et al., 2009).  Indeed, as noted in 
section 1.1.1, a key feature of autobiographical remembering is to provide a coherent 
sense of self over time (Bluck et al., 2005).  Therefore, the memory system will favour 
memories that confirm the current self-image.   
Alternatively, on the converse end of the spectrum lies correspondence.  
Correspondence posits that memory should accurately reflect an experienced event.  
However, a memory system that corresponded literally with experience would 
contain overwhelming detail, posing problems for both storage and retrieval 
(Conway, 2005).  Therefore, the memory system must fulfil not only the need to 
provide an accurate record, but also a sufficient, but not superfluous, amount of 
detail.  Conway, Meares, & Standart (2004) suggest that the memory system achieves 
this through “adaptive coherence”, a suitable level of detail retention.  For many 
memories what may be recalled is the “gist” of an experience (Bartlett, 1932; Koriat, 
Goldsmith, & Pansky, 2000).  Indeed, individuals are able to recall some events 
without any recollection of original details at all, as is evidenced in Brewer’s (1986) 
classification of autobiographical memory (see section 1.1).  Conway (2005) argues 
that all memories lie somewhere between the reaches of correspondence and 
coherence.  Therefore, the view taken in this thesis is that for a rememberer, a true 
memory may not necessarily be one that corresponds with experience but what is 
important is that is it believed to be true insofar that is it coherent with existing self-
representations (Conway, 2005).   
1.2.2 Distortion of Memories 
Further, specific memory errors may occur during the processes of encoding, storage 
and retrieval that will ultimately determine a memory’s place along the 
correspondence-coherence spectrum.   Schacter (1999; 2001) and Schacter, Chiao, & 
Mitchell (2003) categorise all memory errors into three broad groups: errors of 
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forgetting, distortion and persistence.  Here, we are interested in those errors of 
distortion (misattribution, suggestibility and bias) – whereby memories are recalled 
i.e. not forgotten, but may be recalled incorrectly – in other words, those errors that 
place memories between correspondence and coherence.   
1.2.3 Errors of Misattribution 
Source judgements represent an attempt by an individual to understand the origins 
of a memory (Johnson et al., 1993), with errors of source monitoring occurring when 
an individual misattributes information not grounded in memory to their own 
personal experience (Johnson & Raye, 1981).   
Two general errors are thought to occur: external errors that refer to errors in 
attribution i.e. misremembering where an individual was when her/she saw an event 
occur and errors of internal judgements that represent an inability to differentiate 
between experience and imagination – also known as reality monitoring errors 
(Schacter, 1999; 2009).  Johnson & Raye (1981) proposed a metamemory framework 
that showed how the process of identifying real and false memories occurs.  Broadly, 
these decisions are governed by two strategies: heuristic strategies that involve 
assessment of content and appearance of a memory – including its recollective 
characteristics and comparative strategies that evaluate the information with regards 
to other memories, logical rules and general knowledge (Larsen, 1998).   
Although these judgements allow for an introspective evaluation of memory, they do 
not necessarily give rise to accurate judgements.  Indeed, failure to adequately assess 
the content of a memory would place the resulting false memory under the error of 
coherence – the memory fails to cohere to the experienced event.  Importantly 
though, assessing source and reality monitoring judgments allows the researcher to 
delve into the subjective assessment of individual mental processes that lie behind 
the act of remembering, which without such categorisation, would remain unseen.   
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1.2.4 Errors of Suggestibility 
1.2.4.1 External Post-Event Information 
Another memory error that also results in an error of coherence is that of 
suggestibility.  For Schacter et al. (2003) this refers to the fact that some memories 
may be entirely of partially implanted, often through leading or suggestive 
questioning; these kinds of errors can be considered as being generated from 
external post-event information (Pezdek, Lam, & Sperry, 2009).  For example, a 
neutral question may ask: “what did you see?”, or more specifically “did you see any 
knives?”, however a leading question may ask “you saw the knives, didn’t you?” with 
a suggestive question asking “how many knives did you see?”  These types of non-
neutral questions can lead an individual to incorporate detail and events into their 
memory that were not part of the original experience and may be posed in formal 
interview settings, but also may occur when discussing memories informally.   
The issue of suggestibility has been made particularly prominent through recent 
series of “recovered childhood memories”, whereby childhood abuse (usually sexual) 
is recovered by an adult rememberer.  These types of memories are often recovered 
in therapy, however many researchers suggest that the likelihood of such memories 
having actually occurred is low, suggesting that vulnerable people often come to 
believe such memories through suggestive therapy (Williams et al., 2008).   
Indeed, to show the ease at which the memories can come to be believed, highly 
emotional memories have been implanted within laboratory settings.  Classic studies 
by Loftus (Loftus, 1997) see approximately a third of participants coming to believe, 
by recalling and embellishing memories of childhood events that never in fact 
occurred.  Memories that have been implanted range from being lost in a shopping 
centre, to a violent dog attack (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995).  However, limits do exist on 
the amount of information individuals can come to believe (Polage, 2004).  For 
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example, Pezdek & Roe (1994) showed that children would not come to believe that 
they had been abused when they had not and conversely, that they would not believe 
that they had not been abused when indeed they had.  Further, obvious changes in 
details made in studies by Loftus (1979) were frequently rejected.  Therefore, 
although memories can be altered and affected by externally generated information, 
often individuals are able to reject and are subsequently resistant to incorporating, in 
particular highly unusual, externally generated information into memory.   
1.2.4.2 Internal Post-Event Information  
In addition to externally derived post-event information, errors in memory can also 
occur from what can be considered internally-, or self -generated (Pezdek et al., 2009) 
post-event information.  Information that can be considered self-generated can 
include guessing (Hastie, Landsman, & Loftus, 1978), invited speculation (Schreiber, 
Wentura, & Bilsky, 2001), forced confabulation (Pezdek et al., 2009; Zaragoza, 
Payment, Ackil, Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001), and forced fabrication (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 
2008).  Results from all above studies have shown that internally generated post-
event information can have negative consequences for memory, including 
incorporation of false details into memory, causing a failure in reality monitoring – 
whereby the self-generated information is mistakenly attributed to original 
experience (Johnson & Raye, 1981).  Reality monitoring describes a process whereby 
an individual is able to reject non-experienced information as false using 
discrimination processes involving assessment of spatial, temporal, etc. information 
(see 1.3.9.1).  Those memories that have originated from experience contain more of 
these details and can therefore be categorised upon assessment of their inclusion in 
the memory image/description (Johnson & Raye, 1981).  However, when individuals 
are encouraged to imagine or confabulate spatial, temporal etc. details, classification 
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of experienced and imagined memories can prove particularly difficult (Johnson et al., 
1993; Polage, 2004). 
However, self-generated information is generally incorporated into memory to a 
lesser extent than that of externally- or other- generated post-event information 
(Gombos, Pezdek, & Haymond, 2012; Pezdek et al., 2009).  It is suggested that self-
generated information is less likely to be incorporated into memory than externally-
generated information due to a process of recollect-to-reject  (Brainerd, Reyna, 
Wright & Mojardin, 2003; Pezdek et al., 2009).  This process suggests that internally 
generated items are successfully rejected as they are remembered as being 
deliberately generated, and thus are reasoned not to have originated in experience.  
Despite the lower rate of information incorporated from internally- rather than 
externally – generated post-event information, guessing, speculation, confabulation 
and forced fabrication can still negatively impact upon memories, causing distortion 
of truth and resulting in the generation of false memories (or at least true memories 
containing false details).  This is a particularly important issue for police interviews 
whereby interviewees may be encouraged to answer all questions posed to them, or 
for when individuals are urged to imagine traumatic or stressful events (Pezdek et al., 
2009).   
However, a further type of self-generated post-event information that has received 
little interest in the literature is that of deliberately fabricated information.  To my 
knowledge, only a very small number of studies have investigated the effects of lying 
on memory.  Maio & Olson (1995) showed that expressing false attitudes or feigning 
to hold attitudes one knows not to be true strengthens the corresponding truthful 
attitude (Polage, 2004).  This is thought to occur since the truthful belief is initially 
accessed and subsequently denied, and in turn, is reinforced.  More recently, Polage 
(2004) investigated how lying about a childhood event could affect the belief that the 
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event actually occurred.  Participants rated events on the Life Events Inventory (LEI) 
e.g. “were you caught sneaking out of the house”, from very unlikely to extremely 
likely to have occurred in their life.  Two weeks later, participants who rated at least 
two items as low on the likelihood scale were asked to give false information, through 
an interview about one of the events they previously rated as unlikely to have 
occurred in their life.  Either immediately, two weeks or five weeks later, participants 
completed the LEI again, truthfully re-rating their belief in the likelihood of all events 
having occurred.  Results showed that in all delay conditions, for the majority of 
participants, lying about an event decreased the subsequent likelihood rating – after 
lying participants became more convinced that the event had never occurred.  Polage 
(2004) termed this effect ‘fabrication deflation’.  However, a small minority (10-16%) 
of participants increased their likelihood rating so much, that they now indicated a 
complete belief in the occurrence of the lied about event.  Polage (2004) suggests lies 
are successfully distinguished as non-experienced through a tightened reality 
monitoring process – tightened when there is source confusion (Johnson et al., 1993).  
Further, lies are posited to be rejected using process of recollect-to-reject (Brainerd 
et al., 2003; Pezdek et al., 2009), in the same way that other forms of internally 
generated post-event information are classified as non-experienced – participants 
recalled that the information they gave was fabricated and that they were required to 
fabricate and can therefore distinguish the information from that which was gained 
from experience (Polage, 2004).   
A number of theories exist explaining why, 10-16% of participants came to rate their 
lied about events as more likely to have happened.  Firstly, it is suggested that clear 
mental imagery may prevent correct categorisation of information, by leading 
participants to believe that the event actually occurred because of this clear imagery 
(Hyman & Pentland, 1996).  Polage (2004) suggests that when being interviewed, 
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participants may have created such a clear visual image, that it was difficult to refute 
when it was later evaluated.  Further, these interviews may have allowed for spatial, 
temporal, emotional etc information to enter into the memory description, rendering 
it particularly hard to identify using criteria such as those posited by reality 
monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981).  Further, lying about an event may actually act as 
a ‘reminder’ for previously forgotten, experienced events (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; 
Polage, 2004) which may explain their increased ratings.  However, it may also be the 
case that this study was sampling autobiographical facts.  It might be that long-
standing autobiographical facts of childhood events are stable and resistant to 
distortion – when asked if I was caught sneaking out of the house when I was a child, 
my answer is no, as for me this is an autobiographical fact, I know that this never 
happened, so subsequently creating a fabricated account of this is likely to bolster my 
existing knowledge that it never occurred.  I do not recall a time I was not caught 
sneaking out of the house, deny this and then continue to produce a lie that 
generates an image of me leaving the house, which could lead to source confusion.   
A distinct way of assessing the effect of lying on memory would be to ask participants 
to lie about a recently experienced episodic memory, for example one’s whereabouts 
last Thursday, rather than deny autobiographical facts.  In this case an individual 
would have to recall a memory of his/her whereabouts, deny this and then 
subsequently alter the memory.  It may be in this case the source confusion would 
become more apparent.  However, no work has, of yet, investigated this avenue of 
research.   
It seems then that internally generated post-event information (except that of 
deliberate fabrication) can have negative impact upon memory, although this impact 
has been found to be less than externally generated information (Pezdek et al., 2009).  
Lying on the other hand has received little attention, yet work that has investigated 
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its effects on memory suggests that, for the most part, lying can in fact bolster pre-
existing beliefs and memories.  However, the effects of lying about a recently 
experienced event (as opposed to a childhood event or autobiographical facts) have 
yet to be investigated.   
1.2.5 Errors of Bias 
As suggested by those memories that fall under the correspondence category, our 
memories can be altered by our current attitudes and beliefs (Schacter, 1999; Wilson 
& Ross, 2003).  Schacter (2001) refines this error into five distinct bias-type errors: 
consistency bias – past attitudes are distorted to match current attitudes, change bias 
– after an effortful investment in improving performance, for example, the past 
performance will be remembered as more difficult than it actually was, stereotypical 
bias – memories are altered to match with stereotypical judgements, hindsight bias – 
current knowledge renders past events as predictable and finally, the egocentric bias 
- memories are distorted to enhance the self, for example, having an inflated belief 
about one’s abilities in school.   A number of studies have confirmed the existence of 
such biases (Ross, 1989, Williams et al., 2008) and indeed, they have been found to 
bias a range of beliefs from attitudes, the memory of pain and of romantic 
relationships (Schacter, 1999; 2009).   
1.2.6 Time-Slice Errors 
The above review has shown how memories can become to be a completely or 
partially inaccurate representation of an experienced event.  The errors can be 
produced by internal or external factors and can lead to errors in coherence, 
correspondence, or some amalgamation of the two.  However, memories that reflect 
an experienced event accurately may also contain errors.  One such inaccuracy is that 
of temporality, or ‘time-slice errors’ (Brewer, 1988).  Time-slice errors refer to 
inaccuracies regarding the time a particular memory was experienced.  In particular, 
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it refers to an individual providing the incorrect memory for a specific time frame.  
These inaccuracies are particularly transparent within flashbulb memory literature 
whereby participants provided more than one location where they recalled hearing 
shocking or surprising news (Belli & Loftus, 1996).  Belli & Loftus (1996) suggest that 
in fact both versions of events are correct insofar that they both occurred, yet one 
represents a time-slice error, whereby the incorrect memory for a particular temporal 
location was provided.  These memory errors show then that accurate memories can 
be retrieved, but errors may occur regarding the time frame from which they 
occurred.   
1.2.7 Measuring Accuracy 
Since accuracy of memory has been reviewed theoretically, it is also important to 
understand how it might be measured objectively.  As per the Ebbinghaus tradition, 
accuracy of memory was firstly assessed in terms of the quantity of information that 
could be recalled, particularly through the use of list-learning paradigms.  However, 
following the work of Bartlett (1932), came a reconsideration of memory accuracy.  
Bartlett’s (1932) work was significant in that it investigated memory with regards to 
its workings in the real-world and reconceptualised memory as a representation or 
reconstruction of the past (Koriat et al., 2000).  For Koriat et al. (2000), assessing the 
correspondence that memory has with experience should determine its accuracy, not 
the quantity of details able to be recalled.  For example, memories are intrinsically 
bound at their initial level of encoding: if we never witness the gorilla beating its 
chest whilst we watched players pass a ball to each other it will forever remain 
elusive in our account.  In other words, quantity of detail recounted is necessarily 
dependent on encoding.  Here then, what should initially be questioned is our 
perception of reality, not our memory ability.  
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1.3 Intentionally Fabricated Autobiographical Memories 
A further variety of false memory, one that features centrally in this work is that of a 
memory created to be intentionally false (IFAMs).  The view taken here is that a 
fabricated memory differs from a truthful memory in that it includes details (ranging 
from few details to entire fabricated events) that do not correspond with an 
experienced event.  In contrast to false memories, these details are explicitly known 
to be false and are portrayed as if they are believed to be true.  IFAMs are created in 
order to provide a deliberately false account of the past, usually with the 
overreaching intention of deception.  Additionally, recollective qualities have also 
been shown to occur alongside deliberately fabricated memories (Porter, Peace, & 
Emmett, 2007) and will therefore be considered and investigated within this body of 
work.   
It is however important to note that fabricated and false memories may not 
represent discrete memory types.  Indeed, particularly in laboratory settings, the 
initial stages of false and fabricated memory generation most probably involve similar 
processes of editing a truthful memory.  What is important is the outcome, or 
motivation for the editing.  For a fabricated memory, the intention is to create a non-
factual account that is known to be untrue.  For false memories, the intention is to 
create a non-factual account that is believed to be true.  In this line of thought, it is 
possible that a fabricated memory will become a false memory following explicit 
rehearsal and elaboration over time (Polage, 2004).  It may be more appropriate 
therefore to consider fabricated memories as part of the memory distortions 
continuum, allowing memory research to inform their study. 
1.3.1 Intentionally Fabricated Memories and Deception 
Deception permeates many aspects of daily life.  It includes “practical jokes, forgery, 
imposture, conjuring, confidence games, consumer and health fraud, military and 
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strategic deception, white lies, feints and ploys in games and sport, gambling scams, 
psychic hoaxes and much more” (Hyman, 1989, p. 133).  Deception plays an 
important role in social interaction, with research showing that people lie a number 
of times every day (Depaulo et al., 1996; Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010).  Reasons 
cited for lying have been categorised into five broad groups: to impress others or to 
avoid shame or embarrassment; to gain advantages; to avoid negative consequences; 
to benefit others and to help facilitate relationships (Kapardis, 2010).  Lying has also 
been categorised broadly into ‘white lies’ which simply aid social functioning, and 
more serious lies which carry significant emotional costs, often leaving the liar with 
feelings of guilt and anxiety (DePaulo, Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, 2004).  In this 
thesis, the focus will predominately turn towards serious lies.   
The term deception covers a multitude of behaviours from concealment, omission, 
distortion and misrepresentation, all which carry the aim of misleading another 
(Porter, 1998; Vrij, 2000).  A lie can be written, spoken but can also be communicated 
without verbal communication.  Vrij (2000) considers the athlete who feigns an injury 
or the taxpayer who does not report all earnings.  Further, Barnes (1994) notes how 
deception can arise from not saying anything in conversation, though omission or 
‘pregnant pauses’ (p. 17).  For the purposes of this review however, deception is 
considered a behaviour between two or more people.  It does not discuss or refer to 
self-deception.  Here, specifically the interest is focussed upon those lies that 
represent fictitious memories – entirely or partially fabricated past events, rather 
than other types of deception such as holding false propositions and beliefs or 
deceiving through omission.   
Further, Ekman (1996) distinguished different types of lie: opinion lies, emotional lies 
and factual lies.  Although considerable overlap exists between the three categories, 
in particular we are interested in those lies of fact.  Therefore, in this thesis an IFAM 
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can be seen as an entirely or partially fabricated memory, consisting primarily, but 
not exclusively, of false facts.   
IFAMs may arise in forensic contexts, and become particularly pivotal in instances 
when memory is the only form of evidence available.  The sorts of memories that are 
the only evidence include, what in the UK are termed cases of ‘historic’ sexual abuse 
(typically memories dating to childhood recalled by an adult complainant), or 
memories that feature in accident assessments, war, torture and plagiarism.  
However, little research has been conducted within this area and therefore the 
percentage of adults providing fabricated memory-based evidence is unknown yet 
fabricated memories are a common feature of forensic interviews and interrogations 
(Porter & Yuille, 1996; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999a).  A number of instances of 
deliberate fabrication have however been highlighted in the media including the 
Clinton inquiry where President Clinton provided a deliberately fabricated statement 
and the more recent case of Shannon Matthews whose parents launched a large-
scale manhunt for the alleged missing girl, despite holding her captive the entire 
time.  Further, various of reasons and motivations for deliberately fabricating 
memories may exist including revenge, control and monetary gain (Yuille et al., 1995).  
Surprisingly, despite the importance of understanding the mechanisms underlying 
such fabricated memories, particularly when the legal system is often focussed on 
assessing memory reports (Porter, 1998), the vast majority of forensic memory 
research has concentrated on assessing eyewitness ability (Saks, 1986).  Only more 
recently has research begun addressing the need to distinguish true from false 
memories.  Indeed Porter (1998) suggests, “courts need to employ rationally-based 
criteria in evaluating memories for events, in order to approach the realization of its 
fact-finding agenda” (p. 155).  Attempts have been made at providing the court with 
such guidelines, see Guidelines on Memory and the Law, (British Psychological Society 
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Research Board, 2008), yet the notion surrounding the classification of fabricated 
witness reports was only brought to attention in the early 1950’s following work and 
ideas from German psychologists such as Undeutsch.  Indeed, Judges still rule that 
‘common sense’ should prevail in memory assessments, for instance, in R. v. Adams, 
D.J. (1997, as cited in Lynch & McNally, 2003) jurors were instructed “to evaluate 
evidence and reach a conclusion not by means of a formula, mathematical or 
otherwise, but by the joint application of their individual common sense and 
knowledge of the world to the evidence before them”.  More recently, in the case of 
R v Weller (2010), it was stated that, “if one tries to question science purely by 
reference to published papers and without the practical day-to-day experience upon 
which others have reached a judgment that attack is likely to fail…”.  However, little is 
known about such ‘common sense’ judgements, and although a few studies have 
examined the beliefs that the general public (Desmarais & Don Read, 2011), 
psychologists (Magnussen & Melinder, 2011) and judges (Wise & Safer, 2004) hold 
regarding, specifically, eyewitness memory (Magnussen et al., 2006; Simons & 
Chabris, 2011), no studies have explicitly investigated beliefs about autobiographical 
memory.   Further, little is known about judgements of cues to deception, with one 
study finding that judges and other legal professionals held beliefs about lying that 
were inaccurate (Porter & ten Brinke, 2009) and another showing that both lay 
people and police officers often judged the truthfulness of an individual based on 
subjective, stereotypical beliefs about lying (Akehurst, Kohnken, & Bull, 1996). 
However, a small body of work has begun investigating IFAMs, with particular focus 
falling on systematic differences between real and fabricated memories (Conway et 
al., 2003; Merckelbach, 2004; Porter et al., 1999; Porter et al., 2007).  As noted 
previously, this interest was particularly sparked by work of Undeutsch, who originally 
proposed what has become to be known as the Undeutsch Hypothesis, which claims 
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that statements that are the product of experience will differ from those statements 
that are the product of imagination (Undeutsch, 1967).  However, prior to this thesis, 
no work has investigated the processes underlying IFAM construction, or beliefs the 
public hold regarding truthful and fabricated autobiographical memory.   
1.3.2 Methods of Studying Intentionally Fabricated Memories 
A number of paradigms have been employed to study fabricated memories.  One 
methodology seen frequently in other areas of autobiographical memory study is that 
of the Crovitz technique, employed in an IFAM study by Conway et al., (2003).  This 
presents participants with cue words or phrases of activities, such as “holiday” or 
“lying on the beach” and a participant is asked to search for a memory (and in the 
present work, generate a fabricated memory) that matches the cue and record it, 
usually by typing or speaking it aloud.  The technique allows methodological 
parameters to be strictly controlled, and provides a homogenised experiment for all 
participants.  Further, memory retrieval and image generation times can be collected 
along with a verbal or typed narrative of the memory and other phenomenological 
measures can be recorded.  This approach however does not include any measures of 
accuracy – unless corroboration from a family member or friend occurs, the account 
cannot be checked for accuracy (at least insofar as the memory corresponds to 
external facts).   
A methodology similar to the Crovitz technique is that of the autobiographical 
paradigm, employed in studies by Porter et al., (1999).  In such methodologies, 
participants are asked to provide a variety of memories (truthful and fabricated in this 
case) from predefined cues, but these cues have been externally verified, usually by 
family members, prior to the study.  Cues may therefore differ between participants.  
Such studies are particularly insightful as they allow for accuracy scoring to take 
place, yet still capture a long-term memory.  Topic of memory is not as tightly 
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controlled as the Crovitz technique, however, which may affect the presentation of a 
memory.  A slight variation of this method involves simply asking participants to recall 
any truthful memory (however, usually a specific type of memory, such as one which 
is highly traumatic) and then fabricate a similar type of memory.  Again, this is 
beneficial as personal memories are recalled, but with no external verification, it is 
difficult to establish if these memories are accurate representations of an event.   
A different approach to the study of fabricated memories has been the use of staged 
events or mock crimes, seen in studies by Vrij et al., (2010).  In such a methodology, 
participants witness an event or mock crime and are subsequently interrogated about 
the event (this can range from hours to weeks later).  Participants are required to act 
as honest or deceptive witnesses, providing truthful or fabricated recall as necessary.  
This procedure has high internal validity, as the event, time between witnessing and 
interrogation, and the interrogation itself can be highly controlled.  Accuracy can also 
be strictly measured.  However, it lacks any of the naturalistic factors seen in real-
world crime scenarios failing to address reasons for providing the lie and motivation 
not to be detected. 
Field studies have provided a further insight into fabricated memories.  These 
methodologies investigate real-world accounts of fictitious memories in cases where 
the falsehood has been revealed.  Studies by Porter & Yuille (1996) and Porter & 
Brinke (2010) have investigated the language and behaviour of Eichmann and Clinton 
respectively during parts of testimony that are considered to be fabricated.  Although 
this offers a methodology with high external validity, problems arise over classifying 
fabricated testimony (unless explicitly known) and the methodology lacks any 
determinable parameters.   
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Although a number of methodologies have been employed when investigating 
fabricated memories, it seems that for a research area in its infancy, the preferred 
methodologies should be those that allow strict parameters to be set, allowing 
memories to be studied systematically.  Once groundwork in theory has been 
completed, then findings from the laboratory should start to tackle real-world 
problems.  Therefore, work in this thesis will employ the Crovitz cue-based technique 
and the staged event methodologies to set the foundations for future work on 
intentionally fabricated memories.   
1.3.3 Detecting Fabricated Memories 
Of the limited literature available regarding IFAMs, the vast majority has dedicated 
itself to attempting to identify reliable differences between truthful and fabricated 
memories with the overarching aim of assisting law enforcement.  These ventures 
have had some success, indeed, a number of assessment tools have been developed 
and subsequently used as evidence in courtrooms for or against the veracity of a 
memory.  This review will detail the history of fabricated memory detection along 
with its successes and pit falls. 
1.3.4 Physiological Correlates of Fabricated Memories 
The first scientific venture into detecting fabricated memory accounts was taken by 
Lombroso in 1895 (Bunn, 2012).  Lombroso proposed that deceit could be detected 
using physiological indicators such as heart rate and breathing rate, following the 
proposition that fabricating was more physiologically arousing than truth telling, 
possibly due to nervousness or additional effort associated with lying.  Following 
Lombroso’s hypothesis, in 1921 Larson developed a rudimentary polygraph (although 
many individuals have claimed to be the inventor of the polygraph since) – a device 
used to measure physiological changes in the body (heart rate, breathing rate, 
galvanic skin response) elicited by particular questions (Fiedler, Schmid, & Stahl, 
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2010).  The polygraph advanced and has gone on to become a deception detection 
device, validated and used as evidence by some states in North America (Vrij, 2005).  
However, its credibility has been widely criticised, with indicators of nervousness (i.e. 
raised heart rate) often giving rise to false positives – whereby truthful witness were 
identified as liars (Porter, 1998).  Additionally, simple countermeasures e.g. foot 
tapping and backwards counting have shown to reduce physiological signs thought to 
be associated with deception, producing false positive results and essentially allowing 
shrewd individuals to ‘beat the test’ (Fiedler et al., 2010).  Further, most questioning 
techniques employed by the polygraph (e.g. the Control Question Test) tend to use 
yes/no interrogatives, or at least, reduce answering to one or two words.  Since 
memories are usually reported in narrative form (Fivush, 2011), reducing answering 
in such a manner may be removing potential cues to identify real from fabricated 
accounts.   
1.3.5 Non-Verbal Cues to Fabricated Memories 
Following the criticisms of the polygraph and the lack of an assessable memory 
narrative, focus turned to attempting to utilise non-verbal cues to identify fictitious 
memories (Granhag & Stromwall, 2002; Porter & Yuille, 1996; Sporer, 1997).  This 
method of detection rests on the same assumption as that which underlines the 
physiological approach – that lying elicits a stronger physiological response (Vrij, 
2008) than truth telling does.  However, few patterns of non-verbal behaviours have 
been found to be reliably associated with deception, indeed, (Vrij et al., 2008) suggest 
that “Pinocchio’s nose” does not exist. 
A possible explanation for the failure of these detection techniques are their 
underlying assumptions that lying is more anxiety inducing that truth telling.  Anxiety 
may also be associated with truth telling, indeed Bond & Fahey (1987) suggest that 
the process of being interviewed may cause much anxiety for the truth teller, which 
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in turn may lead the truth teller to appear to be fabricating.  That being said, one cue 
widely cited as being a reliable indicator of deceit is that of the reduced use of the 
illustrator (DePaulo et al., 2003), a gesture used to literally illustrate a spoken word, 
such as pointing or highlighting something with the finger.  This cue has however 
been shown to be problematic and does not translate easily from those results 
produced by students in the laboratory to high stake, real world lies (Vrij, 2005).  For 
example, Porter & Yuille (1996) showed how Adolph Eichmann considerably 
increased illustrator use during his trial, similarly, Bill Clinton was also found to 
increase illustrators whilst being questioned regarding the Lewinsky investigation 
(Porter & Brinke, 2010).  A similar problem has been found regarding eye movements.  
Liars tended to avert their gaze whilst lying, but only when the lie was considered to 
be high-stake (DePaulo et al., 2003).   
1.3.6 Linguistic Cues to Fabricated Memories 
Researchers continued to attempt to identify other possible areas that would yield 
cues that could reliably identify real from deceitful memories.  One such area is that 
of linguistic analysis.  Indeed, it has been suggested that verbal cues may represent 
what might prove to be a superior tool for identifying truthful from fabricated 
memories (Vrij et al., 2008; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).  This line of 
investigation assesses what is said and how it is said and is again based the 
assumption that differences in physiological arousal will cause differences in verbal 
outputs between memory types, but more recently research has attributed 
measurable variance in linguistic output between memory types to differences in 
cognitive processes involved with the generation of truthful and fabricated memories 
(Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2010).  This method also seems all the 
more useful when it is considered that the majority of suspect and witness interviews 
are audio recorded (Porter, 1998), meaning that assessment can be non-intrusive and 
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conducted post-interview (Porter, 1998).  Indeed, interview techniques allow for the 
facilitation of this process, as techniques such as the Cognitive Interview advocate a 
period of uninterrupted narrative or ‘free recall’, provided before questioning 
commences and is standard practice for both witnesses and suspects.  Of course, in a 
number of cases, such memory narratives comprise the only evidence. 
This venture has proved relatively successful, with a number of linguistic constructs 
found to be associated with fabricated memories, such as a decrease in pronoun use, 
an increase in words associated with motion (e.g. walk, go) and the inclusion of fewer 
details (Newman et al., 2010; Porter et al., 2007; Bond & Lee, 2005; Dilmon, 2009; 
Sporer, 1997; Burgoon, 2006; DePaulo et al., 2003).  It is also noteworthy that those 
linguistic constructs that have proven useful in distinguishing memory types are all 
attributed to differences in cognitive processes rather than changes in physiological 
arousal.   
Computerised linguistic analysis programs such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC; Pennebaker, Francis & Booth, 2001) have become invaluable tools for 
researchers assessing linguistic constructs within an account, with LIWC providing 
fast, reliable counts of a variety of linguistic constructs within an account. 
1.3.7 Phenomenological Cues to Deception 
A further area of research based on the hypothesis that differences in cognitive 
processes result in observable differences between real and fabricated memory is 
that of phenomenology.  This posits that the way in which a memory is experienced 
will be affected by whether it originates in experience or imagination.  Similar to 
linguistic approaches, this venture has proved relatively successful with fabricated 
memories being reported as less vivid, less coherent (Porter at al., 1999), taking 
longer to generate (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003) and requiring 
more cognitive effort to generate (Vrij et al., 2008) than truthful memories. 
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1.3.8 Neurological Correlates of Fabricated Memories 
With advances in technology, the most recent area of psychology that has attempted 
to distinguish truth from fallacy is that of brain imaging technology.  
Electroencephalogram (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have 
been the two primary techniques implemented to classify neurological outputs of 
truthful and deceptive responding and follow in-line with the notion that differences 
between truth and deception can be identified because of differences in cognitive 
processes that occur when lying and truth telling.  However, as with much previous 
work investigating this area, deception is generally classified as holding untrue or 
counter factual propositions or denying knowledge (Carrión, Keenan, & Sebanz, 2010) 
rather than creating an alternative untrue past.   
Pioneering work by Spence, Farrow, Herford, Wilkinson, Zheng & Woodruff (2001) 
initially found that deception was associated with increased activity in the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.  This finding was supported by Langleben, Schroeder, 
Maldjian, Gur, McDonald, Ragland, O'Brien & Childress (2002), who additionally 
found an increase in the superior frontal gyrus and anterior cingulate cortex to be 
associated with deceptive responses.  Further work by Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, 
Thompson & Yurgelun-Todd (2003) has confirmed such findings, showing increased 
activation in the frontal pole during ‘general’ deception.  Following these first studies 
came a plethora of research investigating the neural correlates of deception (Abe, 
Suzuki, Tsukiura, Mori, Yamaguchi, Itoh, et al., 2006; Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter & 
Vossel, 2007; Lee, Liu, Chan, Ng, Fox & Gao, 2005; Lee, Au, Liu, Ting, Huang & Chan, 
2009; Spence, Kaylor-Hughes, Farrow, Wilkinson, 2008) which despite consisting of a 
number of different methodologies, consistently found the frontal executive system 
to be active whilst deceiving (Abe, 2011).  This neural region has been associated with 
various cognitive functions including working memory (Owen, 1997), cognitive 
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control (Miller, 2000), and task switching (Dove, Pollmann, Schubert, Wiggins, & Yves 
von Cramon, 2000).   
Despite the substantial amount of research investigating the neural correlates of 
deception, little work has studied the neural correlates of intentionally fabricated 
memories.  However, some methodologies have incorporated memory into their 
work.  For example, research by Lee et al. (2002) investigated neural activation during 
feigned memory impairments, finding activity in frontal, parietal and temporal 
cortices.  To my knowledge, however, only one study has systematically investigated 
neural regions associated with IFAMs, that of Conway et al. (2003).  This study 
contrasted the construction and retention of AMs and IFAMs whilst changes in slow 
cortical potentials were measured using an electroencephologram (EEG).  No 
differences in activation were found between AMs and IFAMs during the construction 
phase of the memory, with both memory types showing substantial activation in left 
frontal regions, as per previous work investigating AM generation (Conway et al., 
2001).  However, when both AMs and IFAMs were held-in-mind for a period of 10 
seconds, IFAMs showed an increase in right frontal activation.  The authors concluded 
that although AMs and IFAMs may share neural regions associated with their 
construction, they differ in their content as AMs were considered to contain episodic 
information stored in the occipital networks whereas IFAMs were considered to 
contain more generic imagery (Conway et al., 2003).  
Despite a wealth of literature investigating deception, work utilising neural regions to 
investigate the construction processes involved with IFAM generation and the 
subsequent differences between IFAMs and AMs is extremely limited, although work 
by Conway et al. (2003) offers a fruitful first step, more work needs to be done to 
replicate such findings and investigate further the neural differences between AMs 
and IFAMs.  
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1.3.9 Memory & Statement Assessment Tools 
A number of techniques have been constructed that aim to quantify subjective and 
objective indicators of memories not originating in reality by operationalising 
hypotheses regarding truthful and fabricated memories.  These include Reality 
Monitoring (RM) Johnson & Raye, (1981), Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), Köhnken 
& Steller (1988), the Memory Assessment Procedure (MAP), Porter et al., (1999) and 
Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (ACID), Colwell, Hiscock-Anisman, 
Memon, Taylor, & Prewett (2007). 
1.3.9.1 Reality Monitoring  
Proposed by Johnson & Raye (1981), reality monitoring (RM) addresses how 
memories of actual experience can be distinguished from those originating in 
imagination (these internally generated memories are generally believed, by the 
rememberer, to have originated in experience).  It consists of a set of processes that 
are concerned with distinguishing the origin of events.  In short, the model suggests 
that memories based on real external experience are associated with higher levels of 
sensorial information e.g. “it was a warm bright sunny day” (Porter & Yuille, 1995), 
spatial information e.g. “the field was square and large”, temporal information e.g. “it 
was mid-morning” and contain more details in general than those memories 
originating internally.  These internally generated memories, for example those 
produced through imagination or dreams, are thought to be derived from cognitive 
processes (Johnson et al., 1993) and are therefore, according to RM, associated with 
more cognitive evaluations and subjective information e.g. “I remember seeing the 
field and thinking that it looked pleasant.”  These descriptions can be used to 
determine the origins of a memory – a memory containing sensory, spatial and 
temporal detail with little reference to cognitive processes would be judged by the 
rememberer as being more likely to have originated from reality (Johnson et al., 
1988).   
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Additionally, Johnson & Raye (1981) suggest that an individual may partake in reality 
monitoring reasoning using information and knowledge about memory.  For example, 
a memory of a conversation with a person unknown to the rememberer may be 
attributed to fantasy or imagination since the memory itself could not have occurred 
(Johnson et al., 1988).  Knowledge of the way in which memory works may also act as 
a discriminatory tool.  Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye (1988) suggest two ways in 
which a mental representation may be evaluated: a memory may be uncharacteristic 
of its category e.g. a memory may be particularly vague, or reasoning may be based 
upon beliefs about those memories originating in reality and those originating 
internally.   
RM theory has been operationalised in the form of the Memory Characteristics 
Questionnaire (MCQ) (Johnson et al., 1988).  This questionnaire systematically 
evaluates thirty-nine subjective qualities of real and imagined memories, particularly 
focussing on their descriptions of features, such as the memory’s visual 
representation, temporal details and emotion.  The questions are self-rated, primarily 
on seven-point rating scales i.e. 1 very vague – 7 very clear. 
The MCQ has gained much empirical support in both laboratory (Schooler, Gerhard, & 
Loftus, 1986) and more naturalistic or staged contexts (Leippe, Manion, & 
Romanczyk, 1992).  Real memories have been found to correspond with the RM 
theory, containing higher self-reported ratings of perceptual and contextual details.  
These details were amplified for more recent memories (Poter, 1998).  Additionally, 
when the rememberer was asked to determine the source of numerous 
autobiographical events, perceptual and contextual details were mainly drawn upon 
to categorise real memories, whereas reasoning strategies were used to determine 
imagined events (Porter, 1998).    
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RM has certainly proven to yield positive results for distinguishing real from imagined 
or internally generated memories, but can the tool be used to distinguish real 
accounts from those accounts that are intentionally fabricated?  Research has 
attempted to answer this question but has provided mixed results.  Joffe (1992), 
Porter & Yuille (1996) and Ost, Vrij, Costall & Bull (2002) found that most criteria from 
the MCQ were unable to distinguish real memories from fabricated, or ‘impossible’ 
memories, with real and fabricated memories receiving similar scores across MCQ 
criteria.  However, work by (Sporer & Küpper, 1995) has showed that MCQ criteria 
could reliably distinguish real and fabricated memories, yet many differences were 
only noticeable after a delay of at least one week from the original event (Porter, 
1998).   
1.3.9.2 Statement Validity Analysis 
Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) is a tool for assessing the veracity of a statement – 
whether it is a product of truth or if it contains fabrications, information from an 
incorrect source (a source other than the one in question), distorted information 
from others through means such as suggestion, or if is it a product of imagination 
(Brown, 2010, in Brown & Campbell, 2010).  Originally developed as a tool for 
systematically assessing child memory reports, SVA has proved to be particularly 
useful for cases such as child abuse when memory is frequently the only available 
evidence (Vrij, 2005).  However, the technique has also been used successfully in the 
assessment of adult testimony (Porter & Yuille, 1995; Gödert, Gamer, Rill, & Vossel, 
2005).  SVA has been used widely in Germany since the 1950’s (Vrij, 2005; Porter, 
1998) and is also accepted as evidence in a number of American (Ruby & Brigham, 
1997) and Swedish (Gumpert, Lindblad, & Johansson, 1999) courts.  Indeed, a German 
Supreme Court issued a requirement that all cases of uncorroborated child testimony 
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should be assessed using SVA (Joffe, 1992).  Further, Honts (1994) claimed that the 
SVA was highly valid and argued for its widespread use. 
SVA arose from work by Undeutsch (1982, cited in Vrij, 2005) who claimed, “truthful, 
reality-based accounts differ significantly and noticeably from unfounded, falsified, or 
distorted stories” (p. 44).  Undeutsch (1982) also stated that other external factors 
should be considered when assessing the validity of a memory report, including its 
consistency with other sources (Vrij, 2005).  These hypotheses were operationalised 
by Köhnken & Steller (1988) based on beliefs about cognitive and motivational factors 
for providing fabricated information (Maass & Köhnken, 1989) and the criteria were 
integrated into a formal procedure – termed Statement Validity Analysis (Vrij, 2005). 
SVA consists of three major components: a semi-structured interview, Content-Based 
Criteria Analysis (CBCA) and a review and evaluation of the CBCA outcomes.  
However, before any interviewing is undertaken, background research into the case is 
conducted wherever possible (Brown, 2010, in Brown & Campbell, 2010).  Particular 
emphasis is placed upon gathering information regarding the witness, the event itself, 
assessing previous statements and checking for inconsistencies with case file data 
(Köhnken, 2004; Vrij, 2005).   
Semi-Structured Interview 
This interview allows the interviewee to provide uninterrupted free recall of 
remembered events, with techniques that maximise information given, such as asking 
the interviewee to elaborate a particular point, permitted.  Specific questioning is 
then conducted to clarify any outstanding queries.  Interviews are audio recorded and 
transcribed (Vrij, 2005).  
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Content-Based Criteria Analysis 
 
Table 1.2. CBCA Criteria 
Account Characteristics 
General Characteristics 
Logical Structure 
Unstructured Production 
Quantity of Detail 
Specific Contents 
Contextual Embedding 
Description of Interactions 
Reproduction of Conversations 
Unexpected Complications  
Peculiarities of Content 
Unusual Detail 
Superfluous Detail 
Accurately Reported Details Misunderstood 
Related External Associations 
Accounts of Subjective Mental States 
Attributions of Perpetrator’s Mental State 
Motivation-Related Content 
Spontaneous Correction 
Admitting Lack of Memory 
Raising Doubts on Own Memory 
Self-Deprecation 
Pardoning Perpetrator 
Offense Specific Characteristics 
 
The transcriptions from the semi-structured interview are taken forward to CBCA.  
Trained judges determine the existence or absence of nineteen predetermined 
criteria (see Table 1.2) (Vrij, 2005).  The existence of a criterion serves to highlight the 
Undeutsch hypothesis - that an account is a result of direct experience.  Essentially 
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then, CBCA aims to identify criteria of a truthful statement; fabricated accounts are 
not thought to contain such criteria (Vrij, 2005).   
For example, criteria 1 – 13 are assumed to reflect cognitive factors and it is 
suggested that such cognitive factors are difficult to fabricate and as such would only 
appear in truthful narratives (Köhnken, 1989, 1996).   
According to CBCA, truthful accounts are therefore coherent (logical structure), do 
not follow a chronological sequence (unstructured production) and are rich in detail 
(quantity of detail).  These details should represent the time and location of an event 
(contextual embedding), any notable conversation (description of interactions) and 
this should be provided in something like its original form (reproduction of 
conversations).  Details should also explain any unexpected or unforeseen events 
(unexpected complications & unusual detail) and need not necessarily focus solely on 
the event (superfluous detail).  Further, an interviewee may also describe events that 
are beyond current comprehension, this is particularly applicable if a child attempts 
to explain adult sexual behaviour, (accurately reported details misunderstood).  
Additionally, truthfulness is indicated by incorporation of information, related to but 
not directly pertaining to the incident (related external associations).  Thoughts, 
feelings and emotions surrounding the incident of both the individual (accounts of 
subjective mental states) and the perpetrator (attributions of perpetrators’ mental 
state) are considered criteria of truthfulness.   
Criteria 14 – 18, according to CBCA are based on motivational factors (Köhnken, 1989, 
1996) insofar as the deceiver is thought to be more concerned with impression 
management than the truth teller (Vrij, 2005).  As such, deceivers are thought to 
make a more effortful attempt at appearing truthful than truth tellers.  The result of 
this is that truthful statements contain detail that is then seen as stereotypically 
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inconsistent with truthful narratives, whereas deceptive narrative are more likely to 
fit this truthful stereotype (Ruby & Brigham, 1997; Vrij, 2005).  Those details seen in 
the truthful account that are inconsistent with the truthful stereotype include 
changing given information without interviewer intervention (spontaneous 
correction), awareness and concern that parts of the given narrative may be incorrect 
(admitting lack of memory), acknowledging possible objections and distrust in 
narrative (raising doubts on own memory), personally incriminating or negative 
information (self-deprecation) and showing sympathy or providing excuses for the 
perpetrator (pardoning perpetrator).  Criterion 19 (details characteristic of the 
offence) refers to specific feelings and emotions that typically exist for the crime 
under investigation (format taken from Vrij, 2005). 
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Table 1.3. Validity Checklist  
Validity Characteristics 
Psychological Characteristics 
Cognitive emotional limitations 
Incident specific language / knowledge 
Incongruous affect during interview 
Susceptibility to suggestion 
Interview Characteristics 
Interview appropriateness 
Interview contamination 
Motivation 
Motivation to report 
Questionable context of disclosure 
Pressure to report 
Investigative Questions 
Lack of realism 
Inconsistent statements 
Inconsistency in other evidence 
Offence-specific element 
Lacking offence specific characteristics 
 
Following the assessment of criteria using CBCA, a further procedure is undertaken.  
Added by Raskin & Esplin (1991), the Validity Checklist considers additional external 
factors that might impact upon the credibility of a witness, such as lack of 
metacognitive reasoning and verbal skills required for effective communication (see 
Table 1.3) (Vrij, 2005).  These factors are assessed and considered alongside the CBCA 
criteria.  The methods by which the criteria from both the CBCA and Validity 
checklists are scored have given rise to debate within SVA practitioners (Vrij, 2005).  
Questions have been raised regarding the necessary number of criteria present and if 
particular criteria are more crucial than others to detect a truthful or fabricated 
account (Brown, 2010, in Brown & Campbell, 2010).  Parker & Brown (2000) suggest a 
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dichotomised scoring scale whereby the criterion is either present or absent.  An 
account with more than eight instances of a single criterion would be viewed as 
credible, six to seven moderate, and less than five non-credible or unusual.  Köhnken 
(2004) however suggests that a more flexible scale rating of zero (absent from report) 
through to five (strongly present) for each criterion is a more suitable and sensitive 
method of scoring.   
Laboratory studies employing SVA as a means of distinguishing real and fabricated 
accounts have had limited success, with some criteria gaining no, or very limited 
support from the literature (in particular criteria of self-deprecation and accurately 
reported details misunderstood) (Vrij, 2005).  However, when support existed for the 
criteria, it was usually in the expected direction.  SVA has been applied to real-world 
cases of deception with mixed success.  Esplin, Boychuk, & Raskin (1988), cited in 
Raskin & Esplin (1991), applied CBCA to forty child abuse cases and found that CBCA 
could reliably differentiate reports, finding that most to all of the criteria existed in 
truthful reports.  However, these results have failed to be replicated, at least to such 
a strong degree (Boychuk, 1991; Craig, Scheibe, Raskin, Kircher, & Dodd, 1999; Lamb 
et al., 1997) and have been met with heavy criticism (Wells & Loftus, 1991) regarding 
issues such as the use of a single-rater and unconsidered reliable age differences 
between truthful and fabricated groups.    
1.3.9.3 Memory Assessment Procedure 
The Memory Assessment Procedure (MAP), devised by Porter et al. (1999) was 
developed to provide a framework for distinguishing real memories, false memories 
(inaccurate memories believed to be true) and fabricated memories – those based on 
events that had never been witnessed.  The MAP is essentially a hybrid, comprising of 
theoretical backgrounds of both SVA (that fabricated accounts will be less coherent 
than truthful accounts, for example) and the MCQ (fabricated memories consist of 
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more subjective, cognitive reasoning whereas truthful memories contain more 
contextual and sensory detail).   
Table 1.4. MAP Criteria 
Qualitative and Quantitative Details in the MAP 
Subjective Features  
Vividness/Clarity (self-rated) 
Stress (self-rated) 
Sensory Components (self-rated) 
Confidence (self-rated) 
Re-experiencing Mental Experience 
Experiencing Lack of Memory / Memory Failures  
Perspective (self-rated) 
Presentation-Specific Details 
Amount of Detail 
Relevancy 
Repeated Details 
Providing Reasons for Lack of Memory 
Coherence 
 
In the MAP, memory reports are rated on twelve factors (see Table 1.4), five of which 
are self-rated and seven of which are rated by independent, trained coders.  Most 
criteria are scored on a one through to seven scale, e.g. 1 not at all confident – 7 
extremely confident, with other criteria marked for their frequency e.g. number of 
details.  No specific technique is used to elicit statements for the MAP, but work 
investigating accounts using MAP (Porter et al., 1999) has used semi-structured 
interviews which entail a free recall phase followed by general and specific 
questioning (Yuille, Hunter, Joffe, & Zaparniuk, 1993). 
The MAP has been empirically evaluated in a number of studies, for example Porter 
et al. (1999) asked participants to provide one real memory report, one false memory 
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report, generated in the laboratory using guided imagery techniques (the memory’s 
non-existence was corroborated by relatives) and one created, or fabricated memory 
(it is important to note here that these memory reports were of emotional, 
traumatic, childhood events).  Results showed the MAP to be a successful tool for 
distinguishing memory types – real memories were vivid, detailed and clear.  
Participants were also willing to express a failure of memory.  False events were rated 
as coherent but were less vivid than truthful events and known by the rememberer to 
be unstable, as participants reported having low confidence that the memory actually 
occurred.  Finally, fabricated memories were described as having an exaggerated 
‘over-the-top’ quality (Ost, Vrij, Costall, & Bull, 2002).  Subsequently, they were rated 
as most vivid, and received the highest ratings for clarity.  They were also rated as 
being highly emotional and contained a number of repeated details (Porter et al., 
1999).   
The MAP has also been applied to the categorisation of only truthful and fabricated 
memory accounts, in this case fabricated accounts of victimisation (Peace, 2006).  
Again, the MAP was found to be a successful detection tool, as truthful accounts 
contained more overall detail, contextual detail and were rated as more emotional 
and plausible than fabricated accounts.  Fabricated accounts were again presented in 
an exaggerated manner and were not as consistent over time (after three and six 
month intervals) as their truthful counterparts (Peace, 2006).    
1.3.9.4 Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception 
The Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (ACID) (Colwell et al., 2007) is a 
technique for distinguishing truthful from fabricated statements.  It combines 
methods and theory of CBCA, particularly criteria of spontaneous reproduction and 
sufficient detail, as these have been shown to be reliable indicators of deception in 
previous work (Colwell et al., 2007).  These criteria therefore suggest that a truthful 
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account should contain more detail and have a less structured narrative than a 
fabricated account.  Additionally, ACID derives some of its criteria from RM, which 
posits that the amount and nature of detail in a report is central to the distinction of 
memory types.  Those criteria taken forward to ACID from RM include assessing 
contextual, perceptual and internal details.  Truthful accounts have been shown to 
contain more of these types of detail than fabricated accounts (Leippe et al., 1992; 
Schooler et al., 1986).  A further criterion taken forward from RM is that of vividness – 
truthful accounts are thought to be experienced as more vivid than fabricated 
accounts.  However, when we consider narratives of trauma or highly emotional 
events (Peace, 2006, Porter et al., 1999), truthful accounts are rated as less vivid than 
fabricated ones.  Clearly, topic of memory is a confounding factor, whereby a 
fabricated emotionally salient memory will be recalled differently and contain 
different characteristics to that of an everyday memory, see 1.3.9.3. 
ACID combines a third set of criteria, this time taken from work surrounding 
impression management.  Impression management theories posit that deceptive 
respondents are continually concerned with the presentation of their narrative, this 
subsequently makes their memory accounts highly controlled and in turn, causes 
deceptive responding to be a more cognitively effortful task than truth telling, which 
is inherently less effortful since less concern is attributed to impression management 
(Suckle-Nelson et al., 2010).   
 
 
 
58 
 
Table 1.5.  ACID Criteria 
Details Measured by ACID 
Measured in Free Recall  
Response Length 
External Detail 
Internal Detail 
Contextual Detail 
Measured in Mnemonic Sections of Recall 
Response Length 
New External Detail 
New Internal Detail 
New Contextual Detail 
Measured Throughout 
Admitting Lack of Memory 
 
In ACID, a statement is elicited using the Reality Interview (RI) (Colwell et al., 2007), 
which is a variant of the Cognitive Interview (CI).  The CI is characterised by four main 
mnemonic techniques designed to increase both the quantity and accuracy of recall.  
An interviewee is firstly asked to place themselves back into the location of the event 
(mental reinstatement), then asked to report all details that can be remembered in 
an uninterrupted narrative (recall everything) which is then followed by general and 
specific questions if necessary.  The interviewee is then asked to recall the narrative 
in a number of different temporal orders and then to recall the narrative from a 
variety of perspectives (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010).  The RI utilises this interview 
technique to place additional load on the interviewee with the aim of facilitating 
truthful recall and hindering fabricated recall (Colwell et al., 2007) (due to the 
increased load already thought to be attached to fabricated memory creation).  The 
RI also includes additional recall tasks that are designed to prevent the use of 
schema-based recall.  These tasks include additional forced-choice unexpected 
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questions and require deeper processing and therefore a detailed search of the given 
memory account (Colwell et al., 2007).  Proponents of the RI suggest that these 
additional tasks provide further recall cues for the truth teller but make fabricated 
recall more challenging.  Therefore, the RI serves to amplify existing differences 
between real and fabricated accounts, and categorises accounts by assessing quantity 
and type of detail in statements (see Table 1.5) (Colwell et al., 2007).   
Results have been promising: in a laboratory study whereby students either stole or 
replaced an exam paper and then provided either a truthful or fabricated account one 
week later (Colwell et al., 2007), it was found that seven out of the nine criteria could 
reliably detect fabricated accounts.  The criteria of external and contextual details in 
the free recall section were found to yield non-reliable results.  Honest reports were 
found to be longer in length, more detailed and included more details from the 
mnemonic components of the RI than fabricated accounts.  Additionally, participants 
providing truthful accounts were more likely to admit memory errors than those 
providing fabricated accounts, two-thirds of truthful recallers admitted being unable 
to recall some aspects of their account, whereas only one-third of fabricated recallers 
admitted a lack of memory.  Discriminant function analyses revealed that ACID 
correctly classified 87% of truthful and fabricated accounts, compared to untrained 
raters who only achieved classification of 56% (Colwell et al., 2007).   
1.3.10 Evaluation of Memory Assessment Tools 
Although all assessment tools have received some support from research, a number 
of theoretical problems pertain to their usage.  Firstly, the premise of such tools rests 
on the assumption that an account is either entirely truthful or entirely fabricated.  
The procedures do not consider that fictitious detail may exist alongside truthful 
detail (Vrij, 2005).  This issue is particularly critical when considering that IFAM 
generation is generally thought to incorporate at least some truthful propositions 
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(see 1.3.11).  Indeed, Sapir (1987) suggests that up to 90% of a fabricated statement 
may be truthful with only a small number of propositions deliberately omitted, 
distorted or falsified.  A more appropriate approach may be to identify which 
propositions within a statement are fabricated or appear uncharacteristic of a 
truthful memory, allowing subsequent analysis to be undertaken on these 
propositions alone.  Relatedly, the tools are only able to differentiate truthful from 
fabricated accounts comparatively and do not serve as indices for positively 
identifying fabricated or indeed truthful memories. 
Further, the tools do not consider issues of source monitoring.  Both children and 
adults have difficulty in distinguishing between imagination and reality (Vrij, 2005) 
and many ‘truthful’ memories are products of distortion and may contain wholly false 
detail, unbeknownst to the rememberer (see 1.2.1) (Conway, 2005).  Indeed, Barclay 
& Wellman (1986) state “autobiographical memories are true but inaccurate” (p. 97) 
and studies have shown how false memories can be experienced as detailed and 
coherent (Porter et al., 1999), which would lead a memory containing inaccurate 
details, to be judged as credible by such techniques.  This is likely to be extremely 
detrimental for legal cases whereby all details of a remembered event are particularly 
costly.   
However, despite methodological concerns regarding the assessment tools, an 
amalgamation of empirical results show that a number of characteristics allow 
various types of memories to be reliably distinguished.  However, some findings were 
reversed such as when assessing memory for trauma (Porter at al., 1999).  It seems 
then that the event on which the memory is based should be considered when 
assessing the veracity of a memory since as shown clearly here, a very different 
pattern of findings emerge for neutral and traumatic fabricated memories.   
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1.3.11 Generating an Intentionally Fabricated Autobiographical Memory 
Surprisingly, little is known about the way in which IFAMs are constructed.  It has 
been suggested that an IFAM is created by means of a ‘lie script’ (Colwell, Hiscock-
Anisman, & Memon, 2002).  According to this view a remembered set of events is 
used to create a script and this is used in place a specific memory of a single event.  A 
process that has been termed ‘superficial encoding’ (Porter & Yuille, 1994).  This 
theory has had some support, as Granhag & Strömwall (1999) and Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Jonsson (2003) also consider truth tellers to create their account 
through reconstruction, whereas liars are considered to attempt to accurately repeat 
a previously rehearsed script.  According to this theory, it is  these differences in 
processing and storage that are responsible for systematic and measureable 
differences in truthful and fabricated memory accounts (Colwell et al., 2007).   
Porter (1998) further suggests that verbal ideas and images may play a vital role in 
IFAM generation, suggesting that fabricated memories are “imaginative 
constructions”.  He continues to suggest that fabricated memories may not be 
entirely imaginative in nature, but like false memories (untrue memories that, unlike 
fabricated memories, are unknown to be false), may incorporate elements of an 
experienced event with the purpose of enhancing the credibility of an account.  In a 
rather similar and related way it has been suggested that the process of lying involves 
firstly accessing true beliefs followed by denial and/or distortion of these beliefs 
(Polage, 2004).   
The generation or construction of AMs involves the effortful, iterative, access of 
autobiographical memory knowledge structures and the gradual establishment of 
patterns of activation/inhibition across distributed neural networks that come to 
form an AM in an act of remembering (Cabeza & Jacques 2007; Conway, et al., 2003, 
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  It seems that the construction of IFAMs may 
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involve similar processes, not least because the generation of IFAMs may feature the 
recall of AMs.  It is difficult to conceive of a process of IFAM generation that did not 
feature, to a least some extent, access of autobiographical knowledge and possibly 
the generation of specific AMs.  It seems likely therefore that IFAM creation involves 
initially accessing information in long-term memory, followed by a conscious 
“editing” phase.  In other words, an AM is activated and then consciously edited to 
produce an IFAM.   
This constructive process is likely to affect the way in which an IFAM is presented, and 
is possibly responsible for the notable linguistic and content differences between a 
true, or at least believed to be true, memory.  For example, the additional editing 
phase of IFAM generation may result in a less detailed, vague mental representation.  
It is also likely to add considerable cognitive effort to the generation process.  The 
cognitive effort is also likely to arise from the necessity of holding in mind and 
repeatedly accessing a novel mental representation.   
1.4 Conclusions 
This thesis’s focus on IFAMs arises primarily to help embellish an extremely important 
yet understudied area of autobiographical memory.  It aims both to understand the 
theoretical underpinnings of IFAMs and to replicate and expand upon findings from 
both deception detection studies and statement analysis techniques.  It is hoped that 
this work will provide the groundwork for future research with the overarching aim of 
identifying those providing deliberately false testimony, and providing a fairer 
assessment for those who claim to be victims of false allegations (Porter, 1998).    
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Chapter Two 
2 Generating Truthful and Fabricated Memories 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite the large body of research investigating our ability to place ourselves in the 
future, relatively little research has investigated the ability to create an alternate 
past, termed here intentionally fabricated autobiographical memories (IFAMs).  The 
small body of research that has previously investigated IFAMs has primarily focused 
on identifying the differences between real and fabricated memories, with only one 
previous study (Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, & Sharpe, 2003) exploring the 
construction processes of IFAM generation.   
As was noted in Chapter One, it has been suggested that creating an IFAM may 
involve generating a ‘lie script’ - a remembered set of events are generated to create 
a generic script which is used in place of a specific memory of a single event (Colwell, 
Hiscock-Anisman & Memon, 2002).  This theory has received support (Granhag & 
Strömwall, 1999; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003) and posits that the 
differences in storage and retrieval of truthful and fabricated memories result in 
measurable linguistic, cognitive and phenomenological differences.   
Porter (1998) furthered these original theories, suggesting that fabricated memories 
may incorporate some elements of truthful memories in order to heighten the 
believability of the fabricated account.  Indeed, this notion was repeated in work by 
Polage (2004) who suggested that the process of lying involves firstly accessing true 
beliefs followed by denial and/or distortion of these beliefs. 
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Despite this work, to my knowledge, no empirical research has explicitly addressed 
the construction processes involved with IFAM construction (with the exception of 
Conway et al., 2003).  Therefore, the primary aim of the research presented in this 
chapter is to understand the way in which IFAMs are constructed within the 
autobiographical memory system and if this process is notably different from the 
construction of truthful autobiographical recall.  By investigating this process, it is 
hoped that a better understanding of IFAM storage, rehearsal and recall will be 
gained with the overreaching aim of aiding in the detection of fabricated from 
truthful memories.   
It is suggested here that creating an IFAM would involve similar processes as those 
involved with future imagination insofar as information from long-term memory, or 
specific autobiographical memories are initially accessed to form the basis of an 
IFAM.  Following this, it is suggested that the information retrieved is consciously 
‘edited’ to produce a novel mental representation.    
2.1.1 Predictions 
Because of the differences in IFAM and AM construction processes, and due to the 
proposed additional effort required to maintain a novel fabricated representation, 
IFAMs should reliably differ from AMs in some of their recollective qualities.  For 
example, memories not based on real experience may be associated with less vivid 
mental imagery (Johnson & Raye, 1981), may be placed further back in the past 
(although, to my knowledge, this has not previous been investigated) to demonstrate 
a stable, long-held memory, and may be recalled more frequently through an 
observer perspective, since an observer perspective has been shown to occur 
following distortion (Freud, 1915; Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  Further, AMs may require 
less cognitive effort to generate (Vrij, et al., 2008) due to the lack of an editing phase, 
which in turn will allow for faster generation time (Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & 
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Griffith-Ross, 2009).  I therefore expect to find linguistic constructs within accounts of 
IFAMs that are indicators of cognitive effort, for example fewer complex words e.g. 
those over six letters in length (as defined by Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001), 
and a higher rate of non-fluencies, e.g. “erm”, “umm”, particularly for spoken 
accounts.  Further, it is expected that IFAMs will contain more motion words, e.g. 
walk, go, run.  Motion words have been found to be a characteristic of increased 
cognitive effort, used by a rememberer to reduce the complexity of an account by 
referring to simple actions rather than expressions of emotions or other 
metacognitive reasoning (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003).  Finally, 
IFAMs may be shorter in length than AMs to avoid unnecessary discussion of detail 
(Peace & Porter, 2011; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999a) 
Additional linguistic differences such as an increase in negative emotion words, fewer 
exclusive and sensation words in IFAMs have been shown by Newman et al. (2003), 
however I did not expect to find these linguistic differences since the study was 
concerned with investigating fabricated memories rather than fabricated opinions 
and denials (Newman et al., 2003) which are more likely to be emotionally charged, 
resulting in different linguistic manifestations.  In summary then, four recollective 
qualities, vividness, memory / image generation times, retention interval, and 
perspective and four linguistic constructs: complex words, non-fluencies, account 
length and motion words, all assumed to reflect cognitive effort and / or an editing 
process, were investigated.  Accounts of the memories were recorded by either 
typing or by tape recording while they were spoken1.  
                                                             
1 Previous research has asked participants to both speak and type memories – it is 
important to ascertain whether these results can be collapsed and assessed together or 
whether modality may affect cues to deception.  Further, as witnesses usually speak their 
memories aloud it was thought that the two modalities should be contrasted.  
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2.1.2 Stimuli Generation 
For the following two studies, the Crovitz technique was used to elicit specific 
autobiographical memories (see 1.3.1).  In this technique, participants are cued with a 
word or phrase and then asked to recall a specific memory associated with the given 
word (Crovitz & Quina-Holland, 1976).  Twenty neutral everyday events were to be 
used as cues for memory / imagination generation in the typed condition, ten cues 
were to be used in the spoken condition to ensure testing time did not exceed one 
hour (see Appendix I for cues).  These were taken from Bower, Black & Turner, 
(1979); Trafimow & Wyer, (1993) and Reiser, Black and Abelson, (1985).  Cues were 
chosen that were consistent with British culture, e.g. cues such as “taking the 
subway” were not used. 
To ensure the cues were suitable for both memory and imagination generation, the 
cues were rated for their ease in eliciting true memories, or at least memories 
believed to be true, and their ease in eliciting deliberately fabricated, or imagined 
‘memories’.   
2.1.2.1 Method 
Three hundred and fifty six respondents from the University of Leeds were recruited 
to evaluate the cues proposed for use in the study.  A questionnaire was created 
which listed the twenty everyday events selected for use in the study.  Participants 
were asked to rate on a scale of 1 through 5 (1 being very difficult, 3 being neither 
difficult nor easy and 5 being very easy) how able they would be to recall and to 
imagine carrying out the twenty everyday events.   
2.1.2.2 Findings 
The majority of respondents rated each cue as either ‘very easy’ or ‘easy’ to both 
recall and imagine, therefore, all cues were accepted for use within the studies.  See 
Appendix II, for cue ratings.  The ten cues that received the highest ratings for both 
ease of recall and to imagine were selected for use within the spoken condition.   
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2.2 General Method 
2.2.1 Participants  
Sixty-six participants were recruited for the study (52 females and 14 males).  Their 
ages ranged from 18 - 57 years, with a mean age of 21.  Forty-eight participants took 
part in the study for course credits as part of their undergraduate studies at The 
University of Leeds, and the remaining 18 participants received small payment.  
2.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
 
Figure 2.1. Trial Presentation Order 
Figure 2.1 shows the presentation order of the memory cue and subsequent 
recollective quality ratings for each trial of the study.  Participants were tested 
individually and all testing was completed using a computer.  Participants completed 
the experiment using software designed for running psychological studies, E-Prime.  
Participants were presented with a computer screen displaying “RECALL” or 
“IMAGINE.”.  Following this a cue was displayed, e.g. going to a restaurant.  There 
were 20 cues naming common everyday activities (only 10 were used for participants 
in the ‘spoken’ condition), (taken from Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Trafimow & 
Wyer, 1993; Reiser, Black, & Abelson, 1985), see Appendix I for cue lists.  Cues were 
counterbalanced across participants and conditions, ensuring that all cues were used 
to generate both IFAMs and AMs.  One block of 10 cues (5 cues for those in the 
spoken condition) instructed the participant to recall, the other, to imagine.  There 
was a short 2-minute pause between blocks while the instructions for the next block, 
which notified the participant of the final condition (AM or IFAM), were reviewed.   
RECALL 
Going to a 
restaurant 
Truthful / 
fabriacted 
memory is 
provided 
How vivid 
was this 
memory? 
From what 
perspective 
do you see 
yourself? 
At what 
age did this 
event 
occur? 
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Participants were instructed to generate either a truthful memory or imagine an 
event that had never occurred from the given cue.  They were then instructed to 
press the space bar once they had brought clearly to mind a memory or imagined a 
fabricated past event, there was no upper or lower time limit on memory retrieval / 
image generation.  Participants were instructed to ensure that they imagined all 
fabricated events being in the past and to describe them as if they were trying to 
convince another person that the event had actually been experienced.  For AMs they 
were instructed to bring to mind a memory of an event which they had directly 
experienced that had lasted for minutes or hours but no longer than one day. Both 
types of memory could be recalled or located at any point in their own personal past, 
they were not limited to specific time periods.  Participants were instructed to 
construct memories as quickly as they could but to ensure they were specific.  
Memory retrieval and image generation times were recorded in milliseconds from 
cue on-screen to space bar press.  Participants were randomly assigned to conditions 
and half typed a description of the memory into the computer and the other half 
spoke their memory into a Dictaphone.  After a memory had been provided, 
participants rated the vividness of AMs and IFAMs using 7-point scales (1=low, 
7=high).  Participants also indicated the perspective or point-of-view in their memory: 
they were instructed to judge a memory as having an ‘observer’ perspective if they 
saw themselves in the memory and to judge a ‘field’ perspective if they had 
something approximating to their original perspective or what would have been their 
original perspective for an IFAM.  Finally, participants were asked to judge the 
approximate age at which the memory had occurred.  They were instructed to 
plausibly fabricate this for IFAMs.  Lastly participants took part in short post-
experimental interviews in which they were asked how they had created their IFAMs. 
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2.3 Results 
 
Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations of recollective experience qualities made 
by participants for real and fabricated memories 
Memory Feature AM IFAM 
Vividness (1-7) **  5.3(.8)   4.5(0.9) 
Retention Interval (years) ** 1.9(1.6)  3.0(2.2) 
Memory / Imagine Generation Time 9968 (2713) 10702 (3114) 
Motion Words * 2.5(0.7) 2.9(1.1) 
Non-Fluencies (typed)   0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.1) 
Non-Fluencies (spoken) ** 1.7 (2.2) 3.3 (2.0) 
Complex Words 14.1 (3.3) 13.1 (1.9) 
Account Length (Word Count) 698 (414) 687 (518) 
**p<0.001, *p<0.005 
 
2.3.1 Recollective Qualities 
2 x 2 mixed model ANOVAs, with two levels of memory reporting (typed vs spoken) 
and two memory types (AM vs IFAM) were conducted for three separate recollective 
qualities (vividness, memory retrieval / image generation time and retention interval).  
A main effect of memory type was found for vividness, F(1, 64) = 27.2, MSe = 0.6, p < 
0.001, η2  = 0.3 and retention interval, F(1, 64) = 16.6, MSe = 2.1, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.2, 
indicating that AMs were reliably more vivid and had a reliably shorter retention 
interval, i.e. were more recent than IFAMs.  Modality was not found to produce 
reliable differences.  Table 2.1 shows the means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses).  No other reliable differences or correlations were found.  
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Table 2.2. Correlation matrix – Pearson’s correlations for retention interval and 
vividness ratings of real and fabricated memories 
 AM 
Vividness Rating 
IFAM 
Vividness Rating 
Real Memory Retention Interval * r = -0.4 
p < 0.005 
- 
Fabricated Memory Retention Interval - r = 0.0 
p > 0.05 
*p<0.005 
 
However, vividness and retention interval were investigated further since previous 
research has suggested that episodic memories degrade over time, such that older 
episodic memories may be recalled as less vivid than more recent episodic memories 
(Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Piolino, Desgranges, Benali, & Eustache, 2002).  Indeed, it has 
been proposed that an episodic memory becomes ‘semanticised’ over time (Cermak, 
1984) in that the event is recalled as a fact rather than an episodic memory, leading 
to a degradation of richness when remembering.  Therefore, since fabricated 
memories were reliably rated as occurring further in the past than truthful memories, 
it is important to understand whether their lowered vividness rating is caused by 
temporal placement of the memory on which the fabricated memory is based.  
Conversely, for truthful memories, it is important to understand whether their higher 
vividness rating is related to their more recent occurrence.  To investigate this 
association between vividness and retention interval, separate correlation analyses of 
these variables were conducted; see Table 2.2 for correlation matrix.  Results showed 
that for AMs, age was reliably positively correlated with vividness (r=0.4, p<0.005), 
such that the more recent the memory, the more vivid it was experienced. However, 
a reliable correlation was not found for fabricated memories, such that the temporal 
distance of the memory was not associated with its rated vividness. 
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 Table 2.3. Number of memories recalled with field and observer perspectives  
 Perspective 
 Field Observer 
Memory Type   
AM 425 135 
IFAM 267 293 
 
Memory perspective was investigated using Chi-Square, see Table 2.3.  It was found 
that 76% of AMs had a field perspective (the participant sees the memory through 
their own eyes) and the remaining 24% had an observer perspective (the participant 
sees himself/herself in the memory).  For IFAMs 48% of imagined events had an 
observer perspective with 52% a field perspective.  These differences in perspective 
between AMs and IFAMs were found to be reliable, χ2(1) = 94.4, p<0.001).  
2.3.2 Content Analysis 
Memory accounts were analysed for four predefined linguistic constructs: motion 
words, complex words, non-fluencies and account length for both AMs and IFAMs.  
The counts were made using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, LIWC, program 
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) and the totals for each memory in each of the 
IFAM and AM conditions were entered into separate 2 (memory reporting) x 2 
(memory type) ANOVAs.  A main effect of memory type was found for motion words 
(F(1, 63) = 10.7, MSe = 0.6, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.1) and an interaction effect was found for 
non-fluencies (F(1, 64) = 15.0, MSe = 1.1, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.2).  The means (see Table 
2.1) indicated that accounts of IFAMs featured reliably more motion words than AMs 
and reliably more non-fluencies than AMs but only when the memory was spoken.  
No other reliable differences were found. 
Finally, in the post-experimental interview, when asked how to describe how they 
had generated the fabricated memories, all participants stated that they had created 
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their IFAMs by either recalling specific memories and editing them, or by recalling an 
item of autobiographical knowledge and constructing a fabricated memory around it.  
Both strategies were common and most participants used both.  
2.4 Discussion 
The central findings of this study (Table 2.1 and Table 2.3) showed that there were 
systematic differences between IFAMs and truthful autobiographical memories despite 
the fact that IFAMs are based on existing autobiographical knowledge or specific 
autobiographical memories.  These differences are likely generated due to the additional 
processes involved with creating an IFAM, namely that of ‘editing’ a truthful memory in 
order to generate a novel mental representation.   
In particular, IFAMs were found to be less vivid and have a longer retention interval 
than real autobiographical memories.  According to Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye 
(1988), recollective qualities such as vividness help the rememberer to distinguish 
memories of experienced event from other forms of mental imagery such as, in this 
case, imagining.  Therefore, the heightened vividness ratings for the truthful 
memories may serve as an index for classification of memory source.  Additionally, it 
may be believed that an older memory is more likely to be considered true, as it 
represents an embedded memory.  Also, it may be believed that an older memory 
will suffer from the natural, and therefore irrefutable, process of forgetting than an 
event in the near past, allowing for it to be a less accurate and therefore less vivid 
mental representation.  It may be beliefs such as these that mediated the decisions to 
place IFAMs further back in time than truthful memories.   
However, it was found that vividness correlated with retention interval, insofar that 
more recent memories were more rated as more vivid, for real autobiographical 
memories only.  It appears that some interesting beliefs regarding the nature of 
memory underlie these constructs (see chapter four for a discussion of beliefs about 
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autobiographical memory), for example, it may be the case that the public are 
unaware of the degradation of vividness over retention interval and therefore, it did 
not influence their judgments and ratings of their IFAMs.    
Linguistic analysis showed that IFAMs contained more motion words (“go”, “walk”) and 
more non-fluencies (however, this was only observed when the memory was spoken) 
than real memories (Newman et al, 2003).  Both motion words and non-fluencies are 
thought to reflect increased cognitive effort (Bond & Lee, 2005; Newman et al., 2003).  It 
is suggested that an increase in cognitive effort arises from two novel processes within 
IFAM production.  Firstly, it is assumed that consciously editing a memory will increase 
the cognitive effort associated with remembering.  The responses from the post-
experimental interview suggested that editing often occurs through a process of deletion-
substitution: for instance, the memory “Going the new Italian restaurant with X, Y, and Z, 
last Saturday” might be edited to “Going the usual restaurant with X, Y, and Z, last 
Saturday”.  This process is likely to be considerably more complex and effortful than 
memory retrieval.  Secondly, the effort associated with holding a novel mental 
representation in mind and subsequently describing it is likely to be higher than when 
retaining and describing a more permanent mental image.  Holding this image in mind 
may require constant refreshing to maintain the altered or substituted detail (Kossyln, 
1983).  These two processes are likely to inflate cognitive effort associated with IFAM 
construction and are therefore subsequently reflected in the linguistic content of the 
IFAM description. 
Finally, a further finding, shown in Table 2.3, is that of the differences in perspective 
taken in real memories and IFAMs.  Real memories were strongly associated with a field 
perspective, as is consistent with previous work (Heaps & Nash, 2001).  Indeed, 
perspective of real memory has been found to be altered to an observer perspective only 
when an experience is considered negative (Freud, 1915, Nigro & Neisser, 1983) or when 
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a memory is considered incompatible with a current self-concept (Libby et al., 2005).  
Further, Freud (1915) originally noted that a memory with an observer perspective is 
indicative of processing or ‘editing’ following memory formation.  It is therefore 
suggested that the higher frequency of observer perspectives taken during IFAM 
generation may reflect this ‘editing’ of the original memory, which for some may render 
the new image incompatible with the current self-concept.  Although the scope of the 
present data cannot provide a definitive answer, what can be concluded is that IFAMs are 
equally as likely to have a field or observer perspective, whereas truthful 
autobiographical memories are very frequently presented with a field perspective.   
2.5 Conclusions 
In sum, data from both recollective qualities and linguistics suggest a process of IFAM 
generation that is more effortful than AM generation.  IFAMs are less vivid, less recent, 
do not have an association between vividness and age and require more cognitive effort 
to construct.  Additionally, IFAMs are less likely than real memories to have a field 
perspective.  Further, they contain language that is representative of a reduction in 
cognitive complexity, such as an increase in the use of motion words and an increase in 
the number of (spoken) non-fluencies.  These differences in characteristics and verbal 
description of the two types of memories reflect the differing cognitive processes 
underlying IFAM and AM generation, strengthening the argument that IFAMs are more 
effortful to generate due to an additional process of ‘editing’.   
The present experiment is the first to investigate the processes by which IFAMs are 
generated.  Understanding these processes is integral to future work investigating 
IFAMs and lying more generally.  Understanding the cognitive processes involved with 
fabricated memory generation may lead to new ways to identify IFAMs.  
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Chapter Three 
 
3 The Effect of Secondary Task Demands on the 
Generation of Truthful and Fabricated Memories 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter helped to establish that the process of generating an 
intentionally fabricated memory involves firstly retrieving generic or more specific 
knowledge from long-term memory and then consciously editing this information to 
generate a novel mental representation – an IFAM.  Differing cognitive processes 
between AM and IFAM generation resulted in reliable differences in language and 
phenomenology that in turn indicated an IFAM was more cognitively effortful to 
generate compared to the generation of a truthful autobiographical memory.  The 
additional cognitive effort associated with IFAM generation was attributed to the 
additional process of editing that takes place only in IFAM generation.  
This next chapter aimed to test this assertion empirically by investigating the 
cognitive load associated with truthful and fabricated memory generation using a 
dual-task procedure, explicitly aimed at taxing cognitive resources through the 
inclusion of a concurrent numerical memory task.   
3.1.1 Predictions 
Since it has been shown that a fabricated memory is more cognitively taxing to 
generate than a truthful autobiographical memory, it is expected that IFAM 
generation will impact more on a secondary task than AM generation.  For example, 
secondary task accuracy is expected to be lower during the generation phase of a 
memory not based on real experience as opposed to the generation phase of a 
memory that is grounded in truthful experience due to additional cognitive processes 
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involved with IFAM generation.  Further, the number of correctly remembered digits 
is expected to be lower during IFAM generation than during truthful AM generation.   
Since the secondary task will only be present during the generation phase of memory 
creation, no additional differences from those already noted from the previous 
chapter are expected to be found when the memory is elaborated – such as within 
the language use or the descriptions of phenomenology, hence the same measures 
will be used.   
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants  
Thirty-one participants were recruited for the study (19 females and 12 males).  Their 
ages ranged from 19 - 37 years, with a mean age of 25.  All participants received a 
small payment in return for their participation.  
3.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Trial Presentation Order 
 
Figure 3.2. Dual Task Trial Presentation Order 
 
RECALL 
NO NUMBER 
Going to a 
restaurant 
Enter memory 
description 
How vivid was 
this memory? 
From what 
perspective do 
you see 
yourself? 
At what age 
did this event 
occur? 
RECALL 
WITH 
NUMBER 
26509811 
Going to a 
restaurant 
Enter 
number 
Enter 
memory 
description 
How vivid 
was this 
memory? 
From what 
perspective 
do you see 
yourself? 
At what age 
did this 
event 
occur? 
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Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the presentation order of cues and ratings for each 
trial for both conditions of the study.  Participants were tested individually and all 
testing was completed using a computer.  Participants completed the experiment 
using software designed for running psychological studies, E-Prime.  Participants were 
presented with a screen displaying “RECALL WITH NUMBER”, “RECALL NO NUMBER”, 
and “IMAGINE WITH NUMBER” or “IMAGINE NO NUMBER” which remained on 
screen until the participant indicated they were ready to continue by pressing the 
space bar.  For recall and imagine no number conditions a cue was displayed, e.g. 
going to a restaurant which remained on the screen until the participant indicated, by 
pressing the space bar, that they had retrieved a memory, or fabricated a memory for 
the cue.  For recall and imagine with number conditions participants were presented 
with 8 digit sequences for 2000ms (Heaver and Hutton, 2011; Gil-Gomez Liano and 
Botella, 2011) prior to presentation of the cue.  Participants were asked to hold this 
number in mind whilst generating a memory and to then enter the number, on a 
separate screen, following memory generation.  Participants were instructed to be as 
accurate as possible when entering the number.  
There were 16 cues naming common everyday activities, (taken from Bower, Black, & 
Turner, 1979; Trafimow & Wyer, 1993; Reiser, Black, & Abelson, 1985), see appendix 
III for cue lists.  Cues were identical to those used in chapter two, with the sixteen 
cues scoring the highest ‘ease to recall/imagine’ score in the event suitability survey 
(see appendix II) selected for use in the present study.  Cues were randomly assigned 
to four blocks of 4 trials and were counterbalanced across participants and 
conditions, ensuring that all cues were used to generate both IFAMs and AMs and 
under both load and no load conditions.  One block of 4 cues instructed the 
participant to recall whilst holding a number in mind, one asked to recall without 
holding a number in mind, one asked to imagine whilst holding a number in mind, the 
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other asked to imagine without holding a number in mind.  There was a short 2-
mimute pause between blocks while the instructions, indicating what condition 
would be presented for the next block, were reviewed.   
Participants were instructed to either generate a truthful memory or imagine an 
event that had never occurred associated with the given cue.  They were then 
instructed to press the space bar once they had brought clearly to mind a memory or 
imagined a fabricated past event, there was no upper or lower time limit on memory 
retrieval / image generation.  Participants were instructed to ensure all fabricated 
events occurred in the past and to describe them as if they were trying to convince 
another person that the event had actually been experienced.  For AMs they were 
instructed to bring to mind a memory of an event which they had directly 
experienced that had lasted for minutes or hours but no longer than one day. Both 
types of memory could be recalled or located at any point in their own personal past. 
Participants were instructed to construct memories as quickly as they could but to 
ensure they were specific.  
Memory retrieval, image generation and number input times were recorded in 
milliseconds from cue on-screen to space bar press.  After a memory had been 
provided, participants rated the vividness of AMs and IFAMs using 7-point scales 
(1=low, 7=high).  Participants also indicated the perspective or point-of-view in their 
memory: they were instructed to judge a memory as having an ‘observer’ perspective 
if they saw themselves in the memory and to judge a ‘field’ perspective if they had 
something approximating to their original perspective or what would have been their 
original perspective for an IFAM.  Finally, participants were asked to judge the 
approximate age at which the memory had occurred.  They were instructed to 
plausibly fabricate this information for IFAMs. 
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3.3 Results 
 
3.3.1 Secondary Task  
3.3.1.1 Manipulation Check 
 
Table 3.1. Percentage number of trials with <6, 6, 7 and 8 correct digits 
Digits Correct AM IFAM 
< 6 4.0 12.0 
6 4.0 6.9 
7 20.1 36.0 
8* 95.0 69.0 
*p < 0.001 
To ensure participants had been performing the concurrent task correctly, the 
number of correct digits entered by participants, regardless of order, was counted.  It 
was found that 97% of participants correctly entered six digits or more whilst 
concurrently generating a truthful memory, and 90% entered a number containing six 
or more correct digits whilst concurrently generating a fabricated memory.  
Interestingly however, differences in the amount of correct digits were observed 
between conditions.  Reliably more participants entered completely correct (8 digits 
in any order) numbers whilst generating a real autobiographical memory, than when 
they were generating an IFAM, t(1, 30) = 5.0, p < 0.001, d = 1.6, see Table 3.1. 
3.3.2 Secondary Task Accuracy 
Results revealed that participants entered reliably fewer entire numbers in correct 
serial order (out of a total of 4 inputted numbers for each condition) following IFAM 
generation (m = 0.65, S.D. 1.2) than after recalling a memory of an experienced event 
(m = 1.6, S.D. 0.8), t(1, 30) = 5.0, p < 0.001, d = 0.9.  Note – answers were only scored 
as being in correct serial order if all numbers matched the originally presented 
number; this was done due to the complexity of analysing such numerical data for 
accuracy.  Seen as percentages, after generating an IFAM, participants entered the 
81 
 
entire original number in correct serial order only 16% of the time, whereas after 
remembering real events, participants entered the entire original number in correct 
serial order 40% of the time.   
Participants were also found to take reliably longer to input their number after 
fabricating a memory (9554ms, S.D. 3079ms) than after retrieving a memory of 
experienced events (8155ms, S.D. 3051ms), t(1, 30) = 4.2, p < 0.01, d = 0.5.   
3.3.3 Memory Recall / Image Generation Times
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Table 3.2.  Means and standard deviations of a memory recall times, recollective qualities and linguistic features of real and fabricated 
memories.  
Memory Feature AM with Load IFAM with Load AM without Load IFAM without Load 
Memory Recall Time * 9708 (9272) 13794 (16395) 8275 (6392) 11803 (12660) 
Vividness (1-7) **  5.3(1.0)  4.3(1.2) 5.4 (1.2) 4.2 (1.2) 
Account Length 377 (187) 334 (194) 371 (159) 339 (171) 
Retention Interval 3.1 (3.0) 3.4 (2.8) 3.3 (3.1) 3.5 (2.3) 
Motion Words * 2.9 (0.9) 3.6 (1.2) 3.4 (1.1) 3.5 (1.0) 
Six Letter Words 14.5 (3.1) 13.7 (2.6) 13.3 (2.9) 13.6 (3.2) 
** p < 0.001 *p<0.05 (reliable main effects were found for memory recall times and vividness, an interaction effect was found for motion 
words)
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Memory retrieval times (see Table 3.2) were investigated using a 2 (AM or IFAM) x 2 
(load or no load) repeated measures ANOVA.  A main effort of condition was revealed 
such that IFAMs took significantly longer to retrieve than memories of experienced 
events F(1, 30)=5.2, MSe = 17028741, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.2.  Although the main effect of 
load increased both AMs and IFAMs generation time, the difference was not found to 
be reliable.  This is likely due to the variation found in such memory recall and shown 
here by very large standard deviations.   
3.3.4 Recollective Qualities 
Two recollective qualities (vividness and retention interval) were entered into 
separate 2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs, with two levels of memory condition (AM 
and IFAM) and two levels of dual task (with or without).  Results revealed a main 
effect of condition for vividness (F(1, 30) = 24.0, MSe = 1.3, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.4), 
indicating that IFAMs were reliably less vivid than AMs.  Table 3.2 shows the means 
and standard deviations (in parentheses).  No other reliable differences were found. 
Table 3.3. Number of memories recalled with field and observer perspectives  
 Memory Type Own eyes See Self 
AM Load 95 29 
AM No Load 90 34 
IFAM Load 54 70 
IFAM No Load 58 66 
   
Total AM 185 63 
Total IFAM 112 136 
 
Since frequencies of perspective were so similar across load types (see Table 3.3), 
results were collapsed across conditions.  Memory perspective was investigated using 
Chi-Square.  It was found that 75% of AMs had a field perspective (the participant 
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sees the memory through their own eyes) and the remaining 25% had an observer 
perspective (the participant sees themselves in the memory).  For IFAMs 45% of 
imagined events had an observer perspective with 54% having a field perspective.  
These differences in perspective between AMs and IFAMs were found to be reliable 
overall, (χ2(1) = 44.7, p<0.001).  
3.3.5 Content Analysis  
Memory accounts were analysed for three predefined linguistic constructs: motion 
words, account length and six letter words for both true and imagined accounts, 
Table 3.2.  The counts were made using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, LIWC, 
program (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) and the totals for each memory in 
each of the IFAM and AM conditions entered into separate 2 (memory type) x 2 (load 
or no load) ANOVAs.  An interaction effect was found for motion words (F(1, 30)= 4.3, 
MSe = 1.0, p < 0.05, η2 =0.1).  Indicating that IFAM accounts contained reliably more 
motion words (MD = -0.4, p<0.05) than AM accounts, but only under the load 
condition.  No other reliable differences were found. 
3.4 Discussion 
The present findings show that generating an IFAM impacted more on secondary task 
ability and accuracy as compared to truthful AM generation, indicating that the 
generation phase of memory retrieval is more cognitively effortful for intentionally 
fabricated than truthful autobiographical memories.   
In previous work (chapter two) it was suggested that creation of an IFAM involves a 
process of firstly accessing information or specific detail in long-term memory 
followed by a conscious process of editing: a memory is first recalled, which in itself is 
effortful, followed by a period of editions leading to the creating of a novel mental 
representation.  This additional process of editing, of deletion-substitution, leads to a 
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more effortful generation compared to AM generation.  Results from the present 
study serve to support the above hypothesis. 
Results indicated that the majority of participants recalled at least six digits of the 
original number, indicating that there was a concurrent memory load.  However, 
when concurrently generating an IFAM, reliably fewer participants recalled all eight 
digits, in any order, as compared to recall when generating a truthful memory.  
Further, IFAMs were found to have fewer numbers recalled in original sequence as 
compared to truthful AMs.  Number input time was also reliably slower whilst 
concurrently generating IFAMs as compared to concurrently generating truthful AMs.  
In other words, participants took longer to input the concurrent number following 
IFAM generation and the accuracy of these numbers was reliably lower for both serial 
and non-serial order recall, as compared to AM generation.  These results serve to 
further underscore the increased cognitive effort associated with IFAM generation 
since finite cognitive resources were already depleted due to the additional phases 
associated with IFAM construction, leaving little cognitive resource left for additional 
tasks.  Finally, IFAM construction in the no-load conditions took reliably longer than 
AM construction, further suggesting the occurrence of an additional processes such 
as conscious editing.   
It was also found that IFAMs were rated as less vivid, contained more motion words 
and were seen equally through field and observer perspective. AMs, on the other 
hand, were rated a more vivid, contained fewer motion words and were recalled 
through a first person perspective most frequently.  These findings are highly 
consistent with those in chapter one, suggesting robust effects.  Although these are 
discussed in detail in chapter one, they are briefly considered here too.   
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It is known that episodic memories contain detailed recollective qualities (Martin A 
Conway, 2009) which not only allow the rememberer to have a subjective sense of 
self in the past (Klein, 2001) but also provide criteria for distinction between other 
forms of mental representations (Arbuthnott, Geelen, & Kealy, 2002; Johnson et al., 
1988).  Here then, the differences in the vividness of these details may play an 
important role in the distinction between real autobiographical memories and 
deliberately fabricated autobiographical memories, those things that have been 
imagined.  
In addition, the previous experiment reported in chapter two revealed that IFAMs 
contained linguistic constructs, such as increased use of motion words and greater 
use of non-fluencies, that have been found to be artefacts of cognitively effortful 
recall (Newman et al., 2010).  The use of motion words in accounts is assumed to 
reflect increased cognitive effort since motion words serve to simplify an account 
(Newman et al., 2010).  Here however, this linguistic construct was found within IFAM 
accounts, but only after the load condition.  It may be that this cue is more 
transparent in this condition to help reduce the cognitive complexity associated with 
generating an account under load.  More importantly, however, the results indicate 
that the use of ‘motion’ words may not be a reliable cue to deception, as frequency of 
use of motion words differed dependent upon load.   
Finally, Freud (1915) originally noted that a change in the perspective of a memory 
reflected some kind of revision of distortion.  Indeed, perspective change tends only 
to occur for negative emotional events (Nigro & Neisser, 1983) and for those 
memories which represented a past self that is incompatible with aspects of the 
current self (Libby et al., 2005).  Here then the high frequency of IFAMs reported from 
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an observer perspective suggests editing of some kind such that the memory is no 
longer visualised from its original perspective.  
3.5 Conclusions 
In summary, results have shown that IFAM generation impacts more on secondary 
task accuracy than AM generation suggesting that the generation phase of an IFAM is 
more effortful than the generation phase of an AM.  This increased cognitive effort 
associated with IFAM retrieval is attributed to a conscious ‘editing’ phase.  This 
finding was reflected both in the dual task data, as was evidenced by poorer 
performance on the secondary task whilst generating a fabricated memory as 
compared to whilst generating a truthful memory, and also in the recollective 
qualities data which was indicative of increased cognitive effort though linguistic 
analysis.  Both these findings serve to support the notion that information from long-
term memory is accessed and subsequently altered to produce an IFAM.
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Chapter Four 
4 Beliefs About Autobiographical Memory 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As was noted in chapter one, little is known about the beliefs that the public hold 
about autobiographical memory.  It is particularly important that these beliefs are 
understood since, the only way individuals can evaluate memories is on the basis of 
their own knowledge and beliefs about memory, so called: common sense.  This issue 
is particularly pertinent when members of the public form a jury, as has been noted, 
there have been calls by judges for jurors to ensure that they rely on their common 
sense judgements regarding memory, for example, in R. v. Adams, D.J. (1997, as cited 
in Lynch & McNally, 2003) jurors were required “to evaluate evidence and reach a 
conclusion not by means of a formula, mathematical or otherwise, but by the joint 
application of their individual common sense and knowledge of the world to the 
evidence before them”.   Additionally, in the case of R v Weller (2010), the jury were 
reminded that “if one tries to question science purely by reference to published 
papers and without the practical day-to-day experience upon which others have 
reached a judgment that attack is likely to fail…”.   
The question must then be asked: what is common sense about memory?  Previous 
studies that have investigated the public’s, judges’ and even psychologists’ beliefs 
about memory in general (Desmarais & Read, 2011; Magnussen et al., 2006; 
Magnussen & Melinder, 2011; Simons & Chabris, 2011; Wise & Safer, 2004) have 
found that although mostly all groups had a good basic understanding of memory and 
eye witness ability, a number of questions, for example those concerning repression, 
and the capacity and nature of long-term memory, revealed views divergent from 
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current scientific evidence (Magnussen & Melinder, 2011).  This chapter therefore 
reports the results of a survey based that probed beliefs about autobiographical 
memory in an attempt to ascertain what level of understanding the public has about 
autobiographical remembering.   
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants  
There were 233 respondents drawn from the staff and students of the University of 
Leeds, 25 male, 208 female.  Of these 185 respondents were students and 48 staff.  
Mean age was 21 with a range of 18-67 years of age. 
4.2.2 The Questionnaire  
4.2.2.1 Question Generation 
Questions were chosen as they were believed to probe particular facets of 
autobiographical memory.  The questions were generated with regards to items used 
previous studies (Desmarais & Read, 2011; Magnussen et al., 2006; Magnussen & 
Melinder, 2011; Simons & Chabris, 2011; Wise & Safer, 2004) to ensure questions 
were novel.   
4.2.2.2 Pilot Testing 
The questionnaire was pilot tested using a small student and non-student sample.  
Pilot participants were asked for feedback following their completion of the 
questionnaire.  In line with feedback, some questions were clarified and some 
response categories were altered from fixed response categories to open-ended 
responses.  An additional demographic measure of ‘psychology education level 
achieved’ was also included to investigate whether individuals who had some 
psychological background would provide different answers to those with a non-
psychological background. 
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4.2.2.3 Final Questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained 27 questions and statements (see appendix IV), 
addressing different aspects of autobiographical memory.  The questions and 
statements were judged using a variety of response categories including 7-point 
scales (based on response categories in previous literature (Desmarais & Read, 2011; 
Magnussen et al., 2006; Magnussen & Melinder, 2011), fixed choices and open-ended 
questions.  The questions sampled beliefs about a person’s own memories and their 
beliefs about the memories of other people.  They addressed issues of accuracy and 
detail and focussed on memory for everyday as well as emotional events.  Separate 
sets of questions dealt with childhood memories and memory in the courtroom.  
Respondents also answered a number of demographic questions concerning gender, 
employment, education level and formal education in Psychology.  None of the 
demographic measures gave rise to reliable effects and consequently are not 
reported further. 
4.3 Results 
Before reviewing the results, it is important to note that on some occasions, only a 
small percentage of people either ‘very much’ or ‘completely agreed’ with the 
statements provided in the questionnaire, suggesting that an absolute acceptance of 
certain beliefs may be limited to a small percentages of respondents, with the 
majority of those agreeing often only answering with ‘slightly agree’.  Although there 
exists a degree of difference in strength of belief here, what is important are the 
percentages of those participants who hold the belief to be true or who could be 
persuaded to hold the belief to be true.  It was felt that with this line of thought, it 
would be appropriate to group all ‘agree’ responses insofar that these respondents at 
least have the potential to hold the beliefs identified below to be true.   
4.3.1 Judgments of accuracy, detail, emotion and memory vividness
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Table 4.1. Percentage participants responding in each answer category 
Question/Statement Completely 
Inaccurate 
/ Vague 
Very 
Inaccurate 
/ Vague 
Slightly 
Inaccurate 
/ Vague 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Accurate 
/ Detailed 
Very 
Accurate 
/ Detailed 
Completely 
Accurate / 
Detailed 
Are Everyday Memories Accurate? 
Own Memory 0 5.2 10.7 2.1 42.1 39.9 0 
Others’ Memory 0 2.6 9.9 6.4 53.2 27.9 0 
        
Are Everyday Memories Detailed? 
Own Memory 0 5.6 13.3 7.3 40.8 30.5 2.6 
Others’ Memory 0 3.4 9.0 13.3 54.5 19.3 0.4 
Question/Statement Completely 
disagree 
Very Much 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Very 
Much 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
        
Memory Does not change over time 15.5 38.2 29.2 2.1 7.7 6.0 1.3 
        
Memory is a snapshot of an original experience 17.2 28.3 29.2 10.7 11.6 2.6 0.4 
        
There is a limit to what we can remember 10.3 12.0 18.0 15.0 15.5 16.7 9.9 
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As shown in Table 4.1, the majority of respondents (81%) indicated that they believed 
their own and the memory of others (82%) to be ‘slightly’ or ‘very’ accurate 
representations of the original experience.  No respondent believed their memory to 
be completely accurate and few believed their own or the memories of others to be 
inaccurate to any marked extent.  Interestingly, however, there was a reliable overall 
difference in ratings of accuracy of own and others’ memory (χ2(13) = 778.7, p 
<0.0001).  Post-hoc analysis, using Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Tests with a Bonferroni 
corrected p < 0.007 (used throughout unless otherwise stated), found that 
respondents rated their own memory as ‘very accurate’ reliably more than they rated 
the memories of others as ‘very accurate’, (Z = -3.8, p < 0.007).  Conversely they 
judged the memories of others as ‘slightly accurate’ reliably more often than they 
rated their own memory as ‘slightly accurate’ (Z = -3.2, p < 0.001).  In other words, 
the respondents had more belief in the accuracy of their own memories than in the 
accuracy of the memories of other people.  Reflecting, perhaps, a bias in confidence 
in favour of the self.  
The same pattern of results was found for judgements regarding memory details.  
There was a reliable overall effect of own versus others (χ2(13) = 639.0, p < 0.001) in 
rated memory detail, with own being rated higher.  Post-hoc analysis found that 
respondents rated their own memory as ‘very detailed’ reliably more often than they 
rated the memories of others as ‘very detailed’ (Z = -3.1 p < 0.005).  Conversely, the 
memories of others were rated as ‘slightly detailed’ reliably more often than they 
rated their own memories as ‘slightly detailed’ (Z = 3.5, p < 0.005).  Finally, high 
positive correlations were found between accuracy and detail ratings for own 
memory, r=0.62, p<0.001, and between accuracy and detail ratings for other’s 
memory, r=0.63, p<0.001, such that those respondents who reported their own and 
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others’ memories as being detailed also reported their own and others’ memories as 
being accurate  
Respondents generally believed then that their own memories were highly accurate 
and detailed and more accurate and detailed than the memories of other people - 
which, of course, is most unlikely to be the case.  Possibly this (implicit) belief arises 
simply because we know our own memories better than we know the memories of 
others – a familiarity effect that leads to over-confidence in the accuracy and 
specificity of one’s own memory.  Positive correlations between accuracy and detail 
ratings for own and other memories would seem likely to reflect a belief that the 
more detail a memory has the more likely it is to be accurate.  This pattern of over-
confident belief in the accuracy and detail of one’s own memories relative to others is 
referred to here as the Memory Self-Superiority (MSS) Belief, and to the belief that 
accuracy increases with increasing detail, as the Memory-Accuracy-Detail (MAD) 
Belief.  
Turning next to beliefs about emotional experiences and specifically to the belief that 
highly emotional experiences give rise to highly accurate memories.  Controversial 
though this belief may be it is nonetheless a widespread belief and Magnussen, et al. 
(2006), for instance, found that over 70% of respondents in their survey believed 
memory for a dramatic event to be more accurate than memory for an everyday 
event. In the present survey this figure was even higher and we found that over 80% 
of respondents believed that their own and the memory of others for emotional 
events would be more accurate than less emotional more everyday events (Z = -11.8, 
p < 0.001 and Z = -12.1, p < 0.001 respectively).  Related to this finding were 
judgements of the statement that “the more vivid a general, everyday, memory is, 
the more accurate it is”.  In the present sample 69% of respondents agreed with this 
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statement, to at least some extent.  In contrast, only 23% disagreed with it.  Although 
scientific literature has contrasting findings regarding the association of vividness and 
accuracy (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Christianson & Safer, 1996) results from chapter two 
and three suggest that vividness may be associated with truthful AM, as findings 
indicated that AMs were rated as reliably more vivid than IFAMs.  In any case, 
participants agreed to varying extents that vividness and accuracy are associated, and 
that emotional memories are more accurate than everyday events.  Taken together 
this belief is referred to as the Burnt-In-Memory (BIM) Belief.  
Another belief that was probed was the claim that a memory stays the same over 
time, regardless of whether opinions or attitudes change over time.  Interestingly, 
83% of respondents ‘completely’, ‘very much’ or ‘slightly’ disagreed with this 
statement, whilst only 15% ‘agreed’ (to varying degrees), a reliable difference (Z = -
8.9, p < 0.001).  Thus, the majority of participants believed memory to be malleable. 
Relatedly, in response to the statement: “A memory is like a snapshot of what we 
witness or experience - it is clear and accurate”.  Respondents (75%) generally 
disagreed and indicated their disagreement, to varying degrees, with only 14% 
agreeing (Z = -5.8, p <0.001).  Interestingly, 11% of the sample answered with ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’ suggesting a group who could, perhaps, be persuaded one way or 
the other.  Thus, there could potentially be up to 25% of the sample who do, or who 
could come to believe, that memory is like a photograph.  Overall, however, memory 
was believed, with varying degrees of conviction, to be malleable and not of 
snapshot/photograph accuracy, and presumably, therefore, fragmentary.  This is 
referred to here as the Memory-Malleable-Fragment (MMF) Belief, and note that the 
MMF belief is highly inconsistent with the MAD belief identified earlier.  I also note 
the converse of the MMF belief, the Unchanging-Clear-Photograph (UCP) Belief.  The 
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UCP belief is more consistent with the MAD belief and, according to the present 
findings, could potentially be held by as many as 1 in 5 people. 
 Most strikingly for the statements: “Some people have better memories for their 
personal life events than others” and “If two people witness the same event, their 
memories will be almost exactly the same”, over 99% of the sample agreed with the 
first statement and over 94% disagreed with second.  We term this the Memory 
Individual Differences (MID) Belief.  Finally, in judging the statement: “There is a limit 
to how much we can remember about our lives”, responses were mixed and 40% 
‘completely’, ‘very much’ or ‘slightly’ agreed whereas 42% completely, ‘very much’ or 
‘slightly’ disagreed. There were also 15% of respondents who answered with ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’.  Thus it would seem that there are two opposed beliefs 
commonly held, to varying degrees, about the capacity of long-term autobiographical 
memory: one is that it is limited and the other that it is limitless, a belief is termed 
here the Memory-Limited-Unlimited (MLU) belief. 
4.3.2 Judgments of Earliest Memories: Age, Accuracy, Details & Vividness 
Respondents were asked to recall their first memory and their age at the time of the 
remembered experience.  They were also asked to give their estimate of the earliest 
age from which it would be possible for anyone to have a first memory.  Note that, 
mean age of first memory usually dates to about 3 years 4 months, with quite marked 
variability around this mean, although very few memories date to below the age of 
about 2 years 6 months (Rubin, 2000).  In the present study mean age of own first 
memory was judged as 4.0 (S.D. 1.1) years.  In contrast, the mean estimated age of 
others’ first memories was judged to be 3.2 (S.D. 1.0) years, nearly a full year earlier 
than own memory, and this difference was reliable (t(232) = 11.0, p < 0.001, d = 0.8). 
Remarkably then respondents believed that other people were capable of 
remembering earlier first memories than they themselves were.  Two important 
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points from this findings are that, i) people do not appear be using their own 
memories to make such estimates, and ii) it follows that most people would be willing 
to accept a first memory that dated to an age earlier than their own first memory.  
Both have important implications for judgements of childhood memories in legal 
settings where childhood memory, for example of abuse, is the evidence.  
Table 4.2. Percentages of participants reporting own and other’s earliest memory at 
each age group 
Age at 
which 
memory 
occurred 
Percentage 
Ratings for 
Own 
Memory 
Percentage 
Ratings for 
Others' 
Memory 
Birth 0.0 1.7 
1 0.0 0.9 
2 6.4 18.0 
3 24.9 41.6 
4 37.8 24.5 
5 21.0 8.6 
>5 9.9 4.7 
 
In analyses (the same as those reported earlier) comparisons were made between 
own and other first memories across age categories from birth up to age 5+years (see 
Table 4.2).  Reliable differences were found between the following age categories age 
2 years, (Z = -4.4, p < 0.001) own<other, age 3 years (Z = -4.0, p < 0.001), own<other, 
age 4 years (Z = -3.3, p < 0.001), own>other, age 5 years (Z = -4.0, p < 0.001), 
own>other, and greater than age 5 (Z = -3.4, p < 0.001), own>other. 
These findings then address beliefs about the period of childhood amnesia.  As 
expected a very small number of people, less than 1%, indicated that they had an 
earliest memory dating to the age of two years and none dated their own earliest 
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memory to the age of 1 year and birth.  However, over 20% of these same 
respondents believed that first memories were possible for other people dating to 2 
years of age and below.  Remarkably, a small group judged that other people’s 
memories dating to birth were possible too.  These findings show judgements of 
memories are based on beliefs about earliest memories rather than on one’s own 
earliest memory and/or scientific findings that define the period of childhood 
amnesia.  Possibly people have been exposed to others who claim memories dating 
to these ages.  In a current on-going large scale survey of earliest memories it has 
been found that over 20% of respondents (approximately 1500 people) claimed that 
their earliest memory dated to the age of 2 years or earlier.  Such claims may 
influence people whose own earliest memories date only to the 3 to 5 year-old 
period, or older, and lead them to believe that recalling memories from these earlier 
ages is possible, if not for them, but for others.  This is termed here the Earliest 
Memory Overestimation (EMO) Belief.  Clearly, the EMO belief has important 
implications for judgements of early memories when these constitute ‘evidence’ in 
legal proceedings. 
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Table 4.3. Percentage participants responding in each answer category 
Question/Statement Completely 
Inaccurate / 
Vague 
Very 
Inaccurate / 
Vague 
Slightly 
Inaccurate / 
Vague 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Accurate 
/ Detailed 
Very 
Accurate / 
Detailed 
Completely 
Accurate / 
Detailed 
Are First Memories Accurate? 
Own Memory 2.1 21.5 26.2 4.7 27.9 15.5 2.1 
Others’ Memory 5.6 23.6 25.3 6.0 25.3 12.4 1.7 
        
Are First Memories Detailed? 
Own Memory 3.4 31.8 36.5 5.6 19.7 3.0 0.0 
Others’ Memory 5.2 32.2 29.6 6.9 21.9 3.9 0.4 
Question/Statement Completely 
disagree 
Very Much 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Very Much 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
The more vivid a memory is, the more accurate it is 
Everyday Memories 1.7 4.7 16.3 8.6 34.3 32.6 1.7 
Childhood Memories 1.7 6.4 21.5 16.3 33.0 19.7 1.3 
       
 The more detailed a memory is, the more accurate it is 
Everyday Memories 1.7 5.6 15.0 7.7 39.9 28.8 1.3 
Childhood Memories 2.1 8.2 19.3 13.3 35.6 20.6 0.9 
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Table 4.3 shows the percentage of participants using each answer category for 
accuracy of earliest memories and it can be seen that 46% of respondents rated the 
accuracy of their own first memory as ‘completely’, ‘very’ or ‘slightly’ accurate.  In 
direct contrast, the remaining respondents rated their first memory as ‘completely’, 
‘very’ or ‘slightly’ inaccurate.  This bimodal distribution indicates that there are two 
distinct and opposed beliefs about the accuracy of first memories.  One belief, held 
with varying degrees of conviction, is that the first memories are to varying degrees 
accurate and the other belief is that first memories are to varying degrees inaccurate.  
Although these polarised beliefs appear to underlie judgements of accuracy of a 
person’s own earliest memory, the situation was found to be quite different and 
highly inconsistent for accuracy judgments of another person’s earliest memory. 
Here, 72% of respondents believed others’ first memory to be ‘completely’, ‘slightly’ 
or ‘very’ inaccurate, with only 23% believing it to be ‘completely’, ‘slightly’ or ‘very’ 
accurate.  Thus, there is a shift from the two-belief bimodal distribution of accuracy 
judgments of own first memory to a unimodal distribution for accuracy judgements of 
the first memories of others.  Essentially the first memories of others were judged to 
be low in accuracy.  Statistical analyses found a reliable difference overall difference 
between estimated accuracy of own compared to others first memory (χ2(13) = 374.3, 
p < 0.001).  Post-hoc analysis found own first memory to be less frequently rated as 
‘very’ inaccurate compared to others’ first memory (Z = -3.5, p < 0.001).  Similarly, 
own first memory was less frequently rated as ‘slightly’ inaccurate compared to 
others’ first memory (Z = -2.7, p < 0.007).  Conversely, respondents were more likely 
to rate their own first memory as ‘very’ accurate more frequently than they rated 
others’ first memory as ‘very’ accurate (Z = -4.8, p < 0.001).  Indeed, 16% of 
respondets rated their own first memory as ‘very’ accurate compared to only 3% of 
respondents who rated other’s first memory ‘very’ accurate.  It is also interesting to 
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note that a small percentage of respondents believed their first memory to be 
‘completely’ accurate, whereas no respodents judged others’ first memory 
‘completely’ accurate.  
Turning next to the rated details of first memories, a highly similar pattern of findings 
was observed (see Table 4.3).  Here, 40% rated their own first memory as 
‘completely’, ‘very’ or ‘slightly’ detailed in contrast to 55% of who rated their first 
memory as ‘completely’, ‘very’ or ‘slightly’ vague.  A clearly bimodal distribution, in 
which one group judged their first memory as detailed and the other group judged it 
as vague.  In contrast, 67% of respondents rated others’ first memory as completely, 
very or slightly vague, with only 26% rating others’ first memory as ‘completely’, 
‘very’ or ‘slightly’ detailed.  Together with the accuracy findings for own and others’ 
earliest memory we suggest this reflects a MSS, held with varying degrees of 
conviction, for earliest memories and will refer to it below as childhood Memory Self 
Superiority (cMMS) Belief.  Most interestingly, positive correlations between accuracy 
and detail ratings in own first memory, r=0.58, p<0.001, and in others’ first memory, 
r=0.64, p<0.001, show the MAD belief in operation for early memories, i.e. the more 
details the better the accuracy.  We refer to this as the childhood Memory-Accuracy-
Detail (cMAD) Belief. 
A reliable difference was found between rated detail for own and others’ first 
memory (χ2(13) = 298.3, p < 0.001) and post-hoc analysis established that 
respondents rated their own first memory as ‘very detailed’ reliably more frequently 
than they rated others’ first memory as ‘very detailed’ (Z = -3.5, p < 0.001).  Also, 
respondents rated others’ first memory as ‘very vague’ reliably more often than they 
rated their own memory as ‘very vague’ (Z = -2.8, p < 0.007).  Thus, when reporting 
the detail of one’s own first memory details are judged as either ‘detailed’ or ‘vague’ 
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compared to first memory of others which, by-and-large, is judged as ‘vague’.  Finally, 
a similar pattern was present in judgements of the vividness and detail of childhood 
memories where 54% and 57% of respondents respectively ‘completely’, ‘slightly’, or 
‘very much’, agreed that vividness and detail predict the accuracy of childhood 
memories compared to 30% of respondents for both ratings who disagreed (see 
Table 4.3).  Thus, the BIM belief appears to extend to childhood memories, where it 
constitutes a childhood Burnt-In Memory (cBIM) belief.  
4.3.3 Judgments of Witness Recall in the Courtroom 
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Table 4.4. Percentage participants responding in each answer category 
Question/Statement Completely 
disagree 
Very Much 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Very Much 
Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
Does confidence indicate 
accuracy? 5.6 12.9 25.3 15.5 31.8 9.0 0.0 
Does recalling many 
details from a negative 
event indicate a truthful 
witness? 
0.0 5.2 18.5 17.2 30.5 26.6 2.1 
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Respondents judged the statement: ‘The more confident someone is that his or her 
memory is accurate, the more accurate the memory probably is.’  Results (see Table 
4.4) showed a mixed understanding of the relation between confidence and accuracy 
as 44% of respondents completely, very much or slightly disagreed with the 
statement whilst 40% of respondents completely, very much or slightly agreed with 
the statement.  This bimodal distribution represents a split opinion regarding the 
nature of confidence judgements.  In addition, 16% of respondents answered using 
the category ‘neither agree nor disagree’ suggesting a degree of uncertainly within 
some respondents or those who could be persuaded either way.  The erroneous 
belief, held with varying degrees of conviction, that confidence is necessarily 
associated with accuracy is termed here as the Witness-Confidence-Accuracy (WCA) 
Belief. 
Focusing on remembered details respondents judged the statement: ‘An individual is 
being interviewed about a very negative childhood event in court.  They can 
remember many minor details from the event.  This person is likely to be being 
truthful about what they can remember.’ It was found that nearly 60% of 
respondents agree, to varying degrees, that the truthfulness of a witness recalling a 
negative childhood event is reflected in the amount of detail of the recall: the more 
detail, the more likely the memory is to be truthful, consistent with the earlier, MAD 
belief (see Table 4.4). 
Respondents were also asked to judge the statement: ‘A witness is being interviewed 
in court about their memory for a crime.  They say "I don't know’ to a number of 
questions.  Are they more likely to be a truthful or a deceptive witness?”, 78% of 
respondents said that this behaviour would be more likely to represent a truthful 
witness but 22% judged it characteristic of an untruthful witness.  Thus, the majority 
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considered that a truthful witness would be more likely admit that they could not 
answer a question.  Results therefore show the application of the MMF belief to 
witness testimony and general understanding that truthful memory may not 
represent a clear, accurate memory.  However, we can also see the UCP belief in 
action here for the quarter of respondents who judged “I don’t know” responses to 
be characteristic of a deceitful witness, believing that a lack of memory is equivalent 
to deceit.  Respondents also judged the converse of this: ‘A witness is being 
interviewed in court and answers every question posed to them.  Are they more likely 
to be a truthful or a deceptive witness?’  Interestingly, 63% of respondents believed 
that answering every question was indicative of a deceptive witness.  Again, we can 
see both the MMF and the UCP beliefs in action; respondents generally understand 
that memory, although visual in nature does not act like a photograph of an event 
and thus testimony that resembles the UCP belief is generally deemed deceitful.  
Again, however, it should be noted that 37% of respondents believed that the ability 
to recall all information from an event more likely represented the behaviour of a 
truth teller, somewhat consistent with the UCP belief. 
Taken together, the understanding that truthful and deceitful responses may differ in 
terms of their certainty (i.e. whether they are tentative or clear, unchanging 
memories) is termed here as the Truthful-Deceitful-Responses (TDR) Belief. 
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Table 4.5. Percentage of participants stating each characteristic for positively or 
negatively affecting judgement 
Judgement Trust Distrust 
Inappropriate emotion, anger or aggression 2.0 2.0 
Inappropriately dressed, scruffy, unkempt, unclean 33.9 29.9 
Language used 34.5 32.6 
Avoiding eye contact, being shifty 6.6 13.4 
Female 1.7 - 
Male - 0.3 
Age, adolescent, child, elderly 4.0 3.8 
Perceived class 3.4 5.8 
No 11.5 9.6 
 
Finally, respondents were asked if there were any attributes of witnesses that might 
lead to increased trust or distrust in them as individuals. Respondents judged the 
statement: ‘If you were a juror and a witness came into court to give evidence, before 
you heard anything they had to say, are there any attributes that would make you 
more likely to trust / distrust their evidence?.  The open-ended responses were 
categorised and results are shown in Table 4.5.  
Only 12% of respondents said that there were not any attributes that would increase 
their trust in an individual’s testimony.  In short, this means that 88% of respondents 
reported that at least one physical or perceived attribute would positively influence 
their perception of the witness.  Of these respondents, nearly 70% stated that smart 
dress / good overall presentation (35%) and/or a clear, confident speech (34%) would 
increase trust in the individual’s testimony.  The former traits are assumed to be 
important factors when judging the trustworthiness of an individual and thus 
constitute the Positive-Presentation-Bias (PPB).  7% of respondents said that 
maintaining eye contact would also positively influence their trust of the witness.  
106 
 
Respondents also noted that middle-aged adults (4%), perceived middle-class (3%), 
appropriate emotional display (2%) and a female witness (2%) as being factors that 
would positively influence their trust in the witness statement. 
For attributes leading to distrust, 90% of respondents said that at least one attribute 
would make them more likely to distrust a witness’s evidence. Of these 30% of 
respondents stated that evidence from a scruffy, unkempt or inappropriately dressed 
individual would be more likely to be distrusted, 17% said that unclear speech or 
contradictory evidence would make them distrust the witness.  This pattern of 
thinking conversely reflects the PPB belief and is as such, termed the Negative-
Presentation-Bias (NPB).  Results further showed that 13% said that avoiding eye 
contact and being fidgety would make them suspicious.  Other attributes that 
respondents stated would negatively affect their judgement about a witness included 
overconfidence in their story or arrogance (9%), a foreign accent or an accent that is 
perceived as ‘common’ (6%), the perceived class of the individual (5%), inappropriate 
(i.e. too much or too little) emotion (2%), perceived cultural background / religion 
(1%) and if the witness was male (0.3%).   
Further, a reliable difference was found between response categories for “trust” and 
“distrust” attributes (χ2(13) = 446.2, p < 0.0001).  Post-hoc analysis, however, found 
only one reliable difference and this was within the “amount of eye contact” category 
(Z = -3.2, p < 0.007), in which higher contact equalled more trust and 13% judged that 
a lack of eye contact would make them more likely to distrust a witness compared to 
7% of respondents who judged that maintaining eye contact would make them more 
likely to trust a witness.  Thus, although a reliable difference was found, ratings were 
low and overall eye-contact did not appear to be an important variable in judging 
witness trustworthiness.  Finally, it was found that middle-aged adults were more 
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likely to be rated as truthful witnesses compared to children, adolescents and the 
elderly who were rated as more unreliable.  Related to this person attribute, a small 
minority of respondents specified that they would be more likely to trust evidence if 
it was from a female rather than a male witness. 
4.4 Discussion 
 
Table 4.6. Fourteen Beliefs about Autobiographical Memory 
Beliefs 
Scientific 
Evidence? Likely to be True? 
MSS Memory Self-Superiority None No 
MAD Memory-Accuracy-Detail Against No 
BIM Burnt-In Memory Mixed No 
MMF Memory-Malleable-Fragment Supported Yes 
UCP Unchanging-Clear-Photograph Against No 
MID Memory-Individual-Differences None Possibly 
MLU Memory-Limited-Unlimited None Yes for L, No for U 
EMO Earliest Memory Overestimation  Against No 
cMSS childhood Memory Self-Superiority None No 
cMAD childhood Memory-Accuracy-Detail None No 
WCA Witness-Confidence-Accuracy Against No 
TDR Truthful-Deceptive-Responses Mixed Yes 
PPB Positive-Presentation-Bias None Yes 
NPB Negative-Presentation-Bias None Yes 
 
Results highlight that, in the present sample, beliefs about autobiographical memory 
rest upon a complex set of inconsistent, erroneous, and often entirely incorrect 
(insofar that they do not correspond with current scientific research) beliefs regarding 
detail, vividness, accuracy and emotional of own and others’ every day and childhood 
memories.  Further, results highlighted that these beliefs also permeated judgements 
of recall in the courtroom.  Table 4.6 lists the 14 beliefs identified in the present 
study, the scientific evidence supporting each belief, and an evaluation as to whether 
the beliefs are likely to be true or not.  An evaluation of the above table reveals that 
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many of the beliefs simply do not have any corresponding scientific evidence, 
meaning particular judgements of memory simply do not have any objective 
verification.   
The first part of this review will therefore address those incorrect beliefs for which 
contradicting evidence does exist.  Firstly, the MAD belief asserts that a detailed 
account necessarily points to an accurate account, although the birth of flashbulb 
memory literature nearly four decades ago (Brown & Kulik, 1977), would have 
considered this belief correct, subsequent research has however shown that highly 
detailed memories are susceptible to the same patterns of forgetting and 
inaccuracies as memories of everyday events (Luminet & Curci, 2009).  What can be 
concluded with recent research is that detail is not an accurate predictor of accuracy, 
despite this pervasive belief.  A somewhat related belief is the BIM belief, which 
states that experiencing an emotional event will necessarily lead to an enduring and 
accurate memory.  The scientific evidence corresponding to this belief is mixed: it 
may be suggested that factors such as increased attention for the event and internal 
and external rehearsal (particularly for public events) may serve as factors to improve 
the memory of the event (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Rubin & Friendly, 1986).  However, it 
has also been argued that a memory for trauma can give rise to wholly inaccurate and 
erroneous memories too (Conway, et al., 2004; McNally, 2003).  A further related 
belief is that of the UCP that states that once encoded, a memory is unchanging.  This 
belief underlies the notion of the ‘storehouse’ view of memory in which records of 
experience are preserved, ready for access when necessary.  The notion of the 
storehouse has long been disregarded from memory research, with modern memory 
research viewing memory as a constructive process mediated by current goals and 
self-beliefs (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  However, it seems that this belief still 
exists for some, outside of the scientific community.   
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In addition, many of the beliefs about childhood memory are inaccurate or have no 
scientific corroboration (cMSS and cMAD beliefs).  Of particular concern is the belief 
that memories can be recalled from the preverbal period (EMO belief).  A vast 
amount of research has supported the notion that adults cannot remember before 
around the age of 3 years 4 months.  Indeed, even studies that have found memories 
dating to this period (Eacott & Crawley, 1999; Usher & Neisser, 1993) have been 
unable to verify the accuracy of such memories.   
Further, inaccurate beliefs can be seen regarding judgements of witness recall.  For 
example, the WCA belief states that a belief in the accuracy of memory is a reliable 
predictor of its objective accuracy.  Much research has been undertaken investigating 
the notion - known as the accuracy-confidence correlation - that increased 
confidence in one’s memory does not necessarily lead to increased accuracy for an 
event with the vast majority of results failing to find a reliable correlation between 
confidence and accuracy (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995).  Strikingly, but 
unsurprisingly, results showed that 89% of respondents would be more likely to trust 
someone’s evidence based on one or more physical attribute, and 90% of 
respondents claimed they would be more likely to distrust evidence based on one or 
more physical attribute.  In particular, being well spoken, dressing appropriately and 
not avoiding eye contact were seen as indicators of trust, whereas poor / unclear 
speech, scruffy dress and a lack of eye contact rendered the individual less 
trustworthy.  These particular sets of behaviours and attributes constitute both the 
PPB and the NPB respectively.   
However, what can be affirmed, and what some respondents believed too, is what 
can be described as the ‘modern view’ of human memory.  This view describes long-
term autobiographical memory as fragmentary, constructive, unlimited and although 
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dominated by visual imagery, not at all like photographs or videos, (Conway, 2005).  A 
consequence of this constructive system is that memories are particularly prone to 
error, distortion, and even to the creation of false memories (Bell & Loftus, 1989; 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Loftus, 1993; Roediger & 
Mcdermott, 1995; Schacter, 1999).  In addition, research has shown that different 
patterns of responding can occur depending on whether an individual is being 
truthful or deceptive (Raskin & Esplin, 1991, Chapters six, seven & eight of this 
thesis).  Respondents seemed to be aware of this view, most probably from their own 
experience of receiving and telling lies.   
However, despite some of the identified beliefs corresponding with current memory 
research, many of the beliefs were polarised and inconsistent.  For example, people 
believed others to have vague memories yet believed that others could have earlier 
memories then themselves, that memory is malleable and often incorrect yet 
frequently rate their memories as highly accurate.  Some people believe memory to 
be like a photograph whereas others believe it to be something like what is assumed 
by the modern view of memory.  Finally, the beliefs found in this study are not 
necessarily based on individual experience, as in the EMO belief, or common sense, 
such as the MLU belief and people often view themselves as superior rememberers, 
such as the MSS and the cMSS beliefs.  
In sum, without an understanding of the modern view of human memory, or without 
a memory expert to guide the jury, it is likely that accounts of memory will be judged 
using beliefs about the way in which science currently believes memory works.  As 
had been shown, these beliefs are often incorrect, erroneous, polarised, inconsistent 
and for some, their truth value is unknown.  The implications for briefing those who 
111 
 
have to judge accounts of memories as evidence and providing a courtroom that 
prioritises anonymity are, self-evident. 
4.5 Limitations & Future Work 
Although the present sample was suitable for the current study, I acknowledge that it 
is limited and could be expanded in a number of ways, for example, encompassing 
and sampling a wider range of ages, socio-economic backgrounds, education levels 
and geographical locations, allowing the sample to be more demographically 
representative.  Further, the study would also benefit replication within other 
samples such as those working within the legal system (judges, triers of fact, police 
personnel) in order to ascertain if such beliefs are held widely.  It would also be 
interesting to begin to understand children’s beliefs regarding autobiographical 
memory.  Indeed, Ceci & Bruck (1993) estimate that up to 13,000 children a year may 
be required to provide, often uncorroborated evidence to the courtroom, with a 
similar number giving unsworn statements to police and other legal personnel. 
It is also important to note that the present study was based on an unbalanced 
gender sample, with the study comprising of 208 females but only 25 males.  
Although the results were assessed with regards to gender and no reliable differences 
were found, is it like that such a small representation of males would have yielded 
reliable differences, should they have existed.  It may be that males and females have 
differing opinions of the way in which memory works.  Certainly, future work should 
ensure an equal (or at least weighted) sample of male and female respondents to 
systematically address the question of whether different genders hold differing 
beliefs about memory.   
The questionnaire itself could also benefit from revision, as issues with specific 
memory activation may have rendered some questions difficult to answer.  For 
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example, question one asks, “How accurate do you believe your own personal 
memories of your everyday life to be?” the answer given may change dramatically 
depending upon which memory was activated by the respondent.  Remembering a 
pleasant phone call with a friend may evoke entirely different responses than a 
memory of walking to work in the cold.  Although both memories are ‘everyday’, they 
represent very different, albeit everyday, experiences.  
Similarly, it may be important in future work to tease apart emotional and flashbulb 
memories.  In the present questionnaire, a wedding and the events of 9/11 are 
categorised as ‘emotional’ memories.  It may be important to make a clear distinction 
in future work between what could be considered an emotive memory and what 
could be considered a flashbulb memory.   
It may also be appropriate to provide the respondent with a ‘don’t know’ option in 
future studies.  Although in this study, the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category was 
seen as a sufficient index of uncertainty, it may need to be made more explicit in 
future work.   
In sum, although the work is based on a somewhat limited sample and requires 
replication and revision, the results certainly posit that particular beliefs are held to 
be true by members of the public.  An appropriate next step would be to construct a 
more refined and nuanced questionnaire to be distributed to a representative sample 
with the aim of replicating and furthering the present findings.   
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Chapter 5 
5 Beliefs About Lying and Liars 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As was noted in chapter one, deception is generally categorised dichotomously: a lie 
is thought of as being trivial or serious (DePaulo et al., 2004).  Trivial lies are the lies of 
everyday that enable and maintain successful social relationships between 
individuals, with the revelation of the lie unlikely to produce major consequences for 
the liar or recipient of the lie.  Serious lies on the other hand are categorised as those 
that have serious negative consequences if they are revealed, described by DePaulo, 
Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden (2004) as “threats, transgressions, and betrayals; that 
result specifically in relationship problems; that endanger people’s reputations; and 
that are forbidden by organized religion and indictable by law” (p. 148).  It is these lies 
in which this thesis is interested. 
Much research investigating these high-stake lies (Vrij, 2000) has focussed on 
attempting to understand differences in the behaviours and language used whilst 
lying (objective indicators) and what individuals believe others do when they lie 
(subjective indicators).  Further, these studies have generally employed similar 
methodologies whereby participants are instructed to lie in laboratory settings, 
usually about a staged event or to generate falsely held opinions or emotions.  
Behaviour and language is then measured and coded by independent raters.  To date, 
only one study (DePaulo et al., 2004) has investigated serious lies that participants 
(both a student and community sample) had previously told and received i.e. lies that 
were not generated in and for the laboratory.  In particular, this study was 
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investigating the topography of the lie – its content, the motivation for its use, 
reactions of the liar and receiver and to whom the lie was told.   
The study concluded that most serious lies were told to or received from someone 
who was perceived as being a close relative.  Lies were told, amongst other reasons to 
enable activities to which the liar felt they were entitled, to evade punishment and to 
protect and hurt others.  Liars’ feelings about having delivered the untruthful 
information varied dramatically depending upon what lie had been told.   
Although this study provides useful and unique insight into the ‘make-up’ of the  
serious lie, it did not ask questions regarding specific behavioural, emotional or 
linguistic patterns used by the liar – to avoid detection or that occurred sporadically 
whilst lying.  Nor did it ask, whilst receiving a lie, if the individual noticed, or 
deliberately looked for particular behavioural patterns in individual telling the lie.  
This chapter therefore reports the results of a study that attempted to answer the 
above unanswered questions about serious lies that had been told by and received by 
the individual in their life.  In particular, the study aimed to understand how 
individuals construct lies and how they determine what information they are being 
told is untruthful, how they deal with challenges to their lie and how, or if, they 
challenge information that they believe is false.  Additionally it attempted to examine 
the perceived physiological, emotional, behavioural and linguistic changes (either 
deliberate or unconscious) noticed in the self and others whilst lying.  It is hoped that 
by understanding, in particular the perceived behavioural and linguistic changes 
whilst lying and whilst being lied to, it can be determined how individuals detect lies 
and how they present themselves in order to appear truthful.  Understanding such 
mechanisms would be useful for more applied settings such as the courtroom where 
often demeanour is scrutinised for believed ‘tells’ of lying.  Further, gaining insight 
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into how lies are constructed may add support to the proposed mechanisms that 
drive fabricated memory generation – those of editing.   
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
There were 127 respondents drawn from the staff and students of the University of 
Leeds, 33 males, 94 females.  Of these 116 were students and 11 were staff.  Mean 
age was 21, ranging from 18-60.  Two respondents’ data were removed as their 
questionnaire was submitted incomplete. 
5.2.2 The questionnaire 
5.2.2.1 Question Generation 
Questions were chosen as they were believed to probe particular facets of serious 
deception that had not been previously investigated.  In particular, the questions 
were generated to probe the psychological processes associated with telling and 
receiving serious lies, including what behavioural, emotional, linguistic and 
physiological changes were noticed when being lied to and deliberately altered when 
lying.  The questions were generated with regards to items used previous studies 
(DePaulo, 2004) to ensure questions were novel.   
5.2.2.2 Pilot Testing 
The questionnaire was pilot tested using a small student and non-student sample.  
Pilot participants were asked for feedback following their completion of the 
questionnaire.  In line with feedback, a number of questions were added, in particular 
those regarding the subject of the lie.  These were included to allow respondents to 
contextualise the information provided and were not intended for analysis.  A small 
number of questions were revised to improve the clarity of the wording. 
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5.2.2.3 Final Questionnaire 
The questionnaire contained 132 questions, 8 of which regarded a highly 
consequential lie that the respondent had told and 5 regarded a highly consequential 
lie the respondent had received, see appendix v.  In particular, the questions 
addressed psychological constructs underlying telling and receiving a lie.  Questions 
investigated ways in which lies are constructed and how false information is 
determined, the individual’s perceived ability to lie and to detect lies, how 
accusations are dealt with, how accusations take place and the identification of 
physiological, emotional, behavioural and linguistic changes in self and others whilst 
lying.  Participants responded using open ended answering for each question.  These 
responses were then categorised for further analysis (see appendix v).   
Respondents also answered a number of demographic questions concerning gender, 
employment, education level and formal education in Psychology.  None of the 
demographic measures gave rise to reliable effects and consequently are not 
reported further. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Manipulation Check 
To ensure that each respondent had provided highly consequential lies, the content 
and subject of lies given and received was checked.  Respondents had provided 
serious lies, with their topics ranging from romantic affairs, crashing cars, theft etc.  
These lies fell into a number of categories, see Table 5.1. Type of Lie Provided 
                                                             
2 1the questionnaire contained 19 questions in total; however, 6 were removed from analysis as these 
questions dealt with the features of the lie i.e. the content of the lie.  Such questions were used to 
contextualise participants’ responses, and were not intended for analysis.  These questions are reported 
in appendix VI for completeness. 
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Table 5.1. Type of Lie Provided 
Percentage Category of Lie 
5.3 Romantic Infidelity 
20.3 Whereabouts 
8.2 To get time off work/school 
10.3 To avoid a situation / person 
32.1 About doing something, or not doing something 
18.0 Personal attribute (age, job, status) 
3.2 Real feelings (about something or someone) 
2.7 Financial situation 
 
5.3.2 Constructing and determining lies 
The majority of respondents (73%) reported basing their lie on existing events, with 
only 27% using entirely false information to construct their lie.  This suggests that 
highly consequential lies tended to be formed through a process of editing of the 
truth, rather generating an entirely fabricated account.  
Table 5.2. How was veracity determined? 
Percentage How was veracity determined? 
34.1 Behavioural cues 
16.5 Linguistic cues 
34.1 Contradictory information from another source 
15.3 They had lied before / known to be untrustworthy 
 
When asked how respondents determined the veracity of the information they were 
being told, 52% of the respondents said that they knew the information they were 
being given was false and 48% said that they presumed it was false.  Of the people 
who presumed the information they were being told was false (i.e. those who did not 
have objective proof that the information they were being told was false), 
approximately 50% used subjective, (behavioural (34%) or linguistic (16%)) cues to aid 
their decision in determining the veracity of the information they were being told 
(see Table 5.2).  The remaining respondents reported using objective indicators to 
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determine veracity, such as having contradictory information or basing their decision 
on the perceived trustworthiness of the individual.   
5.3.3 Dealing with challenges and challenging lies 
 
Table 5.3. Dealing with a challenge 
Percentage Type of Challenge 
51.2 Continue to lie 
33.9 Lie was not challenged 
6.3 Change the conversation 
4.7 Challenge the challenge 
3.9 Admit the truth 
 
Respondents were asked whether their lie had been challenged by the receiver, and if 
it was, how they dealt with the accusation (see Table 5.3).  Results showed that 66% 
of respondents had their lie challenged with the majority of these respondents 
dealing with the challenge by continuing to lie.  A small percentage of respondents 
dealt with the challenge using tactics of avoidance (changing the conversation), 
becoming defensive and challenged the challenge (e.g. act surprised that the lie was 
not believed) and finally, actually admitting the truth. 
Results therefore show that respondents were highly motivated to have their lie 
believed as is evidenced by the high percentage (62%) of people who adopted a 
strategy to preserve the lie. 
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Table 5.4. Degree of confidence of that lie was believed 
Percentage Confidence Category 
3.9 100% Confident 
29.1 Very confident 
39.4 Quite Confident 
5.5 50/50 
14.2 Quite Unconfident 
7.9 Very Unconfident 
0.0 100% Unconfident 
 
Despite the fact that the majority of lies were challenged, results, in 
Table 5.4, show that over 70% of respondents were confident, to varying degrees, 
that their lie was believed.  Less than a quarter of people were unconfident, however 
no one reported to being completely sure their lie was disbelieved.  However, it 
would seem likely that the lie respondents reported telling in the present survey 
would be one that was successful (as is evidenced by high rated confidence that the 
lie was believed).  In this case then, it can only be suggested that for the lie reported, 
the majority of respondents viewed themselves, as successful deceivers, with only 
just over 22% of participants indicating doubt, to varying degrees, that their lie was 
believed. 
Table 5.5. Did you challenge the lie? 
Percentage Challenge Type 
48.0 Yes, direct challenge / accusation 
12.6 Yes, indirect challenge (checked phone, asked other people) 
39.4 No 
 
The majority of respondents (60.6%) said that when they believed they were being 
lied to, they did directly challenge the lie, see Table 5.5.  However, a large percentage 
of respondents (39.4%) also said they did not directly challenge the lie.  The 
remaining respondents said they challenged the lie indirectly e.g. by checking text 
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messages or asking other people.  This bimodal distribution suggests that broadly, 
two opposing actions tend to be taken when presented with information that is 
presumed or known to be false: either a direct accusation is made or no action is 
taken. 
5.3.4 Believed emotional and physiological changes whilst lying 
 
Table 5.6. Emotion Felt whilst and after lying 
Percentage 
WHILST lying 
Percentage 
AFTER 
lying 
 
 
Emotion Felt 
62.2 17.0  Nerves/fear * 
21.3 39.0  Guilt * 
6.3 5.1  Amusement/excitement 
4.7 7.9  Nothing 
3.1 -  Upset 
2.4 31.0  Relief * 
* p < 0.001 
As shown in Table 5.6, over 60% of respondents reported feeling nervous or scared 
whilst they were lying with just over 20% experiencing guilt whilst lying.  Excitement, 
upset and relief featured as low reported emotions felt whilst lying.  Interestingly, a 
small percentage of the sample said they had no emotions at all when telling a highly 
consequential lie.   
Further, respondents were asked what emotions they experienced after lying.  Nearly 
40% of respondents said they felt guilty after they had lied.  31% said they felt relived, 
and 17% said they felt nervous.  For 5.1% of respondents lying was exciting, and 7.9% 
of respondents said they did not feel anything after lying. 
The results were compared between emotions felt during and after lying and 
revealed a reliable difference ( 2(9) = 248.2, p < 0.001).  Post-hoc analysis revealed 
that respondents felt reliably less nervous after they have delivered the lie (Z = -7.0, p 
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< 0.001), however, respondents also felt reliably guiltier after they had finished lying 
(Z = 3.3, p < 0.001).  A reliable difference was also found for relief (Z = -6.0, p < 0.001) 
as respondents reported feeling more relieved following lying.  
Table 5.7. Physiological Changes Noticed Whilst Lying 
Percentage Modality Categories 
32.7 None 
28.0 Sweating/blushing 
26.0 Increased heart rate 
9.4 Fidgeting / shaking / moving more than usual 
3.9 Feeling uneasy or sick 
 
Respondents were asked to describe any physiological changes they remembered 
experiencing whilst lying, see Table 5.7.  Of those respondents who did report bodily 
changes, most recalled sweating or blushing and/or increased heart rate.  Small 
numbers of participants reported moving more than normal and feeling sick or 
uneasy.  It is also interesting to note that nearly a third of respondents did not report 
remembering any physiological changes whilst lying.   
5.3.5 Perceived behavioural and linguistic changes when lying and whilst 
being lied to 
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Table 5.8. Comparisons of behavioural cues when lying and when being lied to 
Percentage 
LIE 
RECEIVED 
Percentage 
LIE TOLD 
Behavioural Cue 
20.5 12.6 Nervous/avoidant behaviour 
22.0 14.2 Lack of eye contact 
12.6 27.6 What was said or how it was said * 
7.1 7.9 Facial expression 
37.8 37.7 No behaviour noticed 
* p < 0.005 
As shown in  
Table 5.8, the majority of respondents did not feel that any aspect of their behaviour 
was giving their lie away.  The category with the highest frequency was in fact “what 
was said or how it was said”, suggesting, rather than the way in which they acted, 
respondents felt what they said was more of an indicator of deceit (see Table 5.9 for 
analysis of verbal indicators of deceit).   
A number of respondents did note a change in behaviour whilst lying with the 
majority stating that ‘lack of eye contact’ represented the largest behavioural change, 
followed by nervous/avoidant behaviour.  Small percentages of respondents stated 
that they believed their facial expression may have changed whilst lying.  
Conversely, approximately half of the respondents did not remember the person lying 
to them showing any particular behavioural cues to deception (38% said no, 12% 
believed language was the biggest indicator).  Of those who did remember noticing 
behavioural differences, the majority stated a lack of eye contact, followed by an 
increase in nervous behaviours.  Small percentages of respondents noted the 
individual displaying ‘distant’ behaviour and changes in facial expression whilst lying. 
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Comparisons between behaviours remembered to have occurred whilst lying and 
whilst being lied showed a reliable difference ( 2(9) = 82.9, p < 0.001).  Wilcoxon post 
hoc tests with a Bonferroni corrected p < 0.01, showed one reliable difference: what 
the liar said (Z = -3.1, p < 0.005).  Since the category referring to what the liar said 
regards speech patterns, results suggest here that in fact, behaviours believed to be 
displayed whilst lying are similar to those behaviours noticed in an individual who is 
lying.  In other words, individuals noticed similar behaviours in others that they 
themselves claimed to change whilst lying.  
 
 
 
Table 5.9. Linguistic changes noticed when lying and whilst being lied to 
Percentage 
LIE 
RECEIVED 
Percentage 
LIE TOLD 
Linguistic Category 
10.2 - Emphasising words 
10.2 5.5 Tone of voice changed 
8.7 11.0 Stuttering / repeating words 
18.9 14.2 Talking too fast or too much 
52.0 57.5 No 
- 8.7 Vague 
 
Most respondents (58%) in the present study did not feel that their language was an 
indicator of deceit, see Table 5.9.  It seems likely that “leakage” through language 
would represent more of an unconscious cue, as conscious editing of language whilst 
lying is likely to be considerably cognitively effortful.  However, of those who did 
believe that their language was indicating their deceit, most stated their influent or 
rapid speech would give their lie away.   
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The majority of respondents did not notice any changes in language whilst receiving a 
lie.  Those who did mainly noticed a quickening of speech or shortening of answers.  
10% of respondents said they detected a change in the individual’s tone of voice.  The 
remaining respondents said they noticed particular words being emphasised or 
confused / jumbled answers.   
Similarly to behavioural cues, no differences were found between categories that 
overlapped between received and told lie.  However, when receiving a lie, some 
respondents claimed to notice that the liar was emphasising particular words in order 
to sound truthful, whereas no respondents claimed to use this technique to make 
their own lie seem more convincing.  Further, when telling a lie, a small percentage of 
people said that they were deliberately vague, however, none of the respondents 
noticed vagueness whilst being lied to. 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 How was the lie generated / determined 
It has been suggested that creating a lie firstly involves accessing the truth, followed 
by a conscious ‘denial’ of the truthful facts (Polage, 2004).  Indeed, conclusions from 
chapters two & three suggest that to generate intentionally fabricated 
autobiographical memories (IFAMs), information in long-term memory is often 
initially accessed and a fabricated account is then created by editing the existing 
information.  In the present study, a mixture of both lies per se, i.e. the denial of 
feelings and IFAMs, i.e. providing a false account of one’s whereabouts was recorded.  
Results support both the above theories as it was found that the majority of fictitious 
information was created by editing existing information or knowledge rather than 
creating it anew. 
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When detecting information that is believed to be fictitious (opposed to information 
that is known to be fictitious), respondents used polarised strategies that were either 
subjective or objective in nature.  Subjective cues included examining behavioural or 
linguistic cues for believed signs of deceit, whereas objective cues included using 
contradictory information to inform the decision regarding the veracity of the 
information or basing the decision upon the perceived trustworthiness of an 
individual – i.e. if someone was known to be untruthful potentially false information 
was likely to be doubted.  Results therefore show that even without knowing the 
truth-value of information, respondents use differing strategies to attempt to 
ascertain its veracity.  However, problems may arise when attempting to detect a lie 
if, in particular, subjective cues used to detect lies are based on erroneous beliefs, 
discussed in more detail in section 5.4.4. 
 
5.4.2 Dealing with challenges and challenging a lie 
Most people will strongly protect their lie if it is challenged.  A number of techniques 
were discovered to deal with an accusation, but in general, the respondents dealt 
with a challenge by continuing to lie.  Particularly for highly consequential lies, 
discovery of deceit is likely to be very costly as not only will the undesirable behaviour 
be discovered, but also the relationship between the liar and the target may suffer as 
a consequence of deceitfulness.  Indeed, in a study investigating ‘serious lies’ 
(DePaulo, 2004), it was found that for those respondents who believed that their lie 
would have detrimental, negative consequences for their relationship with the 
receiver if it was discovered, a reliable decrease in closeness and increased 
guardedness was found.  Therefore, since respondents know that their lie being 
discovered would pose problems not only regarding the discovery of the hidden 
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truth, but also for their interpersonal relationships, it seems understandable that a 
strenuous effort would be made to prevent the truth from being revealed.  
Despite over 65% of respondents reporting that their lie was challenged, over 70% of 
respondents were confident, to varying degrees, that their lie was believed by the 
receiver.  Results therefore show that although the majority of respondents had their 
lie challenged, most believed that their response to the challenge was sufficient and 
subsequently stated that their lie was believed.  In other words, respondents claimed 
to be able to deal with any accusations successfully and, in turn, viewed themselves 
as effective deceivers, at least for the lie presented in this survey.  
Viewing ourselves as good lie detectors allows us to reject the notion that we may be 
being duped by those closest to us and allows us to view ourselves as perceptive – we 
want to believe that we can capable of ‘filtering’ fictitious information.  Indeed, when 
we are presented with information that is presumed to be false, it seems that two 
opposing strategies are adopted by the receiver of the lie: either a direct accusation 
takes place or no action takes place.  Failing to accuse the liar may represent a 
number of measures taken by the individual being lied to.  Firstly, failure to accuse 
may be a self-serving mechanism undertaken to avoid dealing with the truth – the 
information that is being concealed, for example, a husband may not wish to believe 
his wife has had an affair.  Facing and dealing with the truth would necessarily lead to 
further problems.  In other words, the revealing of the truth may be too high a 
consequence of accusation.  Secondly, the failure to accuse may be a ‘relationship-
serving’ measure taken by some individuals – not highlighting the lie and allowing it 
to be perceived by the liar as ‘believed’ allows the relationship to remain unchanged 
whereas an accusation may lead to relationship dissolution, loss of trust in a 
friendship etc.  Thirdly, however, a failure to accuse the liar may also be due to a lack 
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of supporting evidence – an individual may feel they are being lied to (by evaluating 
subjective linguistic and behavioural cues) but may have no objective evidence to 
substantiate the claim.  Indeed, results show a small number of participants who seek 
out evidence from a third party before accusing the liar.  Therefore, those who do not 
accuse the liar based on a lack of evidence may have exhausted, or been unable to 
find contradictory information from another source.  However, it should also be 
remembered that without evidence, even an accusation is likely to be detrimental to 
a relationship as it questions many foundations upon which a relationship is built such 
as trust, reliability and honesty. 
5.4.3 Believed physiological and emotional changes whilst lying 
Ekman (1989, 1992) suggested that three common emotions occur whilst we lie: guilt, 
fear and excitement, or “duping delight”, but he is clear to state that not all liars will 
experience these emotions.  The strength and indeed occurrence of the emotion is 
likely to be based both on personality factors (for example, those who score highly on 
the Machiavellianism scale are more likely to lie and manipulate others to get what 
they want and less likely to evaluate such behaviour negatively) and a complex 
interplay between the receiver of the lie, the purpose of the lie and of course the lie 
itself.  For example, we may not feel guilty for a lie we have justified to ourselves as 
necessary or a lie that is believed to have been constructed for the receiver’s benefit, 
indeed Vrij (2000) notes that if a lie is thought of as being legitimate, regardless of its 
seriousness, then it is unlikely it will be appraised with a negative emotion.  
Results from the present study support Ekman’s theory, with anxiety/fear featuring as 
the most frequently experienced emotion (62%), followed by guilt (21%), however 
excitement was only experienced by marginal numbers of respondents (6%).  
Interestingly, a small percentage of respondents reported feeling no emotions whilst 
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they lied: this may be due to a number of factors including appraisal of the lie or the 
lack of existing, contradictory evidence.    
Advocates of the physiological arousal approach to lie detection (Lombroso, 1985, In 
Bunn, 2012) suggest that the above noted emotions go on to produce detectable 
physiological changes in the individual.  A lengthy history surrounds the theory 
suggesting that lying is associated with particular physiological activity (Vrij, 2000).  
Indeed, the polygraph is a machine created to read and graphically represent minor 
changes in many types of physiological activity, with the primary channels of bodily 
activity including palm sweating, blood pressure and perspiration (Bunn, 2012).  
Therefore, theory underlying the measurement of physiological changes states that 
emotional arousal may occur when telling a lie, which in turn leads to unconscious 
and uncontrollable changes in physiological activity.  The measures of physiology are 
therefore an indirect measure of deceit. 
Although using the current data it is impossible to conclude whether particular 
emotions gave rise to physiological changes, the majority of respondents (68%) did 
report noticing a physiological change whilst they were lying.  In particular, 
respondents reported noticing an increase in sweating, often accompanied with 
blushing and additionally respondents reported an increased heart rate.  Results are 
therefore consistent with theory regarding physiological correlates of lie detection, 
but it must be noted here that a ‘truthful’ baseline was not asked for – for example, 
whilst attempting to proving innocence, individuals may experience particular 
physiological changes, indeed, they may be fearful that their story will not be 
believed.  Ekman (1988) refers this overgeneralisation of perceiving fear solely as an 
indicator of guilt as Othello’s Error.  Therefore, although results seemingly provide 
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support for a physiological approach to lie detection, caution must be taken in their 
interpretation.   
It is also interesting to note that a third of respondents did not report noticing any 
physiological changes whilst lying.  However, this finding must be interpreted with 
caution – some physiological changes may not be consciously detectable, or indeed, 
the respondents may simply be recalling inaccurately their bodily state when they 
lied.  Although the percentage may be a liberal estimate of those who did not 
experience any physiological changes whilst lying, results have shown that a small 
percentage of people also report not feeling any particular emotions either whilst or 
after lying, suggesting there may be a small subset of people who do not feel 
particular emotional responses to lying and who therefore do not display the 
expected bodily arousal.  
In addition, a large shift in emotion was reported after the lie had been told.  The 
majority of respondents felt guilty after they had lied, suggesting that lying is 
personally costly, and highlighting that for some, although deemed necessary, lying 
led to undesirable feelings.  However, a large percentage of respondents reported 
feeling relief following a lie, and for these respondents the feeling of ‘getting away 
with it’ may have been more pervasive than feelings of guilt.  A small number of 
respondent reported feeling ‘fear/anxiety’ following telling the lie, possibly due to 
potentially being ‘found out’.  Further, as Ekman (1989, 1992) proposed, a small 
number of respondents felt ‘excited’ after lying, representing “duping delight”, a thrill 
felt by some people after a (believed) successful deception – or indeed, this thrill may 
represent excitement regarding the gain attained from lying i.e. getting away with 
theft.  It is also interesting to note that a small percentage of respondents did not 
report feeling any emotion after lying – this is possibly due to appraisal of the 
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necessity of the lie – if a lie is deemed necessary or no possible alternative is believed 
to be available, then a lie may not carry such negative emotional consequences.   
5.4.4 Behavioural and linguistic changes whilst being lying and being lied 
to 
As discussed above, Ekman’s (1989, 1992) behavioural approach to lie detection 
states that liars will feel particular emotions when they lie (guilt, fear and 
excitement).  He continues to state that that these emotions will manifest in the liars’ 
behaviour and as such, liars will ‘leak’ cues to deception.   
No differences were found between cues believed to ‘leak’ from the individual and 
cues perceived in another for behavioural cues per se.  A difference was found for the 
category ‘what was said or how it was said’; respondents felt that their language was 
making the lie transparent more than they used language to distinguish another’s lie. 
However, this difference may simply occur since the individual is aware of his or her 
own conscious linguistic editing and inflate their transparency, whereas subtle 
language changes, although obvious to the liar, may not be perceivable or known by 
the receiver.   
Of those who did report a behavioural change, or ‘leakage’ whilst lying, the majority 
of respondents said that a lack of eye contact made their lie transparent.  Gaze 
aversion has in fact been found to be reliable cue to deception during high stake 
interactions (DePaulo et al., 2003).  However, gaze aversion also represents a 
subjective – or believed - cue to deception (Vrij, 2000).  Therefore, caution must be 
exercised when analysing this finding – respondents may have noticed an increase in 
gaze aversion, however, what may be being reported here is what is expected to 
happen whilst lying – we expect people to avert their eyes when they are lying.  A 
further highly reported cue to deception was that of nervous/avoidant behaviour.  
Since nervousness encompasses a number of behaviours e.g. gaze aversion, register 
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change, and increase in hand movements, (incidentally, all of which have been found 
to be associated with deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2000)), it is difficult to say 
which behaviours respondents were experiencing since answers often did not specify.  
However, Vrij (2000) states that in fact, the cue ‘nervousness’ in general tends to be a 
subjective rather than objective indicator of deception, simply because we expect lies 
to be stressful.  Again, here it is impossible to verify if respondents were noticing 
objective – reliable - indicators of deceit or if they were in fact reporting what they 
expected to occur – subjective - indicators of deception.  The latter seems a more 
likely conclusion since measures taken using this questionnaire are memory-based 
self-report measures of beliefs and perceptions of own behaviour, not immediate 
observations.   
In recent years, much of the focus of deception research has turned towards finding 
linguistic cues to deception, with some researchers even suggesting that language 
would be the most fruitful way of distinguishing a true account from one that is 
fabricated (Porter & Yuille, 1996; Vrij, 2008).  Additionally, with much forensic 
evidence gathered through spoken accounts, it would make sense that this should be 
a natural progression.  A number of linguistic indicators have shown to be associated 
with an untruthful account.  It has been found that, in general, liars may repeat words 
and ideas, use fewer first person pronouns, more motion words (go, walk), more 
negative emotion words and speak in a higher register (DePaulo et al., 2003; Newman 
et al., 2003; Sporer, 1997).  However, it is important to note that many cues to 
deception are culturally bound, with many of the cues reported to be reliable 
(subjective or objective) indicators of deception only applying to a Western society.  
In particular, the use of the first-person singular pronoun has been found to pertain 
to an individualist culture, were as a collectivist culture is more oriented to the first-
person plural pronoun (Na & Choi, 2009).  The culture from which the detector and 
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deceiver are from must therefore be considered when investigating such cues to 
deception. 
For the present results, no differences were found between linguistic changes 
perceived in the lie told or the lie received.  Of those who did report noticing a change 
in language whilst lying or whilst being lied to, the majority stated rapid or influent 
speech was most likely to give their lie away, followed by a change in tone or register.  
However, findings show that a slowed speech rate has been positively associated with 
deception (DePaulo, 1996).  In other words, liars speak slower than truth tellers do.  
Therefore, again, although respondents may be recording some objective cues to 
deception when lying and when receiving a lie, it seems here that they are also 
reporting cues which have not been found to occur whilst lying, possibly indicating 
that they are reporting what they expect to change, rather than what actually did.  
It should also be noted that over half the respondents for both lie told and lie 
received did not notice any linguistic changes.  As noted earlier, these changes may 
be particularly difficult to detect in individuals who are telling a lie and may in fact be 
unconscious ‘edits’ in the lie being told.  For example, results reported in chapters five 
& six revealed an increase in non-fluencies when providing IFAMs, however non-
fluencies were found to be an artefact of increased cognitive effort due to underlying 
account generation processes, suggesting that respondents are unlikely to notice 
many of their linguistic changes.    
In sum and in line with previous research (Akehurst et al., 1996) data collected 
regarding the believed linguistic and behavioural changes noticed both in others and 
the self whilst lying may not reflect actual, objective cues to deception, but in fact 
may represent a set of beliefs held by the respondents.  We expect liars to be 
nervous, to avoid eye contact, to fall over their words and to speak rapidly.  Although 
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many of these behaviours have been found to be reliably associated with deception, 
many represent subjective cues to deception revealing that respondents hold a mixed 
and often incorrect understanding of the behaviours associated with lying.  Holding 
erroneous beliefs regarding the patterns of behaviour and language that occurs, 
particularly in others, whilst lying is likely to have particularly detrimental effects for 
applied settings, for example, in courtrooms, customs etc.   
5.5 Conclusions 
In conclusion, results have shown that lies are constructed by editing the truth and 
that lies are detected using both subjective and objective means.  Liars deem 
themselves both good liars and good lie detectors, most probably for self-serving 
reasons.  We want to believe we can ‘get away’ with our misdeeds but we also want 
to view ourselves as astute information filterers – we do not want to view ourselves 
as easily dupable.  A great deal of negative emotion is felt whilst lying, suggesting that 
it is not a favourable act in which to participate.  However, it would seem that these 
negative emotions represent less of a negative outcome than the alternate path of 
action - revelation of the truth.  Negative emotion is also felt following the telling of a 
lie suggesting that for some, these unfavourable emotions remain and linger.  
Further, it is unclear whether respondents are using subjective or objective cues 
when assessing behavioural and linguistic changes whilst lying and whilst receiving a 
lie.  Some cues reported as changing whilst telling or receiving a lie do not have any 
objective support in the literature, whilst others have been found to be subjective – 
or believed cues to deception.  It was concluded that what participants remembered 
doing and seeing whilst lying might in fact reflect what is believed to occur when lying 
and when receiving a lie.  Clearly, this has ramifications for applied settings where 
individuals’ veracity may be judged by language or behaviour. 
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As with the previous questionnaire, it is important to note that that the sample 
contained an unequal number of male and female participants, with 33 males and 94 
females responding to the questionnaire.  The issue of gender may be all the more 
important with regards to attitudes and beliefs about lying as gender differences have 
shown to generate reliable differences regarding aspects of lying, for example Levine, 
McCornack, & Avery, 1992 showed that women view lying as less socially acceptable 
and reported more reliably negative reactions when being lied to.  Gender was 
considered when analysing findings in the present study but failed to yield any 
reliable results, most likely because of the small sample size.  Future work should 
ensure a sample that is equally represented by both genders and ensure gender of 
the respondent is considered during analysis. 
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Chapter Six 
6 Recalling Truthful and Entirely Fabricated Memories of 
an Everyday Event 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to investigate the accounts of truthful and entirely fabricated 
memories for a staged event.  Participants will attend a testing session and then recall 
their memory for this event a number of days later, either truthfully or deliberately 
falsely.  Having access to the ground-truth of the original testing session will allow the 
memories to be measured and examined in terms of their accuracy and distortions of 
the original event.  Memory reports will also be assessed using findings that received 
the most support from deception detection studies and statement analysis 
procedures such as the length of the report and the amount of detail reported.  The 
study will also investigate the source of the details provided in the study, since as 
noted by Vrij (2005) source monitoring has previously been entirely omitted from 
deception detection / statement assessment methodologies (see 1.3.10).  No 
measures of subjective experience such as vividness or emotionality will be taken as 
the usefulness of the memory account alone is of interest in the present study and 
since such measures are unlikely to reflect the sort of material that would be 
elucidated from real-world questioning procedures. 
Additionally, the staged event methodology allows a set of standardised questions to 
be issued to each participant regarding the details of the testing session since each 
participant is recalling a memory (albeit deliberately distorted in the fabricated 
condition) of the same event.  Such standardised questions are used regularly by 
police (PEACE (Clarke & Milne, 2001) and Cognitive Interview styles of questioning 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 2010)).  Therefore, the study may also provide insight into the 
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relevance and usefulness of such questioning styles in aiding truthful recall and for 
detecting fabricated recall.   
6.1.1 Predictions 
Since participants in the fabricated condition were asked to provide fabricated 
information regarding all aspects of the initial test session, a number of differences 
are expected.  It is anticipated, based on previous work (Newman et al., 2010) that 
when describing their memories of an event experienced a number of days prior, 
participants in the fabricated condition will use fewer first person pronouns but more 
second person pronouns, fewer sense words and as per chapters two and three, 
more motion words and that their accounts would contain more non-fluencies than 
truthful accounts.  Further, based on the findings from statement assessment 
techniques (Colwell et al, 2007; Porter et al, 1999) it is expected that IFAMs will 
contain fewer overall details and be shorter in length than AMs.  Finally, categories of 
words that might prove interesting but have not been empirically investigated 
previously include cognitive mechanisms “cause, know, ought” and insight words 
“think, know, consider” since these words explicitly relate to metacognitive processes 
such as evaluating ones memory.  It may be that truth tellers are more likely to 
display metacognitive reasoning, such that they are more likely to admit a lack of 
memory.   
Specific questions from AMs and IFAMs are also likely to display different source 
classifications.  It is expected, due to findings regarding beliefs about memory (see 
chapter four) that answers to specific questions from IFAMs will contain more 
answers from memory (due to a belief that accurate memories are held with 
confidence and contain more detail witness-confidence-accuracy (WCA) belief) 
whereas it is likely that in fact, based on previous findings (Boychuk, 1991; Raskin & 
Esplin, 1991) and results from statement assessment techniques (Colwell et al, 2007) 
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AMs will contain more guessed and uncertain answers, with truthful recallers more 
likely to admit a lack of memory. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-five participants (2 male, 23 female) took part in the study with a mean age of 
23 years.  Participants were either undergraduate students at the University of Leeds 
(who were given course credit for their participation) or staff from the University of 
Leeds (who were given £5 for their participation). 
6.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
The study took place across two testing sessions, the first testing session included a 
number of memory measures: “War of the Ghosts”, Bartlett (1932) and recall from 
“Burglar / Buyer” test (Anderson & Pichert, 1978).  These were selected to provide a 
ruse that the study was interested in the outcomes of the memory tests, whereas the 
interest was in the quality of memory for the event itself.  Therefore, in the second 
testing session participants were interviewed about their memory of the events from 
the first session.  Participants were told that the study consisted of two sessions 
involving a number of memory tests.  They were not informed prior to the interview 
that they were to be interviewed or that they would have to recall any of the events 
from the first test session.  Participants were tested in groups of no less than two in 
session one, and then interviewed individually, by a new researcher, in session two.   
The room used for the first test session was a large classroom and contained twelve 
individual desks and a number of other items – some consistent with a testing room 
(computer, whiteboard), others inconsistent (yellow traffic cone, coat hangers), 
(Brewer & Treyens, 1981).  Prior to the participants entering the room, testing 
booklets, pens and an envelope were placed on each desk.  Inside the envelope was a 
piece of paper containing the word “burglar” or “buyer”.  The participant was asked 
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not to touch this until instructed to do so.  One researcher was present in the room 
for the duration of the test session.  The researcher seated participants at the 
individual desks and told them that they were going to be read a story and that they 
must, once the story is completed, reproduce the story in as much detail as possible.  
Bartlett’s (1932) War of the Ghosts was then read aloud (see appendix VII).  Once the 
researcher was confident that all of the participants had completed writing their 
recall, a further memory test was given: the burglar or buyer memory test (Pichert & 
Anderson, 1977).  The researcher asked the participants to open their envelope but 
not to let other participants see its contents.  The researcher then read aloud a 
passage which described the contents of a house (see appendix VIII) and the 
participants were then asked to imagine viewing the house from the perspective of 
either a burglar or buyer (according to the card in the envelope).  The participants 
were then asked to recall as much detail from the story as possible.  Once the 
researcher was confident that participants had completed their recall, they were 
informed that the testing session was complete, but in order to gain an accurate 
record of what the participant was wearing on this day, the researcher asked the 
participants if they would allow a photograph to be taken from the neck down to be 
used later in the study.  All participants agreed and had their photograph taken.    
For the second test session, four days later, participants arrived at testing at their 
chosen time and met with a new researcher.  The researcher gave the participant an 
envelope which contained instructions of the remainder of the session (see appendix 
IX).  The envelope informed the participants that they would be interviewed about 
the events in the first session.  The participants were told that they should imagine 
themselves as a witnesses to the events from the first testing session and to either 
correctly recall information about the tasks they undertook (truthful memory 
condition) or to deliberately provide fabricated information (plausibly) about the 
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events (fabricated memory condition).  As far as the participants were concerned, the 
interviewer only knew that the participant took part in a psychology experiment and 
was blind to the purpose or conditions within the experiment.  The interviewer was 
however aware of the conditions to which the participants were assigned, which may 
have meant that the interviewer’s behaviour was different altered between 
conditions.  Although every effort was made to keep interviewing consistent, further 
research should use a double blind approach whereby both the participants and the 
researchers involved are blind to experimental conditions, this will help ensure 
behavioural consistency over conditions.   
 
The participants were given an opportunity to ask the researcher to clarify any details 
of which they were unsure.  The researcher then asked the participants to recall in as 
much detail, what happened during the first testing session.  Once the participants 
had finished giving all their details, the researcher asked a series of standardised 
specific questions to clarify some of the details from the story.  Additional questions 
were asked such as “what were you wearing?”, “what was the weather like?” and 
“what was the researcher wearing?” etc. (see appendix X for script).  These questions 
were included to replicate the sorts and style of questions generally employed within 
a standard police interview, particularly those which follow the Cognitive Interview 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 2010) or PEACE models (Clarke & Milne, 2001), as both 
investigation tools incorporate a section of free recall followed by ‘specific 
questioning’.  The interview was audio recorded.   
 
The participants were also asked to draw the layout of the room, where they sat and 
to add any other details they noticed or thought were significant.  Vrij et al. (2010) 
found that drawing was a useful tool for detecting deception such that liars drew 
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reliable fewer details than truth tellers and also failed to draw significant but relevant 
individuals.  Drawing was therefore incorporated into the present study in an attempt 
to replicate and further the findings.  Following the drawing, participants were asked 
to rate how motivated they were to provide either thorough and accurate recall or 
how motivated they were to provide a compelling and believable fabricated account.  
This was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 very unmotivated – 7 very motivated).  
Participants were then debriefed. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Manipulation Check 
When fabricating, participants were asked to provide an entirely false account.  An 
investigation into the accounts provided indicated that participants were following 
this instruction, providing on average, fabricated answers to 16.4 (s.d. 4.8) of the 22 
specific questions.  Of these fabricated details, approximately 30% were fabrications 
about central details (the room, the other participants) and approximately 70% were 
peripheral details (clothing of the self and others, the weather during the test 
session).  The amount of fabricated information provided in the free recall section of 
the interview cannot be as easily qualified, but the data were screened prior to their 
inclusion in the study, and any participants who it was felt had not followed 
instructions to provide an entirely, or at least almost entirely fabricated account were 
not included in the study.   
6.3.2 Motivation 
Participants were found to be motivated, the mean motivation rating was 5.6 (SD 
=0.8).  An independent t-test showed that this did not differ between the truthful 
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memory recall condition (M = 5.8, SD = 0.5) and the fabricated memory recall 
condition (M = 5.5, SD = 0.9), t(1, 24) = 0.6, p > 0.05.3   
6.3.3 Source attributions 
 
Table 6.1. Frequency of use of source attributions (out of 22) for specific questions 
(means and standard deviations) 
Source 
Attributions 
AM IFAM 
 
Memory 13.3 (1.1) 17.9 (1.3) 
Indirect Memory 0.8 (0.7) 0.4 (0.7) 
Inference 2.1 (0.9) 1.5 (0.7) 
Guess 2.2 (1.5) 0.8 (0.7) 
“I don’t know” 3.6 (1.9) 1.7 (0.8) 
 
Answers given to specific questioning were coded using the following system: 
memory based – the answer was a memory of what happened; memory using 
external event – the answer was obtained because of a memory of something 
external to the study e.g. remembering the study was in the morning because the 
participant remembers feeling tired; inference – the answer was inferred e.g. 
assuming the researcher had brown eyes because she had dark skin; guess – the 
answer was guessed and “don’t know” – the participant admitted lack of memory.  
Two raters coded the data, correlational analyses revealed an extremely high inter 
rater reliability (r=1.0, p < 0.001). 
                                                             
3 The motivation ratings were used as a co-variate when analysing the results from the study.  
However, due to the lack of variability within the motivation ratings, the co-variate analysis 
did not provide any additional insight into the data.  Future research should however consider 
such ratings when analysing results to investigate if additional factors such as motivation to lie 
has an effect upon how a lie is reported. 
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Source attributions (see Table 6.1) were investigated using Chi-Square.  Results 
showed differences in source attributions between AMs and IFAMs, X2(9) = 31.5, p < 
0.001, φ = 0.2.  An inspection of the residuals (critical value 1.96) indicated that AMs 
contained fewer memory-based responses, more inferences, more guesses and more 
“don’t know” responses than IFAMs.    
6.3.4 Answer Accuracy 
Answers given by participants in the truthful recall condition were checked for 
accuracy.  It was found that overall participants were 74% accurate in the answers 
they provided.  Over answer types it was found that answers based on memory were 
90% correct, answers based on memory of an external event were 84% correct, 
answers based on inferences were 62% correct and answers based on guesses were 
at chance level, with 58% correct. 
6.3.5 Content Analysis 
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Table 6.2. LIWC categories by condition for free recall (means and standard 
deviations) 
LIWC category  AM IFAM 
Word Count*** 477.3 (240.2) 167.5 (81.1) 
First person singular pronouns * 2.8 (1.6) 1.5 (0.9) 
Overall first person pronouns ** 5.7 (1.1) 4.5 (0.9) 
Overall second person pronouns ** 0.1 (0.1) 1.5 (1.8) 
Overall third person pronouns *** 4.9 (1.7) 1.5 (1.1) 
Non-fluencies** 3.4 (1.1) 5.4 (2.4) 
Motion words** 2.3 (0.6) 0.7 (0.8) 
*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 
Independent samples t-tests using condition as factor and linguistic categories predefined 
in LIWC4 (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) as dependent variables revealed a number 
of differences in content of free recall between conditions (see  
Table 6.2).  AMs were found to be longer in length (t(1,23) = 4.2, p < 0.001, d = 1.7), to 
contain more first person singular pronouns (I, my, me), (t(1,23) = 2.4, p < 0.05, d = 1.0), 
more overall first person pronouns (I, we, me), (t(1,20) = 2.6, p < 0.01, d = 1.2), fewer 
overall second person pronouns (you, you’ll), (t(1,22) = -2.7, p < 0.01, d = 1.1), more 
overall third person pronouns (she, their, them), (t(1,22) = 5.9, p < 0.001, d = 2.4), fewer 
non-fluencies (umm, err), (t(1,23) = 2.7, p < 0.01, d = 1.1) and more motion words (walk, 
move, go),  (t(1, 23) = 5.3, p < 0.001, d = 2.3) than IFAMs.   No other reliable differences 
were found. 
                                                             
4
 Note: LIWC counts words as percentages of the overall word count, thus counts are 
proportionate to their corresponding word count. 
144 
 
Table 6.3. LIWC categories by condition for specific questions (means and standard 
deviations) 
LIWC category  AM IFAM 
Word Count 165.8 (90.3) 162.7 (40.5) 
Cognitive Mechanisms* 17.5 (3.1) 14.2 (3.4) 
Insight***   4.2 (2.1) 2.0 (1.9) 
Present** 7.0 (2.1) 3.6 (2.8) 
Past 7.5 (2.6) 9.6 (2.4) 
*** p < 0.005 ** p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 
Independent samples t-tests using condition as factor and linguistic categories 
predefined in LIWC (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) as dependent variables 
revealed a number of differences in content of specific questions between conditions 
(see Table 6.3).  AMs contained reliably more cognitive mechanisms (words 
pertaining to cognitive processes, such as “think”, “know”, “consider”) (t(1, 23) = 2.3, 
p < 0.05, d = 1.0), more insight words (t(1, 23) = 2.6, p < 0.01, d = 1.1), more words 
relating to the present (t(1, 23) = 3.3, p < 0.005, d = 1.4) and marginally fewer words 
relating to the past (t(1, 23) = -2.0, p < 0.06, d = 1.0) than IFAMs.  No other reliable 
differences were found.  
 
6.3.6 Account Detail 
 
Table 6.4. Details in drawings and free recall by condition (means and standard 
deviations) 
LIWC category  AM IFAM 
Free Recall Detail**  124.4 (60.7) 40.5 (19.0) 
Detail/Word Count 0.3 (0.09) 0.3 (0.09) 
Room Drawing Detail**  9.5 (3.7) 7.0 (2.2) 
** p < 0.001 * p<0.05 
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Detail was investigated using the Levine internal/external episodic rating system 
(Levine et al., 2002).  This system advocates coding a given account in terms of the 
internal and external detail presented.  Internal details are those relating to the 
event, external details are those peripheral to the event.  In the present study, 
participants only provided internal detail, as requested, hence only these details were 
carried forward for analysis.  Results, in Table 6.4, show that AMs contained reliably 
more internal episodic detail than IFAMs, t(1, 23) = 4.7, p < 0.005, d = 1.9.  However, 
when considered proportionately i.e. in relation to total number of words provided 
(number of details / word count), detail in account was not found to reliably differ. 
6.3.7 Drawing 
Further differences were found between truthful and fabricated recall by analysing 
the drawings each participant provided.  Results showed that participants in the 
truthful memory condition drew reliably more details than participants in the 
fabricated memory condition, t(1, 23) = 2.1, p < 0.05,  d = 0.8.  Interestingly, only four 
participants drew what was considered an inconsistent detail (traffic cone, oil can).  
All those participants were in the truthful condition.  No participants in the fabricated 
condition falsified inconsistent information.    
 
6.4 Discussion 
The present study investigated the information gained from free recall followed by 
specific questioning with particular focus on the differences of source monitoring and 
content provided when participants were asked to provide truthful and deliberately 
fabricated details for a previously experienced event.  Alongside this the present study 
was also interested in the accuracy gained from, and relevance of questions posed to 
respondents as such questioning formats are common in police interviews (Fisher & 
Geiselman, 2010). 
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6.4.1 Source attributions 
An important finding in the present study was that AMs elicited using the specific 
questions was not solely a product of memory; instead recall consisted of guesses, 
inferences and “don’t know” responses.  In contrast IFAMs were based, or claimed to be 
based, on memory.  This finding has several implications.   
Firstly, when attempting to ascertain the veracity of a report, tentative accounts of 
memory appear to be indicators of truthful memories.  It is the liar who provides an 
account based on robust, certain ‘memory’.  This pattern of answering is likely to be 
influenced by beliefs about memory – in particular the witness-confidence-accuracy 
(WCA) memory-accuracy-detail (MAD) beliefs (see chapter four).  These beliefs support 
the spurious notion that a detailed account held with confidence is likely to be true.  
Therefore, when creating a deliberately fabricated memory, it is likely that respondents 
are providing patterns of answers which fulfil these held beliefs about the mental 
representation of an experienced event.   
Secondly, unless source attributions are made, every answer provided by the truthful 
interviewee will be presumed to be an accurate memory and thus incorporated into the 
“truthful narrative”.  Despite clear instructions not to guess and the explicit option to 
decline to answer, participants provided a number of guessed and inferred answers.  
Results showed that such answer types were at chance accuracy levels and that together, 
these types of answers comprised nearly 25% of a truth teller’s statement.  Essentially 
participants were producing what could be considered ‘non-malicious fabrications’: 
fictitious information not intended to deceive but in fact produced to conform to 
interview procedure.  If these non-malicious fabrications included descriptions of a 
perpetrator or related to the time of crime, then they could be extremely costly indeed.  
Therefore, the use of specific questions in interviews may in fact be detrimental to truth 
tellers, leading them to ‘fill in the gaps’ to questions they are unable to recall.  It would 
147 
 
seem that the best recommendation from these findings is to altogether omit any 
answers that are not the products of memory.  If we removed guesses, inferences and 
other non-memory based answers were removed altogether then truthful account 
accuracy rise would rise from 67% to 90%.   
Conversely, these specific questions essentially provide a platform from which those 
providing fabricated information can create highly detailed accounts.  Following a series 
of more specific questioning, liars present reliably more ‘memory’ answers than truth 
tellers.  It is this inclusion of detail which can be troublesome for a jury since detailed 
accounts are often judged by a jury as more reliable than vague accounts, as per the MAD 
belief (a widely held but untrue belief that detail is associated with accuracy in memory 
accounts) and work on trivial persuasion (Bell & Loftus, 1989). 
6.4.2 Content Analysis 
A further indicator of the veracity of a report elicited during memory recall is that of the 
type of language that a respondent uses.  Using Language Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; 
Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) results indicated that the free recall section of AM 
accounts contained more first and third person pronouns than the free recall section of 
IFAM accounts, and that IFAMs contained more second person pronouns than AMs.  
Speaking of the self using first person pronouns is likely to reflect the mental 
representation of an experienced event, whereas the increased use of second person 
pronouns in fabricated accounts is likely to reflect a schematic representation of an 
event, based on expectations and beliefs about how a particular situation is likely to 
unfold.   
Increased use of third person pronouns in AMs shows a tendency to refer to others more 
when describing a truthful rather than fabricated memory.  Vrij et al. (2010) showed how, 
when drawing a crime scene, liars tended not to draw other significant people who were 
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in fact present.  A tendency to not discuss others when describing an event may reflect 
the complexity associated with IFAM generation (see chapters two and three) insofar that 
it reduces the number of details to be described.  This increased cognitive complexity 
associated with IFAM generation is also likely to be responsible for the increased number 
of non-fluencies in fabricated accounts (see chapters two and three).   
Interestingly in the present study AMs were found to contain more words regarding 
motion than IFAMs.  In previous studies this finding was reversed, with IFAMs containing 
more motion words than AMs.  Here motion words are thought to reflect content rather 
than be produced as artefacts of underlying cognitive processes.  AMs were more likely 
to contain details regarding movement between and within locations, probably reflecting 
a re-experiencing of the original event.  It is therefore important to note that ‘motion’ 
words may represent a problematic cue for distinguishing truthful and fabricated 
memories with the frequency of inclusion of motion words in each memory type entirely 
changing over the course of studies included in this thesis. 
Differences in language use were also found between truthful and fabricated answers to 
specific questions.  Truthful responses were found to contain more words corresponding 
to cognitive process such as “think” and “know” and are likely to be reflecting truth 
tellers’ internal evaluation of their mental representation.  By outwardly evaluating the 
quality of their memory, truth tellers may be demonstrating themselves as careful 
rememberers (Bysouth, 2009).  Further, increased use of such language in truthful 
accounts may reflect the mental re-reliving of the experienced account – a process 
essential to episodic memory recall (Conway, 2001).   
6.4.3 Account Detail 
Although free recall of AMs appeared to contain more detail than IFAMs, when further 
analysed proportionately, it was found that per word, AMs and IFAMs contained identical 
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levels of detail.  In other words, although shorter in length, fabricated memories are as 
detailed with respect to the amount of information given, as their longer, truthful 
counterparts.  Increased detail in truthful accounts is a robust finding within deception 
research (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2008), and is used as a primary criterion for 
distinguishing truthful from fabricated memories in a number of techniques (SVA, RM, 
MAP and ACID, see 1.3.9).  Present findings, however, serve to suggest that when 
analysed proportionately, differences may not exist in detail.  Since in a real-world 
interview situation, truthful and fabricated narratives would not be directly comparable, 
details would have to be measured proportionately, and as suggested here, may fail to be 
a reliable indicator of deception when measured in such a way.   
6.4.4 Drawing 
Unlike Vrij et al. (2010) results in the present study revealed that when asked to draw a 
picture of the room in which the event took place, those providing fabricated information 
gave reliably less detail than those providing truthful information.  The lesser detail found 
in the fabricated drawings may reflect the difficulty involved with visualising and 
maintaining a novel mental representation.  It may also reflect a more schematic 
visualisation of a room, including details commonly associated with an experimental 
environment (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).   Relatedly, only a small number of participants 
included detail that was inconsistent with the testing environment in their drawing.  All 
participants who did so were in the truthful condition.  These results therefore serve to 
support the notion that entirely fabricated drawings are drawn from schematic 
representations, due to the inclusion of only schema-specific detail.   
6.5 Conclusions 
In sum, the findings highlight previously unknown differences between the language 
used and the source of memories for AMs and entire IFAMs of an experienced event.  
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It has also shown, that the police interview itself has previously unknown effects 
upon both truthful and fabricated memory.   
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Chapter Seven 
7 Recalling Truthful and Partially Fabricated Memories of 
an Everyday Event Over Time 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This study aimed to extend the previous study in a number of ways.  Firstly, rather 
than being asked to provide a completely fabricated account, the participant was 
asked to provide only deliberately fabricated information regarding one aspect – the 
researcher who was present in the first test session.  This was done to reflect what is 
more likely to occur in a real-world situation whereby an individual may report a 
witnessed event but may substitute real for fabricated details to distort the narrative 
(Sapir, 1987, Vrij, 2005, and see findings from chapter two regarding the construction 
of fabricated memories).  Partially fabricated memories have also received no 
attention in the scientific literature therefore this study represents the first to 
investigate such memories.  Secondly, the interview was extended over two sessions 
such that the participant was interviewed twice.  The multiple interviews were used 
to assess the way in which truthful and fabricated memories behaved over time.  
Note, measures of language and content were kept consistent to those in the 
previous chapter to provide comparison between entirely and partially fabricated 
IFAMs.   
7.1.1 Predictions 
Because of this change in instruction, a very different set of results is anticipated.  It is 
expected that little difference will be found between the linguistic measures of AMs 
and IFAMs since it is assumed that fabricated details will be incorporated into a 
predominantly truthful account as per findings from chapter two.  The truthful 
account is therefore expected to comprise the majority of the memory report with 
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fabricated details substituted in when necessary.  Distinction between the two 
memory types will therefore be difficult due to the lack of fabricated narrative.  This 
lack of difference is expected to remain stable over time.  However, it is believed that 
source-monitoring clarifications of specific questions will follow the same pattern 
found in the previous study since fabricated details will be explicitly assessed in the 
specific questioning section and cannot be hidden within truthful detail.  AMs are 
expected to consist of inferences and guesses, whereas IFAMs are expected to be 
claimed to be based more on ‘memory’.  It is expected that these source-monitoring 
judgements will remain stable over time.  Further, in accordance with previous 
research (Peace & Porter, 2011), it is anticipated that AMs will be more consistent 
and contain more detail than IFAMs.   
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-eight participants (15 male, 23 female) took part in the study with a mean age 
of 24 years.  Participants were either undergraduate students at the University of 
Leeds (who were given course credit for their participation) or staff from the 
University of Leeds (who were given £5 for their participation).  However, three 
participants were removed from the study as they failed to complete all sessions.   
7.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
Participants attended three testing sessions with approximately one week between 
each session.  In session one, participants completed two memory measures (The 
War of The Ghosts (Bartlett, 1932) and the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm (Roediger & Mcdermott, 1995), see appendices VII, XII and XIII) in a group 
of no less than 2.  The burglar/test was substituted for the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott paradigm in this study due to participants having problems 
understanding requirements of the burglar/buyer test in the previous study.  These 
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were selected to provide a ruse that the study was interested in the outcomes of the 
memory tests, whereas the interest was in the quality of memory for the event itself.  
Therefore, the second and third test sessions involved individual structured 
interviews regarding the events of session one.  These comprised a free recall section, 
a specific questioning section and participants were asked to sketch the location of 
the original test session.  The specific questioning section was categorised into two 
broad subsets: a subset regarding the testing environment, the self and others (the 
control subset, containing 12 questions) that all participants answered truthfully, and 
a subset asking specifically about the researcher (the experimental subset, containing 
10 questions), which was answered deliberately untruthfully by the participants in the 
fabricated condition, but truthfully by those in the truthful condition.  Asking 
participants to provide fabricated information on a specific subset of questions allows 
the fabrication condition to be tightly controlled, and for direct comparison to be 
made between known fictitious and known truthful information.  The interview was 
audio recorded.   
Participants were told that they would attend three sessions, each of which would 
involve a number of memory tests.  Participants were informed at the end of the first 
test session that they were to be interviewed twice about the events of the session – 
they were also told whether they had been assigned to the truthful or fabricated 
condition.  Participants in the truthful condition were required to give a truthful 
account of the events they remembered from session one in both free recall and 
specific questioning phases of interview.  Participants assigned to the fabricated 
condition were required to provide deliberately untruthful information when 
discussing the researcher in the free recall section and for questions regarding the 
researcher in the specific questioning (the experimental subset).   
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The study employed a between-subjects design with one main independent variable: 
recall type (truthful or fabricated) which was counterbalanced across participants.  
The main dependent variables that were assessed included the free recall and 
answers to specific questions elicited from the interview in both sessions two and 
three, the linguistic characteristics of participants’ interviews, participants’ sketches 
of their location, and evaluation of recall from “War of the Ghosts” and the DRM 
paradigm.  
The room to be used for the first test session was a large classroom containing twelve 
individual desks and a number of other items – some consistent with a testing room 
e.g. computer, whiteboard, others inconsistent e.g. yellow traffic cone, coat hangers 
(Brewer & Treyens, 1981).  Prior to the participants entering the room, testing 
booklets, pens and an envelope were placed on each desk.  Inside the envelope was a 
piece of paper containing information regarding the condition to which each 
participant was assigned (see appendix XI).  The participant was asked not to touch 
this until told to do so.  
One researcher was present in the room for the duration of the test session.  The 
researcher seated participants at the individual desks and began the first part of the 
first memory test, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm.  Participants 
were read six lists of twelve words (see appendix XII) and asked, after each list, to 
recall as many words as possible in the answer booklet.  Participants were then asked 
to place the DRM booklet to one side and the researcher then told participants that 
they were to hear a story and that they must, once the story was completed, 
reproduce it in as much detail as possible, without paraphrasing.  The researcher then 
read aloud Bartlett’s (1932) War of the Ghosts, see appendix VII.  Once the researcher 
was confident that all of the participants had completed recall, the second part of the 
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DRM was given.  Participants were presented with a booklet containing six lists of 
seven words, comprising two new words unrelated to the original list, two new but 
weakly related to the original list, two old and one new “critical lure”, highly related 
to the words on the original list (see appendix XIII).  Participants were asked to rate 
each new word on a 4-point scale (1 – sure it’s new; 2 – probably new; 3 – probably 
old; 4 – sure it’s old).  When the researcher was confident that participants had 
completed scoring the words, participants were asked to open their envelope and 
read the instructions for the next two test sessions.  After this was done, participants 
were informed that the testing was completed but in order to gain an accurate record 
of what the participant was wearing on this day (participants were directly asked 
what they were wearing during the second test session), the researcher asked the 
participants if they would allow a photograph to be taken from the neck down to be 
used later in the study.  All participants agreed and had their photograph taken.    
Approximately one week later, participants arrived individually at testing at their 
chosen time and meet with a new researcher for session two.  The researcher gave 
each participant an envelope containing a reminder of instructions for the test 
session and the condition to which the participant was assigned (see appendix XIV).  
The participants were told that the new interviewer was blind to the instructions, 
condition and the events of session one.  The researcher then asked the participant to 
draw the layout of the room, where they sat and to add any other details they 
noticed or thought were significant.  Following this, each participant was asked to 
recall, uninterrupted and in as much detail as possible, what happened during the 
first testing session.  Once the participant completed the free recall phase, specific 
questions were asked (see appendix XV for script). 
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The third test session, approximately a week after the second was identical to that of 
session two.  However, following the interview, participants were asked to rate how 
motivated they were to provide either thorough and accurate recall or how 
motivated they were to provide a compelling and believable fabricated account.  
Participants were then debriefed. 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Manipulation Check 
Participants in the fabricated condition in this study were asked to provide fabricated 
information regarding the researcher in session one.  Participants followed this 
instruction successfully, providing on average 8.9 (s.d. 0.3) answers to 10 specific 
questions with fabricated information.  All information specifically regarding the 
researcher could be considered peripheral detail.  Information participants provided 
in the free recall section of the interview was also assessed to ensure participants had 
followed the instruction.  Interestingly, most participants avoided mentioning the 
researcher, or if they did, they provided vague, but fabricated detail – for example 
referring to the researcher as “he” rather than “she” but proving no other details.  
Providing vague detail is interesting of itself, and will be considered further in the 
discussion (section 7.4). 
7.3.2 Motivation 
Participants were found to be motivated, the mean motivation rating was 5.5 (SD 
=1.4).  An independent t-test showed that this did not differ between the truthful 
memory recall condition (M = 5.6, SD = 1.5) and the fabricated memory recall 
condition (M = 5.4, SD = 1.8).5 
                                                             
5
 As with the results reported in chapter 6, the motivation ratings were used as a co-variate 
when analysing the results from the study.  However, due to the lack of variability within the 
motivation ratings, the co-variate analysis did not provide any additional insight into the data. 
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7.3.3 Source Attributions 
 
Table 7.1. Frequency of use of source attributions for the 10 questions from the 
experimental subset at interview one and two (means and standard deviations) 
Source attribution AM 
Interview 1 
IFAM 
Interview 1 
AM 
Interview 2 
IFAM 
Interview 2 
Memory 6.2 (1.6) 7.7 (1.2) 6.0 (1.3) 7.8 (1.1) 
Indirect Memory 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.0) 
Inference 0.6 (0.7) 0.2 (0.4) 0.9 (0.8) 0.2 (0.4)  
Guess 0.6 (0.8) 0.1 (0.3) 0.7 (0.8) 0.1 (0.2)  
“I don’t know”  2.7 (1.7) 1.9 (0.8) 2.3 (1.5) 1.9 (1.2) 
 
Source attributions were investigated using Chi-Square (see Table 7.1).  Results 
showed differences in source attributions between AMs and IFAMs at interview 1, 
X2(9) = 13.1, p < 0.01, φ = 0.2.  An inspection of the residuals (critical value 1.96) 
indicated that AMs contained fewer answers attributed to memory, more guesses 
and more “don’t know” responses than IFAMs.  A reliable difference was also found 
between source attributions for AMs and IFAMs at interview two, X2(9) = 22.8, p < 
0.001, φ = 0.3.  An inspection of the residuals (critical value 1.96) indicated that AMs 
contain fewer answers attributed to memory, more guesses (although it is important 
to note that guessed answers represent a very low proportion of the answer types 
given and although they provide a reliable difference, they may not be a useful cue 
for distinguishing AMs and IFAMs) and more “don’t know” responses than IFAMs.  No 
reliable differences were found between memory types over time, indicating that 
source attributions were stable across interviews.   
7.3.4 Accuracy  
Answers for the control subset of specific questions were coded for accuracy.  It was 
found that for interview 1, participants were, overall, 64% accurate.  Over answer 
types, it was found that answers based on memory were 70% correct and answers 
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based on memory of an external event were 82% correct, answers based on 
inferences and guesses were at chance, with 50% and 54% correct respectively.  
Accuracy for the control subset of questions was also investigated at interview 2.  It 
was found that overall, participants were 62% correct.  Across answer types it was 
found that answers based on memory were 69% correct, answers based on memory 
of an external event were 77% correct and answers based on inferences and guesses 
remained at chance, with 45% and 55% correct respectively, showing a slight decline 
in accuracy in all answer categories over time. 
7.3.5 Consistency 
Information provided for the questions in the experimental subset for both truthful 
and fabricated conditions was assessed for consistency across interview 1 and 
interview 2.  Here, inconsistency is viewed as providing information in one interview 
and omitting it in another, or contradictory information across interviews.  Although 
those providing truthful information yielded a higher score indicating a greater level 
of consistency across interviews, (with 81% of information remaining unchanged) 
than those providing IFAMs, (with 78% of information remaining unchanged) this was 
not found to be a reliable difference.   
7.3.6 Content Analysis 
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Table 7.2. LIWC categories by condition for free recall (means and standard deviations) 
LIWC category  AM 
Interview 1 
IFAM 
Interview 1 
AM 
Interview 2 
IFAM 
Interview 2 
Word Count * 237.2 (98.7) 169.0 (44.0) 231.8 (103.6) 122.7 (31.0) 
First person singular pronouns  1.4 (1.6) 1.9 (2.1) 1.6 (1.0) 1.7 (2.1) 
Overall first person pronouns 11.9 (3.5) 10.3 (2.1) 11.3 (2.7) 10.8 (2.3) 
Overall second person pronouns 0.7 (0.7) 1.3 (2.6) 0.8 (0.9) 0.2 (0.6) 
Overall third person pronouns 1.2 (0.1) 1.9 (1.5) 0.7 (0.9) 1.6 (1.9) 
Non-fluencies 3.7 (2.3) 3.4 (1.9) 3.1 (2.0) 3.4 (2.5) 
Motion words 1.3 (0.7) 1.0 (1.0) 1.1 (0.5) 1.2 (1.2) 
*p < 0.05 
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Individual mixed model 2 (AM or IFAM) x 2 (Interview 1 or interview 2) ANOVAs were 
conducted for the seven predetermined linguistic categories predefined in LIWC 
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) for the free recall section of the interview 
(Table 7.2).  A main effect of interview was found for word count (F(1, 37) = 5.1, MSe 
= 1341.7, p < 0.05, n2 = 0.3), showing that both AMs and IFAMs were shorter during 
their second recall.  No other reliable differences were found. 
Table 7.3. LIWC categories by condition for specific questions (means and standard 
deviations) 
LIWC category  AM 
Interview 1 
IFAM 
Interview 1 
AM 
Interview 2 
IFAM 
Interview 2 
Word Count * 65.6 (30.00) 52.5 (22.3) 65.2 (35.5) 53.0 (21.2) 
Cognitive Mechanisms 19.2 (4.8) 15.9 (7.6) 18.3 (6.1) 17.0 (6.8) 
Insight  7.4 (4.8) 5.0 (3.2) 7.3 (4.1) 5.9 (4.5) 
Present 9.9 (6.9) 8.2 (5.6) 9.4 (5.6) 7.3 (4.7) 
Past 6.0 (2.8) 5.6 (3.7) 5.8 (2.9) 4.5 (3.9) 
*p < 0.05 
Individual mixed model 2 (AM or IFAM) x 2 (interview 1 or interview 2) ANOVAs were 
conducted for the five predetermined linguistic categories predefined in LIWC 
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) for the experimental subset of specific 
questions (see Table 7.3).  A main effect of interview was found for word count, (F(1, 
37) = 4.3, MSe = 643.6, p < 0.05, n2 = 0.1) such that AMs contained more words than 
IFAMs.  No other reliable results were found.   
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7.3.7 Account Detail 
 
Table 7.4. Details in drawings and free recall by condition (means and standard 
deviations) 
LIWC category  AM 
Interview 1 
IFAM 
Interview 1 
AM 
Interview 2 
IFAM 
Interview 2 
Free Recall Detail  24.5 (10.8) 27.5 (6.6) 28.0 (11.1) 23.2 (5.4) 
Room Drawing Detail*  8.5 (2.6) 6.2 (2.1) 9.4 (3.6) 6.9 (2.0) 
* p<0.05 
Detail was investigated using the Levine internal/external episodic rating system 
(Levine et al., 2002).  (Levine et al., 2002).  This system advocates coding a given 
account in terms of the internal and external detail presented.  Internal details are 
those relating to the event, external details are those peripheral to the event.  In the 
present study, participants only provided internal detail, as requested, hence only 
these details were carried forward for analysis. 
A 2 (AM or IFAM) x 2 (interview 1 or interview 2) mixed models ANOVA was use to 
analyse detail in report.  Results, in Table 7.4, revealed no reliable differences across 
conditions or across interviews.  
7.3.8 Drawing 
Further differences were found between AMs and IFAMs by analysing the drawings 
each participant provided.  A 2 (AM or IFAM) x 2 (interview 1 or interview 2) mixed 
models ANOVA was use to analyse detail in the drawings.  Results, in Table 7.4 show 
that participants in the truthful condition drew included more details in their 
drawings than those in the fabricated condition (F(1, 37) = 5.1, MSe = 10.6, p < 0.05, 
n2 = 0.2.  No other reliable differences were found.  Further, three participants 
provided details that were inconsistent with the experimental room in interview 1, 
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and the same three participants drew these same inconsistent details in interview 2.  
Two participants were in the truthful condition, one was in the fabricated condition.   
7.4 Discussion 
The study investigated the information gained from two interviews, occurring one 
week and two weeks after a staged event.  Primarily, the aim was to investigate the 
differences between truthful and partially fabricated recall of an everyday event and 
evaluate the performance of such memories over time.  The study also assessed the 
accuracy and consistency of truthful information to investigate memory more 
generally.   
This study improved on chapter six in a number of ways.  Firstly, rather than asking 
participants to provide an entirely fabricated statement, they were asked to provide 
fabricated information about one particular aspect – the researcher.  Not only did this 
allow for tight control of the fabricated information insofar that it could be explicitly 
known which parts of the transcript were deliberately fabricated, it was also more 
likely to reflect the way in which IFAMs are created (Vrij, 2005).  Indeed, findings from 
chapters two, three and five posit that IFAMs are created by editing a truthful 
memory through the process of deletion-substitution rather than generating entirely 
fictitious scenarios, events and people.  Sapir (1987) also suggests that up to 90% of a 
fabricated statement may comprise truthful details.  Secondly, the study required 
participants to provide an account on two separate occasions, providing an insight 
into how truthful and fabricated memories behave over a given time period, allowing 
measures such as consistency and accuracy over time to be taken. 
7.4.1 Source attributions 
This study replicated findings from chapter six, again showing that IFAMs were based, 
or claimed to be based predominantly on memory.  AMs on the other hand were 
more likely to be tentative, containing fewer memory-based responses, more guesses 
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and more “don’t know” responses.  Additionally, these source attributions remained 
stable over time, suggesting that remembered answers are not forgotten, that 
guessed or inferred answers do not become incorporated into memory and that 
‘don’t know’ answers are rarely retrieved.  These findings demonstrate that 
participants provide similar categories of information over time, suggesting that they 
are aware of the source of given information.   
It was also found that the actual information provided (in addition to its source 
clarification) was highly consistent over time, with participants in the truthful 
condition providing 81% consistent information and those in the fabricated condition 
providing 78% consistent information.  Therefore, participants in both conditions 
were consistent not only in the information they were providing, but also in the 
source monitoring category to which it was assigned.  This finding has a number of 
important implications.   
Firstly, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on consistency in forensic settings, 
with some legal professionals even using consistency as a cue to differentiate truthful 
from fabricated accounts (Fisher & Culter, 1995).  Here, however, results showed 
found that both truthful and fabricated answers to specific questions were highly 
consistent over time, directly opposing such beliefs.  However, it is important to note 
that the time period between interviews in the present study was only one week.  
Therefore, results can suggest that over a delay of a week, truthful and fabricated 
accounts were consistent; however, different results may be found if they delay was 
substantially increased.  This could be a particularly interesting avenue that future 
research could investigate. 
Secondly, although this finding may suggest that participants were able to recall the 
staged event accurately over time, information provided by participants served to 
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suggest otherwise.  It seemed that when providing information for interview 2, 
participants were simply recalling the information given at interview one, rather than 
recalling the actual mental representation of the event.  For example: 
“I think I said looked around bored last time so I’ll stick with that this time “ 
“Last time I said she was wearing a ring, so a ring” 
“I think I said she was right handed last time, right handed” 
“Erm, I know I said right handed last time I’m going to say right handed” 
 
This is likely to be due again to the emphasis placed on interviewees by legal 
professionals to be consistent over time (Walczyk et al., 2009) and failing to do so can 
cause negative consequences for the rememberer.  If it is the case that the majority 
of participants are recalling information provided in the first interview for the 
purposes of consistency, then every effort must be put into ensuring the information 
given in interview 1 is complete, accurate and comprehensive.  Alternatively, it may 
be important to highlight to interviewees that providing accurate information is more 
important than consistency.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the source attribution findings also serve to 
demonstrate that information provided which is claimed to be almost entirely based 
on memory should be viewed with caution or investigated further.  It is believed that 
participants responded in such a way when fabricating to fulfil erroneously held 
beliefs about the nature of memory.  The Witness-Confidence-Accuracy (WCA) and 
Memory-Accuracy-Detail (MAD) beliefs (see chapter four) posit that detailed 
information held with confidence is likely to be accurate.  Therefore, it would seem 
that when fabricating their accounts, these spurious beliefs may have been informing 
participant’s answer patterns.  
165 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, without the interviewer asking for specific 
source attributions, all information provided, unless explicitly categorised by the 
interviewee as unknown, is likely to be assumed to be veridical memory.  In this 
study, it was found that 13% of information provided in interview 1 was either 
guessed or inferred and 17% of information in interview 2 was guessed or inferred.  
This guessed and inferred information can be considered as ‘non-malicious 
fabrications’ – fictitious information provided not to deceive but to ‘fill-in-the-gap’, to 
conform with believed expectations about remembered information.  Interviewees 
may believe that if a question is being posed, it should be answerable and therefore 
may provide an answer, known to be not derived from memory, to comply with this.  
It was recommended in the previous chapter that all answers which are not explicitly 
based on memory should be removed from the interview.  This recommendation is 
strengthened here as it was found that by removing all non-memory based answers, 
accuracy of the information provided increased from 62% to 73%. 
It must also be highlighted here, as in the previous chapter, that although the specific 
questions allow more detail to be elicited from the witness, they also provide a platform 
from which an individual providing deliberately fabricated information can include 
additional information and create a highly detailed account.  This inclusion of highly 
specific, confident information may lead to an IFAM appearing truthful, as per the WCA 
belief and findings from Bell & Loftus (1989) regarding the powerful persuasive effects of 
additional detail in accounts.  
7.4.2 Content Analysis 
Analysis of language used in the free recall section of the interviews revealed only 
that participants in both conditions gave a shorter account in interview 2 than in 
interview 1.  However, it is unclear from these results alone whether participants 
were simply being more concise in their answers or if they were in fact providing less 
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detail over time.  Analysis of detail in free recall accounts showed that participants 
provided the same level of detail regardless of memory type and this was not affected 
over time.  Therefore, it seems that participants are providing more concise free 
recall in interview 2, without loss of detail.   
In addition, the finding that detail does remain stable both over time and between 
AMs and IFAMs is robust within deception research (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 
2008), and is used as a primary criterion for distinguishing AMs from IFAMs in a 
number of statement assessment techniques (see 1.3.9).  However, when the way in 
which a partial lie is likely to be constructed is considered, particularly in this study – 
by recalling the truth and editing it through deletion-substitution - it is unlikely that 
any differences in detail would emerge, since truthful detail can primarily be 
incorporated into the account and counter factual information can be easily 
substituted in for the factual information.   
As expected, no differences were found between language used in the free recall of 
AMs and IFAMs.  This is likely due to the way in which participants were providing 
their IFAMs.  In the previous chapter and the majority of previous work investigating 
IFAMs (Merckelbach, 2004; Porter et al., 2007; Porter, Yuille, & Lehman, 1999a, 
1999b; Ruby & Brigham, 1997), when fabricating, participants have been asked to 
provide entirely fictitious accounts of an event.  Again, when it is considered that the 
fabricated accounts are likely to be edited versions of the truth - it is unlikely that any 
linguistic differences would occur since the IFAM is primarily truthful with only a small 
number of details altered.   
Not only do these findings show then that an IFAM can be almost entirely hidden 
within an AM, but also that tools for statement assessment e.g. Statement Validity 
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Analysis (SVA) and Memory Assessment Procedure (MAP), would more than likely fail 
at detecting memories fabricated in such a way.   
The section of the interview that did yield reliable differences in content was within 
the experimental subset of specific questions.  It was found that AMs contained more 
words pertaining to cognitive processes, such as “think”, “know” and “consider” than 
IFAMs.  Those providing an AM therefore seem to verbalise their reasoning and 
metacognitive processing, often hedging responses to questions with “I think”, 
further supporting the notion that truthful accounts are more tentative than IFAMs.  
Additionally, this difference in linguistic styles may be a rhetorical device, used by 
truth tellers to demonstrate that they are careful, thoughtful and thorough 
rememberers.  What is important then is some demonstration of ‘thinking’ and of 
effortful memory retrieval (Bysouth, 2009).  
Recommendations from these findings would be for researchers to focus on 
assessment of answers to specific questions, rather than free recall since fabrications 
can easily be substituted and therefore hidden within the free recall section, whereas 
all details given in the free recall can be explicitly examined in subsequent specific 
questioning. 
7.4.3 Drawing 
Results from the drawings indicated that those participants in the truthful condition 
included more details than those in the fabricated condition.  This is consistent with 
findings in the previous chapter and may represent an attempt by those fabricating to 
reduce the number of details included for possible interrogation.  Drawing may 
therefore be an interesting avenue future research investigating truth and lies could 
explore, as in this and the previous study (and indeed work by Vrij et al., 2010), 
number of details have proven to be a reliable indicator of deception.  Interestingly 
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however, inconsistent detail was included by three participants, from both truthful 
and fabricated conditions.  In the previous study, only participants in the truthful 
condition included inconsistent detail, thought to reflect the fact that truthful 
drawings were elicited from memory, whereas fabricated drawings were based on 
schemas of classrooms (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).  However, in the present study, the 
inconsistent detail included within the fabricated condition serves to show that the 
drawing is most probably a product of memory, edited where necessary.   
7.5 Conclusions 
In sum, this study has shown that an IFAM can be almost entirely truthful, and 
therefore will lack many of the cues to fabrication favoured in traditional deception 
detection studies and statement analysis techniques (see section 1.3.9).  However, a 
number of linguistic and source monitoring differences were highlighted between the 
two account types but only in the specific questions sections of the interview, offering 
new and alternative methods of delineating AMs from IFAMs and highlighting the 
importance of using and analysing specific questions. 
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Chapter Eight 
8 Recalling Truthful and Fabricated Memories of an 
Emotional Event Over Time 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The study reported in this chapter aims to build on the previous two studies in a 
number of ways.  Firstly, the study will use a more emotive staged event and assess 
the effect this may have upon recall.  Porter et al’s (1998) work investigating IFAMs of 
trauma yields very different results to the investigation of IFAMs of more neutral 
events (Colwell et al., 2007) such that traumatic memories were reported with an 
‘over-the-top’ quality.  It is one of the aims of the present study to further these 
findings and investigate how AMs and IFAMs of an emotional event are reported in 
comparison to AMs and IFAMs of more neutral events (chapters six and seven).  
Answering such a question will inform the current understanding of IFAMs, deception 
and memory more broadly, indicating whether the emotionality of an event is likely 
to change the way in which is it remembered and reported.  Secondly, the study will 
include an additional condition that instructs participants to provide IFAMs on two 
occasions and then provide an AM on a final occasion.  This condition will assess the 
impact that providing intentionally fabricated information has on subsequent ability 
to recall the truth.  Finally, because of the failure of the free recall section to elicit any 
reliable differences in content between AMs and partial IFAMs and due to the 
usefulness of the specific questioning section (chapter seven), this study will focus on 
the source of answers given to specific questions and the confidence held in these 
answers.  Because of this, the methodology will differ from those in previous studies 
insofar that online questionnaires will be used in place of face-to-face interviews due 
to the self-report nature of the questionnaire.  It is important to note that because of 
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this change in methodology, the findings in this chapter may not map onto the 
previous chapters particularly well.  It may also be difficult to attribute any 
differences in the findings solely to the emotionality of the event, it may be that using 
online interviews, or using self-report measures may affect the results given.  In any 
case, this study represents an interesting and novel investigation into real and 
fabricated memories of an emotive staged event, future work may expand upon 
these to help refine the differences between everyday and emotional real and 
fabricated memories and help elucidate which processes and methodological 
alterations are responsible for results given.   
8.1.1 Predictions 
It is expected that the emotional event on which the AMs and IFAMs will be based 
will influence source monitoring and confidence ratings.  However, since such a study 
has not been previously conducted, it is not certain how such ratings will be 
influenced.  It may be that confidence ratings are inflated for IFAMs, as per Porter et 
al. (1998) finding that traumatic memories display an ‘over-the-top’ quality.   
Additionally, since previous work assessing the effects of fabricating on memory has 
been primarily reduced to investigating lying about autobiographical facts, it is 
unclear how providing an IFAM will affect the ability to subsequently recall the 
original AM.  It may be that providing an IFAM will bolster the original AM as per 
Polage (2004), alternatively, results may find that providing an IFAM may hinder the 
ability to recall the AM, with individuals coming to believe their IFAM as per false 
memory creation.  Such predictions are difficult to make due to the lack of previous 
research.   
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8.2 Methods 
8.2.1 Participants 
Forty-two participants (3 male, 39 female) took part in the study with a mean age of 
19 years.  Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Leeds and 
were given course credit for their participation.  Data from four participants were 
removed from the study as they failed to complete all sessions.   
8.2.2 Materials and Procedure 
Participants attended one group session, with no less than two participants, where 
they completed a memory measure, The War of The Ghosts (Bartlett, 1932), see 
appendix VII.  This was selected to provide a ruse that the study was interested in the 
outcomes of the memory test, whereas the interest was in the quality of memory for 
the event itself.  They then witnessed an unexpected staged altercation between the 
researcher and another individual, claiming to need the testing room for teaching 
immediately.  Following this, participants read a piece of paper that detailed the 
condition in which they would be for the remainder of the experiment.  Participants 
were in one of three conditions.  Participants in the truthful condition were required 
to give a truthful account of the events they remembered from session one in all 
subsequent questionnaires.  Participants assigned to the continual-fabrication 
condition were required to provide deliberately untruthful information for specific 
questions centred on the staged altercation (the experimental subset) and provide 
truthful information on all remaining questions (the control subset) in all subsequent 
questionnaires.  Participants in the fabrication-subsequent-truth condition were 
asked to give deliberately fabricated information on the experimental subset and 
truthful information in the control subset in the initial and second questionnaire.  
They were then asked to provide truthful information to the entire third 
questionnaire.   
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Following this, participants were asked to complete a short survey regarding the 
events they had just witnessed.  The survey comprised ten questions regarding the 
session, the altercation, the participant, other participants and the researcher (see 
appendix XVI).  Some participants were asked to complete the survey truthfully, these 
participants were in the truthful condition, and others were asked to complete the 
survey by providing deliberately fabricated information for specific questions (the 
experimental subset).  These questions focussed upon details of the altercation 
including what was said, actions that occurred and what the individual who 
interrupted looked like.  Participants were then instructed to provide truthful 
information for all other questions (the control subset).  These participants were in 
both the continual-fabrication condition and the fabrication-subsequent-truth 
condition.  The session was then ended and participants were reminded of when to 
expect the email link to the first questionnaire. 
The initial survey provided a record of an individual’s experience, allowing for later 
measures of consistency to be taken.  Participants were then emailed links to online 
questionnaires regarding the events of the session one week (questionnaire one) 
after the session and finally three weeks after the initial session (questionnaire two), 
see appendix XVII.  The questionnaires contained sixteen items (eight in the 
experimental subset, eight in the control subset) regarding the test session, the self, 
the altercation, the researcher and other participants.  Each question was followed 
with a source attribution (memory based – the answer was a memory of what 
happened; memory using external event – the answer was obtained because of a 
memory of something external to the study e.g. remembering the study was in the 
morning because the participant remembers feeling tired; inference – the answer was 
inferred e.g. assuming the researcher had brown eyes because she had dark skin; 
guess – the answer was guessed and “don’t know” – the participant cannot 
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remember the answer to the question). Additionally, participants were asked to rate 
how confident they were that they had provided the correct answer to the question 
(5 very confident - 1 not at all confident).  Participants in both fabricated conditions 
were asked to provide source monitoring decisions and confidence ratings that they 
felt would make their account seem convincing to an external assessor.   
The study employed a between-subjects design with one main independent variable: 
recall type (truthful, continual-fabricated or fabrication-subsequent-truth) which was 
counterbalanced across participants.  The main dependent variables that were 
assessed included accuracy of answers to the specific questions elicited from 
questionnaires one and two, the source attributions and confidence judgements of 
these answers in both questionnaires and the consistency of answers over all 
questionnaires.   
The room to be used for the first test session was a large classroom containing twelve 
individual desks and a number of other items consistent with a testing room e.g. 
computer, whiteboard.  Prior to the participants entering the room, testing booklets, 
the questionnaire, pens and an envelope were placed on each desk.  Inside the 
booklet was additional information regarding the condition to which each participant 
was assigned (see appendices XVIII and XIX).  The participant was asked not to touch 
this until told to do so.  
One researcher was present in the room for the duration of the test session.  The 
researcher seated participants at the individual desks, then told them that they were 
to hear a story and that they must, once the story was completed, reproduce it in as 
much detail as possible without paraphrasing.  The researcher then began reading 
aloud Bartlett’s (1932) War of the Ghosts.  Once the researcher was confident that all 
of the participants had completed recall, the researcher contacted a second 
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researcher discreetly who then entered the room, disturbing the session and began 
the altercation regarding the room booking (see appendix XX for all altercation 
transcripts6).  The issue was resolved and the second researcher left.  Following this, 
participants were asked to open the questionnaire, read the information regarding 
condition assignment and complete the questionnaire following these instructions.  
Participants were also informed that the altercation had been staged.   
One week following the test session participants were emailed a link to the online 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire firstly reminded the participants of the condition to 
which they were assigned and reminded them how to answer the questionnaire in 
accordance with the condition.   
Three weeks after the initial test phase (two weeks after the second questionnaire) 
participants were emailed another link to the online questionnaire.  Again, 
participants were reminded of their condition assignment and provided with 
instructions on how to complete the questionnaire in line with the condition.  It was 
in this final questionnaire that those participants in the fabrication-subsequent-truth 
condition were asked to provide truthful answers to the experimental subset of 
questions.  Following completion of the final online questionnaire, participants were 
presented with a screen presenting the study debrief and an email address to which 
any questions concerning the study could be directed. 
 
 
 
                                                             
6
 The altercation differed slightly on some occasions.  However, this was taken into account 
when participant questionnaires were coded ensuring responses were matched to the 
appropriate transcript and scored accordingly.   
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Source Attribution 
 
Table 8.1. Number of questions answered (out of eight) with each source 
attribution from the experimental subset from questionnaire one (means and 
standard deviations) 
Source attribution Truthful Memory 
Questionnaire 1 
Fabricated-
subsequent-truth 
Questionnaire 1 
Continual-
fabrication 
Questionnaire 1 
Memory 6.5 (1.1) 6.0 (2.1) 5.5 (2.0) 
Indirect Memory 0.4 (0.8) 0.9 (1.1) 1.5 (1.7) 
Inference 0.3 (0.6) 0.7 (1.1) 0.4 (0.6) 
Guess 0.7 (0.6) 0.3 (0.8) 0.6 (1.2) 
“I don’t know”  0.1 (0.3) 0.1 (0.4) 0.1 (0.3) 
 
Source attributions, shown in Table 8.1 were investigated using Chi-Square, however 
no reliable differences were found between source attributions between conditions 
in questionnaire one. 
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Table 8.2. Number of questions answered (out of eight) with each source 
attribution from the experimental subset from questionnaire two (means and 
standard deviations) 
Source attribution Truthful Memory 
Questionnaire 2 
Fabricated-
subsequent-truth 
Questionnaire 2 
Continual-
fabrication 
Questionnaire 2 
Memory 5.8 (2.3) 3.2 (2.8) 5.1 (2.7) 
Indirect Memory 1.4 (1.9) 1.6 (1.9) 1.5 (1.8) 
Inference 0.1 (0.5) 1.1 (1.3) 0.6 (0.9) 
Guess 0.4 (0.5) 1.3 (1.8) 0.4 (0.9) 
“I don’t know”  0.4 (0.5) 0.8 (0.4) 0.4 (0.8) 
 
Results, shown in Table 8.2, revealed differences in source monitoring between 
conditions in questionnaire two, χ2(8) = 33.3, p < 0.001, φ = 0.3.  An inspection of the 
residuals (critical value 1.96) indicated that participants in the fabricated-subsequent-
truth condition gave fewer memory based answers, but more answers based on 
inferences and guesses than those in the truthful and continual-fabrication 
conditions.  Further, a reliable difference was found in the source attributions 
between conditions over time, χ2(18) = 43.4, p < 0.001, φ = 0.2.  An inspection of the 
residuals (critical value 1.96) indicated that participants in the fabricated-subsequent-
truth condition gave less memory based answers, but more answers based on 
inferences and guesses in time two than in time one.  No other reliable differences 
were found, suggesting that for the other two conditions, source attributions were 
stable across interviews.   
8.3.2 Consistency 
Information provided for the questions in the experimental subset for truthful and 
both fabrication conditions was assessed for consistency between questionnaire one 
and questionnaire two.  Here, inconsistency is viewed as providing information in one 
interview and omitting it in another, or contradictory information across interviews (a 
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highly consistent answer was scored two points, a slightly altered or less detailed 
answer was given one point and a different or omitted answer was scored zero).  
Truthful recallers received a mean consistency score of 12.1 (s.d. 4.1), participants in 
the continual-fabricate condition received a mean consistency score of 11.2 (s.d. 3.3) 
and participants in the fabricate-subsequent-truth condition received a mean 
consistency score of 0.1 (s.d. 0.3).  Seen as percentages, 67% of information in the 
truthful condition remained unchanged, 70% of information in the continual 
fabrication-condition remained unchanged and only 1% of information in the 
fabricate-subsequent-truth condition remained unchanged.  A one-way ANOVA with 
condition as factor and consistency score as dependent variable revealed an effect of 
condition, F(1, 41) = 68.3, p < 0.001, n2 = 0.8.  Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed that 
participants in the fabricate-subsequent-truth condition received reliably lower 
consistency scores than participants in the truthful (m = -12.0, p < 0.001) and 
continual-fabricate condition (m = -11.1, p < 0.001). 
8.3.3 Confidence 
 
Table 8.3. Confidence scores (out of 5) for questions from the experimental subset 
from questionnaire one (means and standard deviations) 
Source attribution Truthful Memory 
Questionnaire 2 
Fabricated-
subsequent-truth 
Questionnaire 2 
Continual-
fabrication 
Questionnaire 2 
Memory 4.3 (0.6) 4.6 (0.5) 4.6 (0.5) 
Indirect Memory 3.5 (0.5) 3.9 (0.7) 3.6 (0.6) 
Inference 3.5 (0.5) 3.4 (0.7) 3.0 (0.7) 
Guess 2.8 (0.8) 2.2 (1.3) 2.8 (1.0) 
Overall Confidence 4.5 (0.6) 4.2 (0.7) 4.1 (0.6) 
 
178 
 
Overall confidence scores of the experimental subset at questionnaire one (shown in 
Table 8.3) were investigated using a one-way ANOVA with condition as factor and 
overall confidence scores as dependent variables.  No reliable differences were found 
between conditions, such that participants in all conditions rated their answers with 
equal confidence.   
Table 8.4. Confidence scores for questions from the experimental subset from 
questionnaire two (means and standard deviations) 
Source attribution Truthful Memory 
Questionnaire 2 
Fabricated-
subsequent-truth 
Questionnaire 2 
Continual-
fabrication 
Questionnaire 2 
Memory 4.4 (0.6) 4.6 (0.4) 4.4 (0.5) 
Indirect Memory 3.5 (0.8) 3.6 (0.6) 3.6 (0.9) 
Inference 2.6 (0.6) 3.2 (0.7) 2.9 (0.9) 
Guess 2.1 (0.6) 2.6 (0.7) 2.1 (0.8) 
Overall Confidence 4.0 (0.6) 3.7 (0.7) 4.0 (0.9) 
 
Overall confidence scores of the experimental subset at questionnaire two (shown in 
Table 8.4) were investigated using a one-way ANOVA with condition as factor and 
overall confidence scores as dependent variables.  No reliable differences were found 
between conditions, such that participants in all conditions rated their answers with 
equal confidence.   
Further, confidence in source monitoring judgements was investigated over time.  
However, no reliable differences were found, suggesting that source attributions 
remain stable classifications over multiple interviews.  
8.3.4 Accuracy 
To investigate the effect of lying on memory, accuracy scores in the experimental 
subset of questions in questionnaire two were compared between the fabricate-
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subsequent-truth condition (participants in this condition had attempted to recall the 
truth after having lied in all previous questionnaires) and the truthful condition, in 
which participants had been required to provide truthful answers throughout all 
questionnaires.  
 
An independent t-test revealed that there was a reliable difference between accuracy 
scores  in the experimental subset (t(26) = 5.4, p < 0.001) such that participants who 
provided truthful accounts after having given fabricated responses were less accurate 
in their responses (41% accuracy) than those who had provided truthful answers 
continually (85% accuracy).   
 
Further, to investigate the nature of truthful recall over time, answers for the control 
subset of specific questions (in which all participants were instructed to provide 
truthful responses) from all three conditions were coded for accuracy.  It was found 
that for questionnaire one, participants were, overall, 49% accurate.  Over answer 
types, it was found that answers based on memory were 72% correct and answers 
based on memory of an external event were 70% correct, answers based on 
inferences and guesses were at less than chance levels, with 27% and 27% correct 
respectively.  A one-way ANOVA with accuracy of answer types as dependent 
variables indicated a reliable difference (F(1, 41) = 7.2, p < 0.05, n2 = 0.8).  Bonferroni 
post hoc tests revealed that answers attributed to memory were reliably more 
accurate than those attributed to inferences and guesses (see percentages above).  
Additionally, answers attributed to indirect memories were reliably more accurate 
than those attributed to inferences were and guesses (see percentages above).   
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Accuracy for the control subset of questions was also investigated in questionnaire 
two.  It was found that overall, participants were 48% correct.  Across answer types it 
was found that answers based on memory were 80% correct, answers based on 
memory of an external event were 54% correct and answers based on inferences and 
guesses remained at less than chance levels, with 27% and 30% correct respectively.  
A one-way ANOVA with accuracy of answer types as dependent variables indicated a 
reliable difference (F(1, 41) = 14.1, p < 0.005, n2 = 0.9), such that answers attributed 
to memory were more accurate than those attributed to an indirect memory, those 
inferred or those answers that were guessed. 
 
Further, the relationship between confidence and accuracy was assessed to 
investigate the confidence-accuracy correlation.  This states that the higher rating of 
confidence an answer receives, the more likely it is to be accurate (see Sporer, 
Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995).  This correlation has received mixed results, with some 
studies supporting and others rejecting the correlation.  In the present study no 
reliable correlations were found across time, conditions and source attributions such 
that, for example, confident answers based on memory were not associated in any 
way with the accuracy score their received. 
8.4 Discussion 
This study aimed to strengthen findings from two previous studies, particularly those 
regarding source attributions of answers to specific questions.  Additionally, it aimed 
to extend previous methodologies by introducing a more salient staged event and a 
third condition that required participants to attempt to recall truthfully their memory 
for the event, having provided fabricated information in all questionnaires previously.  
The effects of such an instruction, prior to this study, was unknown.  It must however 
be reiterated  that because of substantial changes to the methodology used in this 
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chapter and the ones previous, differences in findings may not be solely attributable 
to the changed emotionality of the event – other alterations such as the modality of 
reporting or the online format of the questionnaire may have played a pivotal role in 
the differences noted.  The results will therefore be interpreted taking this into 
consideration.   
8.4.1 Section 1: Distinguishing Truthful and Fabricated Memories 
Results regarding the source attributions of the truthful and continual-fabrication 
conditions serve to highlight important beliefs underlying the construction of 
fabricated memories.  Unlike the previous studies, no reliable differences were 
observed between source monitoring categories.  Previous results suggested that 
truthful memories consisted more of guesses, inferences and “don’t know” answers, 
whereas fabricated memories were claimed to be based, more frequently, on 
“memory”, yet this finding failed to be replicated here.  However, an inspection of the 
proportionate use of these answer types across studies shows that in fact, in the 
present study, fabricated answers yielded similar high percentage use of “memory” 
answers.  In other words, in the previous two studies and the present study, 
fabricated memories contained 81%, 79% and 71% of “memory” based answers 
respectively (the latter two percentages are averaged across two interviews as no 
reliable differences of time were observed).  As has been discussed in the previous 
two chapters, is does still remain likely that the Witness-Confidence-Accuracy (WCA) 
and memory-accuracy-detail (MAD) beliefs (see chapter four) that posit that detailed 
information held with confidence is likely to be accurate, influence the classification 
of source attributions (however it is important to note that the beliefs the 
participants in the present study hold about memory were not explicitly investigated.  
Until more work is completed replicating findings in the belief to memory 
questionnaire, it is not possible to say that such beliefs are universal.  However, it is 
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possible to say that these beliefs may occur in the population – and therefore such 
beliefs may be influencing how memories are reported).  Therefore, these results 
serve to strengthen the previous findings.   
What appears to be different in the present study are the answer types provided by 
those required to give truthful recall.  In this study, we see an elevated proportionate 
use of memory based answers in the truthful recall condition, such that truthful 
responses in previous two studies contained 60% and 61% of memory based answers, 
whereas the present study contained 77% of memory based answers (again, the 
latter two percentages are averaged across both interviews as no reliable differences 
of time were observed).  In chapter four, results revealed that individuals hold a 
number of inaccurate beliefs about memory – one such belief is the Burnt-In Memory 
(BIM) belief that holds that emotional memories give rise to highly accurate mental 
representations.  In may be that such a belief is underlying the construction and 
subsequent classification of source attributions in the present study, providing that it 
is assumed that the change in emotionality is the cause of such differences.  
Participants may have believed that the emotive event they witnessed gave rise to a 
more stable and salient memory, therefore making them more likely to categorise 
answers as being grounded in memory, rather than, as has been observed with more 
everyday memories, guesses and inferences.   
Results from the present study may suggest that, because of underlying beliefs, AMs 
and IFAMs behave differently, depending upon the to-be-remembered event.  
Although this can be seen by the varying results produced when detecting everyday 
and traumatic memories using the MAP (Porter et al., 1999), this study highlights, for 
the first time, if the differences in emotionality are taken to be the root cause of such 
changes, that the differences an everyday and more salient event can have upon 
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recall.  Although results need to be replicated and furthered, and the reasons for the 
changes in results need to be elucidated, the data may suggest that classifying the 
veracity of an emotional event may require entirely different criteria than when the 
event is more mundane.  In previous chapters (six and seven) recommendations were 
to investigate further or treat with suspicion, answers that contained an unusual 
amount of ‘remember’ responses.  However, here it would seem that a high amount 
of remember responses is acceptable, providing the remembered account is, to some 
degree, emotive.  It may be then that in cases where an individual witnesses an 
emotive event, source attributions may not be a clear-cut way of identifying potential 
IFAMs and asking for source monitoring attributions in an interview setting may not 
be useful for detecting fabrications. 
Additionally, it is important to note that source attributions for AMs and IFAMs were 
not found to reliably differ over time, suggesting that participants were aware of their 
answer type classification, recalling it accurately over time and not incorporating 
guessed or inferred answers into memory.  It seems then that participants may be 
aware that they are providing inferred and guessed answers, but may masquerade 
these as ‘memories’ to fulfil interview expectations.  For example, truthful accounts 
contained 13% of guesses and inferences in interview one, and 6% in interview two.  
In other words, participants are giving ‘non-malicious fabrications’ to answer 
questions that memory may not be able to provide.  Indeed, removal of all non-
memory based answers sees accuracy rise from 47% to 68% in interview one, and 
from 45% to 65% in interview two, further strengthening the previous assertions that 
answers not based on memory should be removed from investigation, allowing for a 
more accurate account to be generated.   
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As in the previous chapter, it was found that the actual information provided (in 
addition to its source attribution) was consistent over time, with participants in the 
truthful condition providing 67% consistent information and those in the fabricated 
condition providing 70% consistent information.  Therefore, participants in both 
conditions were consistent not only in the information they were providing, but also 
in the source to which the information was attributed.  This finding opposes beliefs 
regarding consistency held by some legal scholars who suggest that consistency is a 
reliable indicator of veracity (see Fisher & Culter, 1995), however, it must be 
remembered that the findings in this study only apply to a relatively short delay 
(three weeks in total); it may be the case that entirely different results would be 
found after a more substantial delay.  Certainly, future research could address this 
area. 
An investigation of confidence ratings revealed that answers in both truthful and 
fabricated conditions were rated equally as highly confident in both interviews.  
However, no reliable correlations were found between accuracy and confidence 
across conditions therefore suggesting that it does not necessarily follow that 
confident answers are accurate.   
8.4.2 Section 2: The effects of fabricating upon the subsequent ability to 
recall the truth 
Results from the fabricate-subsequent-truth condition in the present study serve to 
highlight the detrimental effects fabricating a memory can have upon subsequent 
truthful recall attempts.  Results from the source monitoring data show that when 
attempting to recall a truthful memory after providing fabricated recall, answers to 
specific questions were more based on guesses and inferences with fewer memory 
based answers as compared to truthful memories that had not been preceded by 
fabrication.  This suggests that when providing truthful recall after having fabricated, 
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answers are more tentative, more based more on guesses and less reliant on memory 
than if truthful recall had been provided throughout.   
Relatedly, and indeed most strikingly, it was found that those in the fabricate-
subsequent-truth condition provided answers that were reliably less accurate (44% 
less accurate) than those who had provided a truthful account throughout.  This 
finding serves to show that deliberately fabricating an account not only reduces the 
amount of information that is retrieved from memory, but also reliably impairs the 
ability to subsequently recall accurately.   
Interestingly, further analysis of the incorrect answers suggests that participants did 
not come to believe the fabricated information, with only 1% of the incorrect data 
being consistent with previously given fabricated information.  Therefore, it seems 
that individuals are able to reject previously given fictitious information, preventing 
this internally generated information from being incorporated into memory.  It would 
seem likely that a process of recollect-to-reject  (Brainerd et al., 2003; Pezdek et al., 
2009) was employed to discriminate self-generated information.  This process posits 
that fabricated information is rejected on the grounds that it is remembered as being 
generated to fulfil the need to fabricate.  In other words, a participant can recall their 
fabricated information and successfully classify it as fabricated information since the 
participants is aware that it was generated to be false.  What seems to be interesting 
however is that following successful rejection of fabricated information, participants 
performed poorly at accurately recalling the original event.  It would seem likely that 
this poor level of accurate recall may be due to the lack of explicit rehearsal of the 
original event to which participants in the continual-truth condition would have been 
exposed.  In such a case, it may be that individuals have to rely more on schema-
based knowledge of an event or simple guesswork.  The results certainly seem to 
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support this notion.  Brewer & Treyens (1981) suggested that schemas contain 
inference-based information, and results indicated that accounts in the fabricated-
subsequent-truth condition contained reliably fewer memory based answers and 
more inferences and guesses than continual-truthful and fabricated accounts, 
suggesting that they may indeed be schematic representations and guesswork rather 
than answers based on existing mental representations of the original event.  
Interestingly however, those in the fabricate-subsequent-truth condition rated their 
answers as highly in confidence as those who had provided truthful recall throughout 
despite receiving reliably lower accuracy scores.  This therefore suggests that these 
participants were not aware of their impaired recall ability and serves to show that 
confidence ratings should not be used as a way of discerning accurate information.   
8.5 Conclusions 
Results from this study not only bolster a number of the previous findings but also 
indicate some important implications for fabricated memory.  Firstly, the results 
supported previous findings and recommendations such as removing non-memory 
based answers from an account to increase account accuracy and that fabricated 
memories primarily consist of ‘memory’ based answers.  Additionally, they highlight 
the differences in recall between everyday and more emotional events – although 
this finding must be treated with caution since, due to a number of methodological 
changes from previous studies, it is difficult to elucidate which alterations may have 
impacted upon results.  However, if emotionality is accepted as being the cause of 
differences in results, it could be suggested that because inaccurate beliefs permeate 
individuals’ understanding of emotional memory, such that emotional events are 
remembered differently from more everyday events, they are, in turn, reported 
differently.  Certainly, more work needs to investigate this finding, but it serves to lay 
the groundwork for more refined analysis of IFAMs, taking into account the emotive 
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status of the original event.  Results also indicated that answers should not be 
discounted or indeed reviewed favourably with regards to their confidence rating.  
Confidence was not found to be associated, in any way, with accuracy.  Finally, 
findings show that deliberate fabrication can impair subsequent attempts at truthful 
recall, not because the fabricated information is incorporated into memory due to 
failures of source monitoring, but most likely because of the lack of explicit rehearsal 
of the original event leading the individual to rely on schematic knowledge of a given 
interaction/event.  Noticeably, however, such answers were rated with the same 
confidence as those that had been consistently truthful throughout, again bolstering 
the notion that confidence should not viewed as a measure of accuracy. 
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Chapter Nine 
9 Discussion  
This concluding chapter aims to outline and evaluate the principal findings from this 
body of work.  It will also provide a discussion of the implications of these findings for 
applied settings and indicate future pathways for study.   
9.1 Generating Fabricated Memories 
The central findings from chapter two showed that truthful autobiographical 
memories (AMs) play an integral role in the generation of intentionally fabricated 
autobiographical memories (IFAMs).  Results revealed that when asked to recall an 
AM or generate an IFAM to a given word cue, IFAMs are frequently created by firstly 
recalling an AM, either general autobiographical facts or a more specific episodic 
memory, and subsequently editing this mental representation to create a new 
fictitious event.  Post experimental interviews with participants clarified that the most 
frequently used strategy for editing was deletion-substitution whereby specific 
episodic details were deliberately altered.  For example, an AM, “last night I made a 
curry” may be substituted with “last night I made a lasagne” to generate an IFAM 
based upon an experienced event.  This study was the first to empirically clarify this 
process, with previous work having only theorised the differences in the construction 
phases of AMs and IFAMs (Porter, 1998, Colwell et al., 2002).     
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Table 9.1. Occurrence of principal memory features in AMs and IFAMs 
Memory Feature AM IFAM 
Vividness  + - 
Non-Fluencies - + 
Field Perspective + - 
Observer Perspective - + 
 
AM and IFAM reports were also measured on a number of linguistic and 
phenomenological constructs and were found to differ in a number of ways, see Table 
9.1.  Most notably, IFAMs were recalled more often from observer perspectives than 
AMs.  Freud (1915) originally noted that a memory often takes an observer 
perspective after it has been edited or processed in some way.  This position has been 
supported more recently (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Libby et al., 2005; Nigro & Neisser, 
1983). Therefore, the higher frequency of observer perspectives reported for IFAMs is 
likely to reflect the previously edited AM.  Relatedly, IFAMs were also reported as 
being experienced as less vivid than AMs.  Robinson & Swanson (1993) noted that 
observer perspectives were often associated with more less mental imagery than 
memories recalled with a field perspective, whilst Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye 
(1988) suggest that vivid imagery may provide an index for distinguishing experienced 
events from other types of mental representations such as imagining. 
Interestingly, analysis of language used to describe both AMs and IFAMs showed a 
difference in frequency of use of ‘motion’ words, e.g. ‘”go”,” walk”,” run” such that 
IFAM accounts contained more words regarding motion that did AM accounts in 
some studies but not others (see chapter 2, 3, 6 and 7).  Previous work (Newman et 
al., 2003) suggested that motion words are incorporated into accounts in order to 
reduce their complexity.  Describing actions rather than emotions or other 
metacognitive details is thought to reduce the cognitive effort required for the 
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generation of the memory.  However, it was suggested in chapter six that the 
increased use of ‘motion’ words found in AM accounts may in fact reflect the 
description of the account itself – that those generating an IFAM may have used 
fewer motion words to reduce the complexity of their account.  Indeed, results from 
chapter three revealed that motion words were only a reliable use to deception when 
the account was generated under load and results from chapter 7 failed to find any 
reliable differences in motion words between accounts.  Although this cue has 
received some support through previous research (Newman et al., 2003), results from 
the present studies have shown the cue may be an unreliable indicator of fabrication, 
with results changing according to load and dependent upon how the memory itself is 
reported. 
However, it is likely that, due to the additional phase of editing, and the constant 
refreshing and accessing of a newly generated image, generating an IFAM is likely to 
be significantly more cognitively complex than recalling an AM.  Therefore, the 
inclusion of more motion words is probably a strategy employed to help reduce the 
cognitive effort required to generate such a memory.  
The cognitive effort associated with AM recall and IFAM generation was explicitly 
assessed in chapter three.  Along with replicating findings regarding the linguistic and 
phenomenological characteristics of AMs and IFAMs found in chapter two, the study 
revealed that IFAMs required more cognitive effort to generate than AMs.  This 
finding was elicited through the assessment of performance on a secondary number 
recall task, performed concurrently whilst generating AMs and IFAMs to given word 
cues.   
It was found that whilst generating an IFAM, participants performed reliably poorer in 
the secondary task, recalling fewer numbers correctly, fewer in their originally 
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presented order and took longer to input the to-be-remembered digits than whilst 
recalling an AM.  These results show that the generation of an IFAM impacted more 
on the ability to perform a secondary task than did the generation of an AM, 
revealing that IFAM generation is more cognitively effortful than AM generation.   
Taken together, the results from chapters two and three show that the generation 
phase of memory retrieval is more cognitively effortful for intentionally fabricated 
than truthful autobiographical memories.  IFAMs are more effortful to generate since 
they require more cognitive resources for the additional phase of editing a recalled 
AM.  This editing phase can be indirectly observed by the increased number of 
fabricated memories recalled with an observer perspective.  Holding in mind and 
constantly refreshing a novel mental image is also likely to be more cognitively 
effortful than recalling a longer held AM.  This effort is reflected in the language used 
when IFAMs are recalled such that IFAM reports contain more “motion” words 
(although it is important to note that this difference in motion words was not 
replicated throughout the thesis).  
Most importantly, the studies reported in chapters two and three reveal that memory 
plays a highly important, if not essential role in the generation of fabricated 
memories but also in deception more generally.  Fabricating necessarily involves the 
retrieval of existing autobiographical information, most probably followed by a 
conscious ‘editing’ phase.  Indeed, if IFAMs are considered as akin to the ‘incubation’ 
stage of false memory generation (whereby individuals are asked to consciously edit 
existing memories or to imagine alternate events) see section 1.3, it can be seen 
clearly that memory must be essential to fabricating.  More broadly, memory should 
take a central role, or at least be considered when designing and interpreting 
deception detection studies, as it is very hard to conceive of a time where one would 
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deceive without sampling or drawing inferences from memory or imagination (which 
has shown to be inextricably linked to memory) in some way. 
9.2 Reporting Truthful and Fabricated Accounts 
The central findings from chapter six revealed that truthful and entirely fabricated 
recall for a recently experienced staged event could be reliably distinguished using a 
number of characteristics.   
Table 9.2.  Occurrence of principal memory features in free recall section of truthful 
and entirely IFAM accounts  
Memory Feature AM IFAM 
Word Count + - 
First Person Pronouns + - 
Second Person Pronouns - + 
Third Person Pronouns + - 
Non-Fluencies - + 
Details + - 
 
As shown in Table 9.2, in the free recall section of the memory accounts, AMs were 
longer in length, included more first person pronouns, more third person pronouns 
and more details than IFAMs.  Conversely, IFAMs contained more second person 
pronoun and more non-fluencies than AMs.   
The increased use of specific pronouns is particularly interesting as it seems to reflect 
underlying thought processes of the memory type.  For instance, when fabricating, 
participants were more likely to describe their experience in the second person, 
stating, for example “you would go into the room…” rather than, as was seen in the 
truthful accounts, the tendency to report using the first person, by stating, “I went 
into the room”.  This use of second person pronouns may reflect the use of schema-
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based recall – the participants may be describing a script of events based on beliefs 
and expectations of how the given event could have happened.  In contrast, the AM 
event descriptions, dominated by first person pronouns, reflect the lived experience 
as participants stated what happened, not what was expected to have happened.  
The pronouns here not only provide a useful tool for identification of IFAMs and AMs 
but also provide an interesting insight into thought processes involved with different 
types of recall.   
Similarly, the increased use of third person pronouns in the AM recall seems to 
indicate a propensity to discuss others when describing the event.  Previous research 
(Vrij et al., 2010) has shown that liars tend not to identify others.  Such a lack of third 
person pronouns in fabricated accounts may reflect this attempt to avoid discussing 
others, which also may play a role in reducing the complexity of the given story by 
reducing the number of given details. 
AM accounts were found to be longer in length and contained more episodic details 
than fabricated accounts.  Truth tellers therefore seem to be more likely to talk about 
the experienced event for longer and in more detail.  Those fabricating may 
deliberately reduce the amount of information given to reduce the complexity of the 
account and to provide fewer details that could be scrutinised.  Interestingly 
however, when analysed proportionately (i.e. when details were calculated with 
respect to word count) no differences were found to exist between the number of 
given details.  This finding is in direct contrast  to much previous research that states 
that truthful accounts contain reliably more details that fabricated accounts (DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2008) and indeed, is often used as a primary criterion in a 
number of statement analysis tools (SVA, RM, MAP and ACID, see section 1.3.9) 
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Table 9.3. Occurrence of principal memory features in specific question section of 
truthful and entirely fabricated accounts  
Memory Feature AM IFAM 
‘Memory’-based answers  - + 
Inferences + - 
Guesses + - 
Don’t Know answers + - 
Cognitive Mechanisms + - 
Insight Words + - 
 
As shown in Table 9.3, when answering specific questions about their experience of 
the staged event, truth tellers are more likely to base their answers on inferences, 
guesses and admit a lack of memory.  Conversely, those who are providing fabricated 
accounts are more likely to attribute their answer to a direct memory.  It seems 
therefore that when attempting to distinguish truthful from IFAMs, those accounts 
that appear to be based on mental representations may in fact be those that need to 
be approached with caution, whereas those memories that contain more 
uncertainties may be, according to these results, more likely to originate from real 
experience.   
Additionally, the language used when answering specific questions about a previously 
experienced staged event reliably differed between truthful and fabricated narratives 
such that truth tellers used more words pertaining to cognitive mechanisms and more 
insight words (“think”, “know”) than those providing fabricated accounts.  Providing 
such descriptions may be a rhetorical device; a way of demonstrating that the 
participants are thorough and careful remembers’, as participants’ demonstrate 
‘thinking’ and effortful memory retrieval (Bysouth, 2009).   
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In sum then, when an entire event is fabricated, a number of linguistic and source 
monitoring cues are available to aid distinction between memory types.  These cues 
manifest both when free recall of a previously experienced event is given and when 
answers to specific questions are given.  Additionally, these cues seem to reflect 
differences in thought processes that underlie AM and IFAM generation and 
elaboration.  Therefore, this cognitive based identification approach seems to offer a 
more successful detection method than those approaches based upon differences in 
emotional arousal.  
Leading on from these findings is the study presented in chapter seven.  This study 
aimed to identify whether cues that could distinguish truthful and entirely IFAMs 
could also distinguish between AMs and partial IFAMs.  Such memories are created 
by interspersing fabricated with truthful details and may be more likely to represent 
the sorts of fabrications offered in real-world settings (Sapir, 1987, Vrij, 2005).  
Central findings from this study indicated that partial IFAMs represent a much greater 
challenge to the legal system than entirely fabricated memories since they yield 
reliably fewer cues allowing for distinction between memory types than entire IFAMs.   
No linguistic features were found that could reliably distinguish AMs and IFAMs when 
participants were asked to provide a free recall of the previously experienced staged 
event.  The lack of differences between the reports of AMs and IFAMs is likely to be 
due to the way in which the memory reports are generated.  As noted in chapter two, 
often IFAMs are generated by recalling a truthful autobiographical memory and 
consciously editing this memory to create a novel mental representation.  The 
process of editing was described by participants as one of deletion-substitution.  
Therefore, differences in accounts are likely to be slight since the majority of the story 
can remain truthful with existing information simply being substituted for fabricated 
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information.  Indeed, results from the deception survey (see chapter five) indicated 
that the majority of lies told were based upon existing information, suggesting that 
most lies told will be editions of truth and therefore particularly difficult to detect.   
Table 9.4. Occurrence of principal memory features in specific questions section of 
AMs and partial IFAM accounts 
Memory Feature AM IFAM 
‘Memory’-based answers  - + 
Guesses + - 
Don’t Know answers + - 
 
Results from the analysis of answers given to specific questions (shown in Table 9.4) 
were more promising, with a number of cues reliably distinguishing AMs from IFAMs.  
These cues generally replicated those in the previous study of entire fabrication as 
again, real memories were found to contain fewer memory-based answers and 
contained more answers based on guesses and inferences.  Once more, this shows 
that truthful answers are more tentative and uncertain whilst fabricated answers 
contain more answers that are claimed to be based on actual memory.    
Findings from the analysis of partial IFAMs suggest that they are very difficult to 
detect due to the limited number of cues allowing for distinction.  Few cues exist 
since partially IFAMs can be almost entirely truthful accounts, with only the necessary 
or desired details altered.  These details can be simply substituted for new fictitious 
ones.  It seems that the most fruitful areas of potential detection is through the 
analysis of answers given to specific questions – fabricated answers tend to be more 
certain than those based on the truth, with most answers claimed to be based on 
remembered experience.      
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However, a related study (chapter eight), investigating how participants recalled and 
generated IFAMs of a more salient event (a staged altercation) highlighted further 
problems with the detection of AM and IFAMs.  After witnessing a staged but 
unexpected altercation, participants were asked to provide truthful or fabricated 
answers to specific questions (the free recall was removed since the previous study 
indicated that it was not a useful tool for distinguishing truth from fabrication).   
Here however, answer type did not distinguish between recall types as it had done 
previously.  Results from previous studies showed that IFAMs of mundane events 
generated more answers attributed to memory than AMs, which tended to comprise 
more of guesses and inferences.  However, when the event is more salient or 
memorable (such as the staged altercation) a different pattern of results occur 
(however, as noted within chapter 8, since a number of methodological changes were 
introduced, it is difficult to elucidate exactly which processes were influencing the 
differences found in this study, it can only be suggested that such differences are 
attributable to the increased saliency of the event).  Although IFAMs still generate 
similar levels of answers attributed to memory as were seen in previous studies, the 
number of answers coded as ‘memory’-based for AMs is greatly increased.  This 
change in answering is likely due to a number of erroneously-held beliefs about 
memory – discussed later in section 9.5 (however, again, it must be remembered that 
the beliefs about memory have yet to be shown to universally occur within the 
general population.  Caution must be exercised when generalising these findings from 
the respondents in chapter four to other respondents). 
This increase in ‘memory’-based answers for AMs renders the difference non-reliable, 
therefore making AMs and IFAMs non-discernible through the frequency of use of 
‘memory’-based answering.  Further, since a large percentage of truthful answers 
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were now classified as ‘memory’-based, the other classifications that had previously 
proven useful in distinguishing AMs and IFAMs were seldom used and they too failed 
to prove useful cues for distinction.  Therefore, it may be the case when a 
remembered event is particularly salient or emotional (as long as it is assumed that 
the emotional saliency was primarily affecting results), AMs and IFAMs are, using the 
current coding systems, almost indiscernible.   
9.3 Can Fabricating a Memory Affect the Ability to Recall the 
Truth? 
A further question that was investigated in this thesis assessed whether generating 
and reporting an IFAM a number of times could affect an individual’s ability to 
subsequently recall the truth.  Participants witnessed a staged altercation and were 
asked to provide multiple fabricated accounts of the event over the following three 
weeks.  After approximately one month, participants were then asked to provide an 
AM of what occurred during the original staged altercation.  The findings showed that 
generating an IFAM has very detrimental effects on the ability to subsequently recall 
the truth.  Participants who had previously given fabricated information were reliably 
less accurate at recalling AMs than those who had continually told the truth.  This 
poor performance may be due to the lack of explicit rehearsal to which those who 
continually told the truth were exposed.  Without original experience to rely on, it 
seems that participants based their memories on schemas – generic knowledge of 
how an event typically occurs.  This was supported by an increased number of 
answers based on guesses and inferences – answer types that Brewer & Treyens 
(1981) suggested would be consistent with schema-based answering.  However, an 
analysis of answers given indicated that participants did not come to believe their lies 
as only 1% of fabricated answers were carried through to truthful recall.  Through 
processes of recollect-to-reject  (Brainerd et al., 2003; Pezdek et al., 2009) which 
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states that fabricated information is rejected since it is remembered as being created 
to fulfil the need to lie, participants failed to incorporate internally generated 
information into memory. 
A particularly interesting finding from this study showed that despite participants 
who had provided an IFAM and then attempted to recall the original AM receiving 
reliably lower accuracy scores than those who had provided AMs throughout, 
measures of confidence were not reliably different between groups.  In other words, 
both groups were equally as confident in the answers they had provided, despite one 
group performing over 40% less accurately.  This finding has particularly detrimental 
implications as it highlights an individual’s inability to accurately assess the reliability 
of their own memory, reinforcing the notion that confidence should not be used as an 
indicator of accuracy.   
9.4 Beliefs about Lying and Beliefs about Lies 
Results from chapter five revealed the types of fabricated information that individuals 
distribute and receive in real-world situations and the feelings and behaviours that 
are associated with the dissemination and reception of such information.  Despite the 
wide range of results, findings with particularly important implications are noted 
here.  Results demonstrated that the majority of fabricated information told is an 
amalgamation of both truthful and fabricated information, with the majority of 
participants indicating that their fabricated information was created by editing 
existing information.  As was noted above (section 9.2), fabricated information that is 
partially based upon the truth represents a particular challenge to those wishing to 
attempt to distinguish truth from fallacy since fabricated information is disguised 
within a truthful narrative thus reducing the number of cues available to aid 
detection.  Results therefore suggest that the majority of fabricated information given 
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will be particularly difficult to detect since most often it is delivered alongside the 
truth, or at least information that is believed to be true. 
Results also indicated that people often used cues to detect lies that are not 
supported by the scientific literature – at least in the lies they reported in the 
questionnaire.  This may be particularly detrimental to personal interactions and in 
situations where individuals are required to assess the veracity of another’s memory 
i.e. in court.  Additionally, it was found that individuals tend to view themselves as 
competent lie detectors, capable of filtering information appropriately.  However, 
much research has shown that lay people, and indeed police personnel, are no better 
than chance at detecting fabricated information (Vrij, 2000).  Again, an inflated 
confidence in the ability of detect fabricated information is likely to be detrimental 
when assessments of such information are made. 
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9.5 Beliefs about Memory 
 
Table 9.5 Fourteen Beliefs about Autobiographical Memory 
Beliefs 
MSS Memory Self-Superiority 
MAD Memory-Accuracy-Detail 
BIM Burnt-In Memory 
MMF Memory-Malleable-Fragment 
UCP Unchanging-Clear-Photograph 
MID Memory-Individual-Differences 
MLU Memory-Limited-Unlimited 
EMO Earliest Memory Overestimation  
cMSS childhood Memory Self-Superiority 
cMAD childhood Memory-Accuracy-Detail 
WCA Witness-Confidence-Accuracy 
TDR Truthful-Deceptive-Responses 
PPB Positive-Presentation-Bias 
NPB Negative-Presentation-Bias 
 
The central findings from chapter four demonstrated that members of the public (at 
least those sampled in the questionnaire) hold a number of erroneous and 
inconsistent beliefs about the way in which memory works.  Following analysis of a 
survey that addressed various aspects of own and others’ memories, fourteen beliefs 
were identified, see Table 9.5.  Although all beliefs represent interesting inaccuracies 
in understanding (insofar as they do not correspond with current scientific research), 
the MAD, BIM and WCA beliefs are of particular interest.   
The Memory-Accuracy-Detail (MAD) belief states that amount of detail included in 
the description of a memory is positively associated with the believed accuracy of a 
memory such that a highly detailed account is seen as being highly accurate.  
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Although classic flashbulb memory literature (Brown & Kulik, 1977) originally stated 
that highly detailed memories represent a ‘special’ subset of accurately recalled 
memories, more recent research (Luminet & Curci, 2009) has opposed such a belief, 
showing that highly detailed memories are susceptible to the same distortions and 
errors as other more everyday memories.   
The Burnt-In-Memory (BIM) belief is also of particular interest, as it pertains to the 
erroneous belief that an emotional event will generate an accurate memory trace 
that is resistant to forgetting and distortion.  Although research does suggest that 
highly emotional events can give rise to highly accurate memories (Brown & Kulik, 
1977; Rubin & Friendly, 1986), it has also been shown that traumatic memories can 
be wholly inaccurate and error prone (Conway, et al., 2004; McNally, 2003).  Despite 
these differences in research findings, this belief may provide a useful tool for 
interpreting findings from other studies within this thesis.  In particular, the BIM 
belief helps to explain the elevated levels of ‘memory’-based answering by truth 
tellers after witnessing a more emotionally salient event.  Participants may have 
erroneously assumed that the memory originating from an emotional event was 
more likely to remain vivid and accurate and therefore reflect this belief in their 
answering patterns.  
The Witness-Confidence-Accuracy (WCA) belief represents the erroneous association 
between confidence and accuracy, such that the more confident an individual is in his 
or her answering, the more likely he or she is to be accurate in the information he or 
she is providing.  Although there has been much opposing research investigating the 
accuracy-confidence-correlation, the majority of findings have failed to find a reliable 
association between confidence and accuracy (Sporer et al., 1995).  However, the 
WCA belief helps in interpreting the finding from previous studies that revealed that 
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fabricated answers to specific questions are frequently claimed to be based upon 
‘memory’.  It may be that the WCA belief is informing such answer patterns, with 
participants who are fabricating claiming to remember all details clearly in order to 
appear more confident, and, in accordance with this belief, claim to ‘recall’ only 
accurate memories.    
Indeed, any number of the above beliefs may inform participants’ answer patterns 
when fabricating a memory or indeed when recalling an AM.  If individuals believe 
that memory works is specific ways, they are likely to generate, recall and judge 
memories based upon these beliefs.  Clearly, it is important that the public and 
particularly those involved in assessing memories are educated about the way in 
which scientific research has found memory to work.   
9.6 Implications for Identifying Fabricated Memories 
This body of work is the first to investigate both completely fabricated and partially 
memories.  It is also the first body of work to systematically examine implications for 
attempting to detect memories of everyday events and memories of more 
emotionally salient events.  Previous work investigating IFAMs has only tended to 
explore entirely IFAMs, ignoring the fact that often, as Sapir (1987), Vrij (2005) and 
results from this body of work suggest, fabricated information is offered within an 
almost entirely truthful narrative.  Additionally, work that has investigated emotional 
or traumatic memories (Peace & Porter, 2011) has not tended to compare the 
efficacy of detection tools between emotive and everyday memories, therefore failing 
to suggest that differences may occur between memory types.   
Results from the present work have shown striking differences in the way in which 
entire, partial and emotive fabricated and indeed, AMs are reported.  Firstly, results 
have shown the entirely IFAMs of everyday events are associated with the most cues 
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enabling their distinction from AMs.  In particular, they can be differentiated through 
the language used to describe them, through the way in which answers to specific 
questions are formulated and given and through specific phenomenological ratings 
such as vividness and the perspective through which they are experienced.   
However, when a memory for an everyday event is partially fabricated i.e. a truthful 
event is recalled and subsequently edited, distinction from AMs becomes increasingly 
difficult.  Many of the cues that were unique to a completely fabricated account are 
lost since the partial memory account is essentially truthful.  When attempting to 
detect these sorts of memory, the most fruitful cues to investigate are the types of 
answers given to specific questions.  When fabricating, participants were more likely 
to claim that their answers were the product of ‘memory’, and were less likely to 
admit a lack of memory or to guess answers.  Additionally, truthful recallers may 
demonstrate that they are ‘thinking’ or ‘remembering’ using words such as “think” 
and “consider” in order to present themselves as careful, thorough rememberers.   
Finally, it was found that when a partial lie of a more emotional / surprising event is 
recalled, cues for detection (or at least the cues investigated in the present work) are 
almost non-existent (again, assuming that the emotionality of the event was 
responsible for the change in the ways in which the memories were reported).  This is 
possible due to a change in answering patterns from truthful recallers.  Whereas 
previously, answer type had proven to be a useful tool for distinguishing AMs and 
IFAMs, when recalling an AM of a more salient event, participants increased their use 
of memory-based answers, thus rendering this method of differentiation ineffectual.  
This change in answer pattern is likely due to erroneously held beliefs about the way 
in which emotional events are encoded and recalled, causing truthful recallers to 
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incorporate more memory-based answers into their accounts and, in turn, causing a 
non-reliable difference between answer type categories.   
Therefore, this work is the first to demonstrate that fabricating or indeed lying is not 
a single-faceted phenomenon.  An IFAM can be an entirely fictitious story or can be 
an edition of the truth and this difference has been shown to dramatically alter the 
cues available for detection.  Additionally, the event upon which the fabrication is 
based also needs to be considered, since, as has been demonstrated here, 
remembered emotional events seem to alter the topography of the memory account, 
rendering its detection using cues employed in the present work, essentially 
impossible.  Over the course of five experimental studies investigating AMs and 
IFAMs, cues that have been reliable indicators of one memory type in one study have 
failed to be replicated in another, with some cues in some cases pertaining to AMs, in 
others to IFAMs.  These huge variations in reliable indicators come before more 
ecological factors are taken into account such as the motivation the individual has to 
lie, motivation not to be caught, appraisal of the lie and necessity (or believed 
necessity) of the lie.  For example, an individual highly motivated not conceal 
information may act and speak very differently to an individual who was not as highly 
motivated.  Further, a very nervous individual may act and speak in a very different 
way to an individual seasoned at lying.  Indeed, as Vrij (2008) notes, those lies that 
are appraised as being necessary or unimportant may not yield any emotionality and 
hence may not provide as many cues to detection as those lies that are appraised 
differently.   
This work then, rather than revealing more potential cues for distinguishing truthful 
from fabricated memories, has shown the potential variability of such ‘reliable’ cues.  
Essentially, this work suggests that development of a ‘checklist’ of cues that can 
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reliably distinguish truthful from fabricated memories may be a fruitless task – the 
variability of cues, the individual differences and the differences of lie type itself 
seems to add an endless number of variables, each of which may affect cues in 
different ways.   
9.7 Implications for Interviewing 
Although this body of work has not explicitly investigated police interviewing 
procedures, the results gained can provide some interesting insights for the 
interviewing process.  A central finding from this work highlights problems with 
truthful witnesses and is related to the types of answers participants gave to specific 
questions when being asked about a previously experienced event.  The present work 
categorised each answer given with regards to its source (i.e. memory-based, 
inference etc.).  Without these explicit source attributions, all answers provided by 
interviewees are presumed to be memory-based and are subsequently taken forward 
and incorporated into the memory account.  As can be clearly seen from the results 
from this thesis, many answers provided are in fact products of guesses and 
inferences.  These non-memory-based answers can be considered ‘non-malicious 
fabrications’, generated to fulfil answers to questions posed at interview.   
To reduce the inclusion of such answers, interviewees must be explicitly reminded 
not to guess or infer when answering.  Additionally each answer provided by a 
witness should be clarified as to its source to further reduce the inclusion of such 
answer types.  Removing non-memory based answers reveals an account that is a 
produce of memory alone.  Although memory is often incorrect and distorted, results 
from this body of work showed that removing all non-memory answers and leaving 
an account based solely on memory, saw a reliable increase in overall accuracy of the 
account.   
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Further, results from chapters seven and eight show that AMs and IFAMs are equally 
consistent over time (at least the short time frame sampled in the studies) such that 
information provided at time one was likely to be present and be the same (or at 
least similar) to information provided in time two.  This finding is in direct opposition 
to much previous work (Peace & Porter, 2011; Walczyk et al., 2009) which states that 
fabricated information is reliably less consistent over time than truthful information.  
More work clearly needs to be conducted to investigate what effects substantial time 
delays could have on truthful and fabricated memory recall.  Results showed that 
some participants were using a technique of recalling what was said in a previous 
interview rather than recalling the original AM or IFAM.  Efforts should be made at 
interview one to elicit accurate and complete information as it seems that often, 
what is provided at this point informs much of the subsequent given information.  
Additionally, it may be necessary to phrase questions at time two differently or ask 
questions in an alternate order to prevent interviewees from simply recalling their 
answers from time one rather than accessing their memory.  Alternating question 
structure may also be effortful for those providing fabricated information and may 
prevent them from also relying on memory of previously given answers.  
9.8 Implications for Legal Settings 
Results regarding beliefs about memory have particular implications for legal settings 
such as the courtroom.  The finding that members of the public (at least those 
sampled in the questionnaire) hold many inconsistent and incorrect beliefs about the 
nature of human memory is problematic, particularly when jury members are urged 
to evaluate memory-based evidence using their common sense judgements (c.f. court 
of appeal cases).  For example, the Memory-Accuracy-Detail (MAD) belief states that 
the more details are included in a memory account, the more likely it is to be rated as 
accurate.  A jury could then be easily duped by an individual providing a fictitious 
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account simply through the inclusion of detail.  Indeed, this process has been 
described by Bell & Loftus (1989) as ‘trivial persuasion’.   
Additionally, beliefs such as the Earliest-Memory-Overestimation (EMO) posit that 
memories can be formed in the preverbal period, despite prevailing research 
suggesting that memories are not formed until around the age of three.  Such a belief 
has huge implications for the witness who is able to ‘recall’ a memory from under 
such an age.  The belief also has implications for false memory syndrome whereby 
individuals claim to be able to recall memories from very young ages, as according to 
this belief, the existence of such memories would be accepted.  Understanding such 
facets of memory may help reduce the formation of such false memories, or at least 
equip individuals with the knowledge and ability to question their veracity of their 
own and others’ memory.   
Strikingly, but not unsurprisingly, results also showed that approximately 90% of the 
public would be more likely to form both positive and negative judgements about a 
defendant in court based upon external characteristics such as dress, ethnicity and 
perceived class.  Such results suggest that anonymity should be exercised in a 
courtroom setting, preventing the jury from seeing a defendant and, in turn, reducing 
the number of prior judgements made, both negative and positive.   
Additionally, results regarding perception of lies highlighted that often individuals use 
cues to detect deception (at least in the lies they reported in the questionnaire) that 
have not been supported by scientific research or that have received little support.  
As noted previously, individuals also believe themselves to be comprehensive lie 
detectors, despite research showing that lay people perform no better than chance at 
detecting false information (Vrij, 2000).  Therefore, the use of invalid cues to 
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deception coupled with an elevated belief of detection ability may lead to confident 
but incorrect evaluations of information. 
Couple unfounded character judgements with erroneous beliefs about memory and 
the use of invalid indicators of deception, and the likelihood of a just and accurate 
appraisal of an individual’s memory is significantly compromised.  Clearly, those 
judging memory accounts need informing of current scientific research, allowing 
them to make more informed and accurate decisions about the veracity of memory 
reports. 
9.9 Future Directions 
Although results from the present body of work have yielded some important results 
and implications regarding the generation, reporting and detection of truthful and 
IFAMs, a number of avenues for further investigation have inevitably been opened.   
Future work needs to investigate different types of fabricated information; it needs to 
consider that often, fabricated information is generated by simply editing episodic 
details from an AM.  Current assessment tools are simply not suitable for assessing 
such memory types as they are designed only for detecting entire IFAMs.  New 
assessment techniques such as the one outlined in this thesis need to be replicated 
and extended and must take into account the different ways in which fabricated 
information can be generated.  Further, future research must also consider the type 
of event that is recalled.  As shown here, more salient events in fact altered the way 
in which truthful narratives were recalled.  More work needs to be completed to 
assess the differences and indeed similarities between truthful and IFAMs of 
emotional events.  Work also needs to investigate the effects of time period between 
recall of both truthful and fabricated accounts.  Findings from this study have been in 
opposition to previous findings regarding consistency, and this area of research could 
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benefit from clarification, especially considering that in applied situations, 
interviewees may have to recall their memories over multiple interviews and over 
long time periods. 
Future work may also further findings from the memory questionnaire reported in 
chapter four.  It is important to understand whether the beliefs held by the sample 
are universal and therefore whether the beliefs can be said to be influencing how 
memories (both truthful and fabricated) are reported.  It would also be beneficial to 
understand how, or if, these beliefs differ across different populations – a particularly 
interesting line of inquiry may be beliefs children hold about memory – and different 
socio-economic groups.  
9.10 Conclusions 
This work has defined processes involved with IFAM generation, demonstrating for 
the first time that truthful autobiographical memory is often involved in the 
generation process.  It has also attempted to define this process, showing that AMs 
are often consciously edited to generate IFAMs.  It has shown how this process is 
effortful and how this difference in effort creates measurable linguistic and 
phenomenological differences in memory accounts.  Further, this work has 
investigated both entire and partial fabrications, demonstrating how differently each 
type of IFAM is reported.  It has also shown how more salient events affect recall and 
in turn make distinction between AMs and IFAMs almost impossible.  Finally, this 
work has highlighted a number of erroneously held beliefs about memory and about 
lying, both of which are likely to have considerable consequences for the evaluation 
of memory reports.   
In sum, this work represents a new investigation into IFAMs, furthering, extending but 
also critically assessing the existing literature and research.  It is hoped that the 
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conclusions drawn from this body of work will lay the foundations for further work 
investigating truthful and fabricated memories.   
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Appendix I. Cues Used in Chapter two 
 
Typed Condition (twenty cues) 
1. Going to a restaurant 
2. Attending a lecture 
3. Getting up in the morning 
4. Grocery shopping 
5. Visiting a doctor 
6. Going to see a film at the cinema 
7. Playing sport 
8. Going to a party 
9. Making a hot drink 
10. Cleaning the house 
11. Going to the bank 
12. Making a meal 
13. Doing an exam 
14. Getting a train 
15. Going on holiday 
16. Visiting a museum 
17. Going to the hairdressers 
18. Going to a nightclub 
19. Taking a drive 
20. Getting a bus 
 
Spoken Condition (ten cues) 
1. Going to a restaurant 
2. Attending a lecture 
3. Getting up in the morning 
4. Going to see a film at the cinema 
5. Going to a party 
6. Going to the bank 
7. Making a meal 
8. Getting a train 
9. Going on holiday 
10. Going to a nightclub 
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Appendix II. Results from cue suitability survey, discussed in chapter two 
 
Table I. Percentages of ease of ability to recall and imagine for each cue 
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RECALL 
                    
Easy 92 81 72 70 81 84 50 84 58 63 69 87 74 82 82 42 75 83 67 69 
Neither 5 10 11 20 10 10 23 9 11 20 16 10 14 10 10 20 10 10 14 12 
Difficult 3 10 16 10 9 6 27 7 31 17 15 3 12 7 8 37 15 7 20 18 
                     
IMAGINE 
                    
Easy 98 88 86 81 65 89 66 83 83 72 79 89 73 85 81 47 71 87 73 78 
Neither 1 4 6 13 24 8 25 14 13 20 15 8 12 10 12 23 18 6 14 12 
Difficult 1 8 8 6 11 3 10 3 4 8 5 3 15 6 6 30 11 6 13 10 
                     
Total ‘easy’ recall/ 
imagine % 
190* 169* 158* 151 146 173* 116 167* 141 135 148* 176* 147 167* 163* 89 146 170* 140 147 
 
* cue received top ten highest score of ‘ease of recall and imagine’, selected for use in spoken study . 
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Appendix III. Sixteen cues selected for use in chapter three 
 
1. Going to a restaurant 
2. Attending a lecture 
3. Getting up in the morning 
4. Grocery shopping 
5. Visiting a doctor 
6. Going to see a film at the cinema 
7. Going to a party 
8. Going to the bank 
9. Making a meal 
10. Doing an exam 
11. Getting a train 
12. Going on holiday 
13. Going to the hairdressers 
14. Going to a nightclub 
15. Taking a drive 
16. Getting a bus 
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Appendix IV. Questions and statements included in 
questionnaire from chapter four 
Question/Statement 
1. How accurate do you believe your own personal memories of your everyday life to 
be? (how well does what you remember represent what actually occurred) 
2. In general, how accurate do you believe other people's memories of their own 
everyday  lives to be? 
3. How detailed are your memories for everyday events? (do you remember a lot of 
details about the place you where, who you were with or do you just remember the 
"gist" of what happened) 
4. In your view, how detailed are other people's memories for everyday events? 
5. Do you believe your memories of emotional events (e.g., weddings, funerals, tragic 
events such as 9/11) are more or less accurate than memories for everyday events? 
6. Do you believe other people's memories of emotional events (e.g., weddings, funerals, 
tragic events such as 9/11) are more or less accurate than their memories for everyday 
events? 
7. Bring to mind the first memory you have. What age are you in this first memory? 
8. How accurate do you believe your first memory to be? 
9. How detailed is your first memory? 
10. In your view, what is the earliest age someone can have a memory from? 
11. In your view, how accurate would someone's earliest memory be? 
12. In your view, how detailed would someone's earliest memory be? 
13. The more vivid a memory is, the more accurate it is 
14. The more detailed a memory is, the more accurate it is 
15. A memory stays the same over time, regardless of whether our opinions or attitudes 
changes over time. 
16. A memory is like a snapshot of what we witness or experience - it is clear and accurate. 
17. Some people have better memories for their personal life events than others. 
18. If two people witness the same event, their memories will be almost exactly the same. 
19. There is a limit to how much we can remember about our lives. 
20. The more vivid a memory from childhood is, the more accurate it is 
21. The more detailed a memory from childhood is, the more accurate it is 
22. A witness describes their memory of a crime in a court room and is asked how 
confident they are that their memory is accurate. The witness is extremely confident 
that their memory is accurate. Please indicate how much you agree with the following 
statement: The more confident someone is that their memory is accurate, the more 
accurate the memory probably is 
23. An individual is being interviewed about a very negative childhood event in court. They 
can remember many minor details from the event. This person is likely to be being 
truthful about what they can remember. 
24. A witness is being interviewed in court about their memory for a crime. They say "I 
don't know" to a number of questions. Are they more likely to be a truthful or 
deceptive witness 
25. A witness is being interviewed in court and answers every question posed to them. Are 
they likely to be a truthful or a deceptive witness? 
26. If you were a juror and a witness came into court to give evidence, before you heard 
anything they had to say, are there any attributes that would make you more likely to 
trust their evidence?  
27. If you were a juror and a witness came into court to give evidence, before you heard 
anything they had to say, are there any attributes that would make you more likely to 
distrust their evidence? 
Note: unless otherwise stated responses options were a 7-point Likert scale e.g. a) completely inaccurate 
b) very inaccurate c) slightly inaccurate d) neither accurate nor inaccurate e) slightly accurate f) very 
accurate g) completely accurate.  The measure was changed to reflect the content of each question. 
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Appendix V. Questions included in questionnaire for chapter 
five 
Question/Statement Response Categories  
Section 1: A lie you told  
Was the lie an entire fabrication or 
based on real-life events?* 
Entire fabrication, based on real life 
events 
Was your lie challenged? If so, how did 
you respond to these challenges? 
Continued to lie, challenged the 
challenged, changed the 
conversation, admit the truth, not 
challenged 
What emotions did you feel when you 
were lying? 
Nervous, guilty, upset, excited, scared, 
relief, nothing 
Did you notice any physiological (bodily) 
changes when you were lying? If so, 
what were these? 
Sweating/blushing, increased heart rate, 
fidgeting/shaking, feeling 
sick/uneasy, no changes 
Did you feel that any aspect of your 
behaviour was giving the lie away? If 
so, what behaviour? 
 
Facial expression, lack of eye contact, 
what was said or how it was said, 
acting different, looing nervous, no  
Did you feel that any aspect of your 
language was giving your lie away? If 
so, which aspects of your language? 
Vagueness, stuttering, taking too fast or 
too much, avoiding answering, 
change in tone, no 
How confident were you that you were 
being believed when you were lying? 
100% confident, very confident, quite 
confident, 50/50, quite unconfident, 
very unconfident, 100% unconfident 
How did you feel immediately after you 
had finished lying? 
Guilty, relieved, nervous, fine/normal, 
excited/good  
Question/Statement Response Categories  
Section 2: A lie told to you  
Did you know that the information you 
were being told was false or did you 
presume it was?* 
Presumed it was false, knew it was false 
If you presumed that the information 
you were being told was false, why 
did you think this? 
Behavioural cues, linguistic cues, 
contradictory information from 
another source, person known to be 
unreliable 
Did you challenge the lie? If so, what did 
you do? 
Yes – direct accusation, Yes – indirect 
accusation, no challenge 
Did you notice any changes in the 
behaviour of the individual as they 
were lying to you? If so, what 
behaviour changed? 
Facial expression, lack of eye contact, 
what was said or how it was said, 
acting different, looing nervous, no 
Did you notice any changes in the 
language of the individual as they 
were lying to you? If so, what 
changed? 
Emphasis on certain words, stuttering, 
taking too fast or too much, avoiding 
answering, change in tone, no 
* dichotomous response category 
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Appendix VI. Deleted questions from deception questionnaire in 
chapter five 
 
Section 1: A lie you told 
What was the lie? 
Who did you lie to? 
How did you communicate the lie? 
 
Section 2: A lie told to you 
Who lied to you? 
What was the lie? 
How was the lie communicated to you? 
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Appendix VII. The War of the Ghosts 
 
One night two young men from Egulac went down to the river to hunt seals, and 
while they were there it became foggy and calm. Then they heard war-cries, and they 
thought: "Maybe this is a war-party". They escaped to the shore, and hid behind a 
log. Now canoes came up, and they heard the noise of paddles, and saw one canoe 
coming up to them. There were five men in the canoe, and they said: 
"What do you think? We wish to take you along. We are going up the river to make 
war on the people". 
One of the young men said: "I have no arrows". 
"Arrows are in the canoe", they said. 
"I will not go along. I might be killed. My relatives do not know where I have gone. But 
you", he said, turning to the other, "may go with them." 
So one of the young men went, but the other returned home. 
And the warriors went on up the river to a town on the other side of Kalama. The 
people came down to the water, and they began to fight, and many were killed. But 
presently the young man heard one of the warriors say: "Quick, let us go home that 
Indian has been hit". Now he thought: "Oh, they are ghosts". He did not feel sick, but 
they said he had been shot. 
So the canoes went back to Egulac, and the young man went ashore to his house, and 
made a fire. And he told everybody and said: " Behold I accompanied the ghosts, and 
we went to fight. Many of our fellows were killed, and many of those who attacked us 
were killed. They said I was hit, and I did not feel sick". 
He told it all, and then he became quiet. When the sun rose he fell down. Something 
black came out of his mouth. His face became contorted. The people jumped up and 
cried. 
He was dead. 
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Appendix VIII. Burglar / Buyer Transcript 
 
The two boys ran until they came into the drive. 
“No one is ever in one Wednesdays, it’s a great time to skip school”, said Andrew.  
Tall conifers hid the house from the road and the pair walked across the large front 
gardens. 
“I didn’t know your house was so large,” said Matthew. 
“Thanks.  It’s much better now though because Mum and Dad had the gardens 
landscaped and added a new kitchen” said Andrew. 
There was a large wooden front door, and a smaller side door.  The boys ran around 
to the side door.  It lead to a garage that could easily hold two cars but currently only 
contained two mountain bikes and a vast array of interesting but unusual tools.  They 
continued through the garage.  It lead into a large modern kitchen.  Andrew told 
Matthew that this side door was always left open in case him or his sister had 
forgotten their keys and returned home before their parents. 
“Can you give me a tour?” asked Matthew.  Andrew agreed, first showing the newly 
pained and decorated front room, it was modern but contained many antiques.  
Matthew thought they must be old and expensive.  Andrew turned on the large 
stereo and bragged how he could play it loudly as the nearest house was quite far 
away.  Matthew suddenly realised that the house was not overlooked at all, in fact he 
couldn’t even see the nearest neighbour. 
The boys walked quickly through the enormous dining room, the table was laid with 
beautiful crockery and cutlery, Matthew was surprised at the grandeur.  Andrew 
decided not to show Matthew the cellar.  Not only did it spook him but it was rather 
musty and damp after a flood the previous year.   
The boys ran upstairs and peered into Andrew’s mother’s study.  The walls were lined 
with old books and a number of paintings, some of which Matthew recognised, were 
hung on the walls.  “Some of those are originals, you know,” said Andrew.   
The pair continued onto the bedrooms.  They entered Andrew’s parents’ bedroom, 
where he showed Matthew the safe in which his parents kept money.  “My Dad 
doesn’t like using banks”, said Andrew.  Matthew couldn’t help but notice the 
dressing table.  It was laden with jewels and gold; it glittered as the sun shone in 
through the large bay window.   
There were another four bedrooms upstairs but Andrew only went in his own room.  
Matthew was excited by the three computer consoles and the huge number of 
computer games his friend owned.  He was quite surprised at the décor upstairs 
though, it was much more dated than downstairs, and was quite in need of updating 
– a big job, thought Matthew.   
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Appendix IX. Participant instructions given in chapter six 
 
Truthful Condition 
Welcome to the second half of the experiment.  In this session you will be 
interviewed about the activities in which you took part during the first testing session 
a number of days ago.  We would like you to imagine yourself as a witness to these 
events and to act as a real witness would.   
The first half of the interview will be a free recall session where you can provide an 
account of what you did during the test session.  The second half of the interview will 
consist of direct questions about specific details of the session. 
You will be interviewed by a researcher who knows only that you took part in two 
psychology tests.   
Please bear in mind the following guidelines when taking part in the interview: 
 You should recall as much information about the first testing session as 
possible.   
 Please be as accurate as possible in your recall.  However, it is important that 
you do not guess any details of which you are unsure or cannot remember 
clearly.   
 It is acceptable to say that you do not know or that you cannot remember. 
 
Fabricated Condition 
Welcome to the second half of the experiment.  In this session you will be 
interviewed about the activities in which you took part during the first testing session 
a number of days ago.  We would like you to imagine yourself as a witness to these 
events and to act as a real witness would.   
The first half of the interview will be a free recall session where you can provide an 
account of what you did during the test session.  The second half of the interview will 
consist of direct questions about specific details of the session.  Please note that you 
are permitted to say you do not know if you cannot think of an answer. 
You will be interviewed by a researcher who knows only that you took part in two 
psychology tests.   
However, we would like you to provide a plausible but incorrect account of 
what you did, where you were and what the room was like.  Your job is to 
convince the interviewer that your fabricated story is in fact true.   
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Appendix X. Interview script used in chapter six 
 
Welcome to the interview.  Please take a seat.  I am going to ask you a number of 
questions about what you did in the test session a few days ago.  
1. Please begin by telling me about everything that you did in the test session. 
2. Thank you.  Do you wish to add anything else? 
 
I am now going to ask you a number of specific questions about the test session. 
 
1. Where was the test session? 
2. When was the test session? 
3. What you were wearing during the test session? 
4. What was the weather like during the test session? 
5. What time of day did you take part in the test session? 
6. How long did the test session last? 
7. How many researchers were in the room? 
8. What was researcher(s) wearing? 
9. What gender was researcher(s)? 
10. How tall was researcher(s)? 
11. What colour hair did researcher(s) have? 
12. What length hair did researcher(s) have? 
13. What colour eyes did researcher(s) have? 
14. What age was researcher(s)? 
15. Was the researcher(s) left or right handed? 
16. Was the researcher(s) wearing any jewellery? 
17. What ethnicity was the researcher(s)? 
18. I was told that you were tested with a group of people 
19. How many? 
20. What were their genders? 
21. What were their ages? 
22. What were they wearing? 
 
23. Please can you now draw me the room in which you were during the test 
session?  Please indicate where you sat and any surroundings you noted 
whilst you were there.  
 
Thank you for taking part, you have answered all the questions.  
XI 
 
Appendix XI. Participant instructions used in chapter seven 
 
Truthful Condition 
In the next two sessions you will be interviewed about the events that took place in 
today’s test session.  We would like you to imagine yourself as a witness to these 
events and to act as a real witness would. 
The first half of the interview will be a free recall session where you can provide an 
account of what you did during the test session.  The second half of the interview will 
consist of direct questions about specific details of the session. 
You will be interviewed by a researcher who knows only that you took part in two 
psychology tests.   
Please bear in mind the following guidelines when taking part in the interview: 
You should recall as much information about this first testing session as possible.   
Please be as accurate as possible in your recall.  However, it is important that you do 
not guess any details of which you are unsure or cannot remember clearly.   
It is acceptable to say you cannot remember. 
 
Fabricated Condition 
In the next two sessions you will be interviewed about the events that took place in 
today’s test session.  The interviewer will know that you were in a test session but will 
only know that you took part in psychological testing.  Therefore, your job is to give a 
plausible incorrect account of what you did. 
HOWEVER: We would like you to ONLY give deliberately incorrect information about 
the following: 
 All aspects of the researcher (the researcher was the person who ran the first 
session) 
 
Please note that you are permitted to say you do not know if you cannot think of or 
recall an answer. 
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Appendix XII. Word lists used for part one of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) test 
 
List 1 
Table 
Sit 
Legs 
Seat 
Desk 
Recliner 
Cushion 
Swivel 
Stool 
Sitting 
Rocking 
Bench 
 
List 2 
Hill 
Valley 
Climb 
Summit 
Top 
Molehill 
Peak 
Glacier 
Bike 
Climber 
Range 
Steep 
 
List 3 
Thread 
Pin 
Eye 
Sewing 
Sharp 
Point 
Prick 
Haystack 
Hurt 
Injection 
Syringe 
Knitting 
 
  
List 4 
Smooth 
Bumpy 
Road 
Sandpaper 
Jagged 
Ready  
Course 
Uneven 
Rugged 
Sand 
Ground 
Gravel 
 
List 5 
Bed 
Rest 
Awake 
Tired 
Dream 
Wake 
Snooze 
Doze 
Slumber 
Snore 
Nap 
Yawn 
 
List 6 
Sour 
Candy 
Sugar 
Bitter 
Taste 
Tooth 
Honey 
Soda 
Chocolate 
Heart 
Cake  
Pie 
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Appendix XIII. Words list used in part two of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) test 
Critical lures (those closely related to, but not presented in previous lists) are underlined.   
 
List 1 
Table 
Sofa 
Butterfly 
Wood 
Bench 
Candle 
Chair 
 
List 2 
Anchor 
Hill 
Plane 
Steep 
Goat 
Hand 
Mountain 
 
List 3 
Coffee 
Bear 
Thread 
Yoga 
Knitting 
Juice 
Needle 
 
  
List 4 
Lamp 
Gravel 
Key 
Tough 
Science 
Smooth 
Rough 
 
List 5 
Bed 
Blanket 
Hole 
Peace 
Health 
Yawn 
Sleep 
 
List 6 
Nice  
Sour 
Good  
Tail 
Pie 
Staple 
Sleep 
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Appendix  XIV. Participant reminder instructions used in 
chapter seven 
Truthful Condition 
In this and the next session you will be interviewed about the events that took place 
in the first test session.  We would like you to imagine yourself as a witness to these 
events and to act as a real witness would. 
The first half of the interview will be a free recall session where you can provide an 
account of what you did during the test session.  The second half of the interview will 
consist of direct questions about specific details of the session. 
You will be interviewed by a researcher who knows only that you took part in two 
psychology tests.   
Please bear in mind the following guidelines when taking part in the interview: 
 You should recall as much information about this first testing session as 
possible.   
 Please be as accurate as possible in your recall.  However, it is important that 
you do not guess any details of which you are unsure or cannot remember 
clearly.   
 It is acceptable to say you cannot remember. 
 
 
Fabricated Condition 
In this and the next session you will be interviewed about the events that took place 
in the first test session.  The interviewer knows that you were in a test session but 
only knows that you took part in psychological testing.  Therefore, your job is to give a 
plausible incorrect account of what you did. 
HOWEVER: We would like you to ONLY give deliberately incorrect information about 
the following: 
 All aspects of the researcher (the researcher was the person who ran the first 
session) 
Please note that you are permitted to say you do not know if you cannot think of or 
recall an answer. 
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Appendix XV. Interview script used in chapter seven 
 
Welcome to the interview.  Please take a seat.  I’m going to ask you a number of 
questions about what you did in the test session a few days ago.  
 
1. Please begin by telling me everything about what you did in the test session. 
2. Thank you. Do you wish to add anything else? 
 
I’m going to ask you a number of specific questions about the test session. 
1. Where was the test session? 
2. When was the test session? 
3. What you were wearing during the test session? 
4. What was the weather like during the test session? 
5. What time of day did you take part in the test session? 
6. How long did the test session last? 
7. How many researchers were in the room? 
 
Experimental Subset 
a. What was researcher(s) wearing? 
b. What gender was researcher(s)? 
c. How tall was researcher(s)? 
d. What colour hair did researcher(s) have? 
e. What length hair did researcher(s) have? 
f. What colour eyes did researcher(s) have? 
g. What age was researcher(s)? 
h. Was the researcher(s) left or right handed? 
i. Was the researcher(s) wearing any jewellery? 
j. What ethnicity was the researcher(s)? 
 
8. Were there any other people in the room? 
9. How many? 
10. What were their genders? 
11. What were their ages? 
12. What were they wearing? 
 
13. Please can you now draw me the room in which you were during the test 
session?  Please draw where you sat and any surroundings you noted whilst 
you were there.  
 
Thank you for taking part, you have answered all the questions.  
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Appendix XVI. Initial survey used in chapter eight 
 
 
A woman entered the room during your test session. The following questions will be 
regarding this woman and her purpose for being in the room 
Control Subset 
1. What was the individual’s hair colour?    
2. What was she wearing?  
Experimental Subset 
3. What did she require the use of the room for?  
4. When did she need the room?  
5. Why did the women think she was booked to be using the room? 
The following questions will be regarding the conversation that entailed between 
your researcher and the woman 
6. How much longer did your researcher say she required the room for? 
7. How did the woman refer to the researcher’s behaviour - did she use any 
specific words?  
8. Who did your researcher claim had given her permission to use the room?  
9. How long did your researcher claim she thought the room was free for?  
10. Did either woman apologise to each other?  
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Appendix XVII. Questionnaire used in sessions two and three in 
chapter eight 
 
You will now be required to answer a series of questions about the study you took 
part in last week. If you are unsure on an answer to a question please answer ‘Don’t 
know’. Do not guess. Please do not refer to any diaries or discuss the answers with 
anyone.  
Control Subset 
1. What time did the session last week take place? 
2. What date did the session take place? 
The following questions are regarding the researcher (this is the individual who took 
you for your memory test in session one). 
3. What hair colour did the researcher have? 
4. What eye colour 
5. How tall was the researcher? 
6. What was the researcher wearing? 
A woman entered the room during your test session. The following questions will be 
regarding this woman and her purpose for being in the room 
7. What was the individual’s hair colour?    
8. What was she wearing?  
Experimental Subset 
 
9. Why did she require the use of the room? 
10. When did she need the room? 
11. Why did the woman think she was booked to be using the room? 
The following questions will be regarding the conversation that entailed between 
your researcher and the woman 
12. How much longer did your researcher say she required the room for? 
13. How did the woman refer to the researcher’s behaviour - did she use any 
specific words? 
14. Who had given your researcher claimed gave her permission to use the 
room? 
15. How long did your researcher claim she thought the room was free for? 
16. Did either woman apologise to each other? 
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Appendix XVIII. Condition assignment information – truthful 
condition 
 
 
You are participant number: ****.  Please use this unique number in all fu sessions 
and correspondence with the researcher. 
In today’s session you witnessed a staged event in which a disagreement took place 
regarding a room booking - the individuals involved in the event were acting.  
You will shortly be asked to answer a short questionnaire in which you will be asked 
today’s session.  
In the questionnaire you are completing today, and the subsequent two online 
questionnaires, you will be asked about the events that took place today.  You are 
required to be as accurate and truthful as possible when answering the questions.  
Please ensure that you do not guess answers.  You may answer with don’t know or 
cannot remember. 
In the next two sessions, you are required to complete online questionnaires in which 
you will be asked questions regarding the session today and the staged event that 
occurred.  
Session two will take place in approximately one week’s time.  You must complete the 
study on one of the following three days: *xx/xx/xxxx*.  Session two will occur a 
further two weeks after this, on one of the three following days: * xx/xx/xxxx *.  An 
email reminder will be sent to you the day before the first date of each session to 
remind you. 
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Appendix XIX. Condition assignment information – continual-
fabricate and fabricate-subsequent-truth condition 
 
You are participant number: ****.  Please use this unique number in all future 
sessions and correspondence with the researcher. 
In today’s session you witnessed a staged event in which a disagreement took place 
regarding a room booking - the individuals involved in the event were acting.  
You will shortly be asked to answer a short questionnaire in which you will be asked 
today’s session.  
In the questionnaire you are completing today, and the subsequent two online 
questionnaires, you are required to lie about the details regarding today’s test 
session.  In particular, we would like you to give deliberately fabricated information 
about the individual who interrupted your session and the argument that ensued. 
In the next two sessions you are required to complete online questionnaires in which 
you will be asked questions regarding the session today and the staged event that 
occurred.  
Session two will take place in approximately one week’s time.  You must complete the 
study on one of the following three days: *xx/xx/xxxx*.  Session two will occur a 
further two weeks after this, on one of the three following days: *xx/xx/xxxx*.  An 
email reminder will be sent to you the day before the first date of each session to 
remind you. 
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Appendix XX. Altercation transcripts used in chapter eight 
 
Session 1 
11am 18th Nov 
L: Hi how come you’re here I’m supposed to be teaching here today 
R: I’m just doing one of my tests I’ll only be about 10 minutes 
L: Right have you not looked on the online booking system?  It’s a bit irresponsible. 
R: My supervisor Catriona said it would be free all day 
L: No this room is never free all day.  Make sure you look on the online booking 
system before you use the room next time, it’s very irresponsible. 
R: I’ll literally be as fast as I can, I’ll only be 10 minutes 
L: Ok we’ll I’ve got to do some photocopying anyway but I want this room free in 10 
minutes. 
R: Ok. 
 
Session 2 
23/11/2011 
12pm 
L: Hi what are you doing in this room I’m supposed to be teaching here in 10 minutes 
R: I’m just doing a study but literally be finished in like 10 minutes 
L: Right have you not looked at the online booking system it’s a bit irresponsible 
R: My supervisor Catriona said it was free all day this room 
L: No this room is never free all day.  Make sure you look on the online booking 
system before you come here next, it’s really irresponsible. 
R: Ok well we’ll literally just be 10 minutes I’ll be finished as fast as possible 
L: Ok well I’ve got to go and do some photocopying anyway but I’ll be back in 10 
minutes. 
R: Ok thank you. 
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Session 3 
12pm 24/11/2011 
L: Hi what are you doing in here I’m supposed to be teaching now 
R: I’m just doing a study I’ll literally be 10 minutes 
L: Have you not checked the online booking system, this is a bit irresponsible 
R: My supervisor Catriona said it would be free all day 
L: No this room is never free all day you need to check the online booking system next 
time, this is really irresponsible 
R: Ok well I’ll literally be as fast as I can I’ll be done in 10 minutes 
L: Ok well I’ve got to go and do some photocopying anyway so I’ll be back in 10 
minutes. 
R: Ok 
 
Session 4 
24/11/2011 
1pm 
L: Hi what are you doing in here I’m supposed to be teaching now 
R: I’m just doing a study I’ll literally be like 10 minutes 
L: Right have you not looked at the online booking system this is a bit irresponsible 
R: Erm my supervisor Catriona said that this room would be free all day 
L: No it’s never free all day you should check the online booking system before you 
use the room this is really irresponsible 
R: Ok well literally I’m just finishing I’ll be 10 minutes 
L: Right I’ve got to go and photocopy anyway so I’ll be back in 10 minutes 
R: Ok. 
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Session 5 
28/11/2011 
10am 
L: Hi how come you’re in here I’m supposed to be teaching in 10 minutes 
R: I’m just doing a study but I’ll literally be like 10 minutes 
L: Have you not checked the online booking system this is a bit irresponsible 
R: Well I asked my supervisor Catriona and she said that it would be free all day 
L: No this room is never free all day this is really irresponsible 
R: Ok well like we’re literally like 10 minutes then we’ll be finished 
L: Ok well I’ve got to go and do some photocopying anyway so I’ll be back here in 10 
minutes 
R: Ok 
 
Session 6 
28/11/2011 
1pm 
L: Hi how come you’re in here I’m supposed to be teaching here now 
R: I’m just I’m just in the middle of a study but we’ll be like 10 minutes  
L: Right have you not checked the online booking system, this is a bit irresponsible 
R: My supervisor Catriona say that this room would be free all day so I should just use 
it 
L: No this room is never free all day you should check the online booking system 
before you come in the room this is really irresponsible 
R: We’ll be as fast as we can it’ll be no more than 10 minutes 
L: right well I’ll go and do some photocopying but I’ll be back in 10 minutes 
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Session 7 
29/11/2011 
12pm 
L: Hi why are you in here I’m supposed to be teaching here now 
R: I’m just doing a study but I’ll just be 10 minutes 
L: Right have you not checked the online booking system, it’s a bit irresponsible 
R: Erm well my supervisor Catriona said that this room would be free all day 
L: No this room is never free all day you need to check the online booking system 
before using the room this is really irresponsible 
R: Ok well we’ll be as fast as we can literally like 10 minutes 
L: Ok well I’ve got to do some photocopying anyway so I’ll be back in 10 minutes 
 
 
Session 8 
02/12/2011 
11am 
L: Hi what are you doing in here I’m supposed to be teaching now 
R: Erm well I’m just doing a study but we’ll literally just be like 10 minutes 
L: Did you not check the online booking system this is a bit irresponsible 
R: No I didn’t but my supervisor Catriona said that this room would be free all day 
today 
L: No this room is never free all day you need to check the online booking system 
before you use these rooms this is really irresponsible 
R: Right we’ll literally be as fast as we can like 10 minutes 
L: Ok well I’ve got to do some photocopying anyway so I’ll be back in 10 minutes 
R: Right I’m really sorry 
 
 
 
